Shadowing-Übung: What Happened During the Iranian Revolution 1979? (Documentary) - Englisch Sprechen Lernen mit YouTube

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By the early 1970s, Iran is changing fast. Back in 1953, the United States helped the Iranian monarch – or Shah - Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, in a coup against a pro-parliamentary faction. From then on, the country becomes a key ally in American Cold War strategy.

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US aid, technical assistance, and weapons flow in, while the Shah tries to modernise Iranian society and develop relations with the West. Shah Pahlavi encourages other countries in the Middle East to do the same, although Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal warns him: “Your Majesty, I appreciate your advice. May I remind you, you are not the shah of France. You are not in the Élysée. You are in Iran. Your population is 90 percent Muslim. Please don’t forget that.” In 1963, Shah Pahlavi’s launches the so-called White Revolution, a land reform program including education, women's rights, and urbanisation. Oil sales fund the program, and they soar by 670% after Iran refuses to join the Arab oil embargo following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. By late 1975, literacy rates have doubled to 32%, forming a growing middle class of salaried workers and small-business-owning families.

Women can vote, and officials develop more secular forms of law.

But Iran is not a democracy. "But I think that we have just taken what is good for this country. And I even sometimes wonder if this multi-party system is good for those who have it elsewhere. But for us it seems that what we have done now, is the best because as I said, just go in the streets and question anybody, you will see the whole country has joined the movement." The Shah is a monarch positioning himself as a paternal figure. He centralizes power by appointing loyal, but usually indecisive, ministers and outlawing political parties.

In 1975 all adult men must join the Shah’s Rastakhiz Party, while Iran’s secret police – the SAVAK – suppress underground parties like the National Front and communist Tudeh.

While the White Revolution benefits secular urbanites, others resist it.

Rapid modernization brings inflation, corruption, income inequality, social tensions, and inefficiency. As rural workers move to cities for better pay, many discover they rarely benefitted from the Shah’s policies. One villager from Aliabad complains: “We have nothing in this country. We see that others are rich and have seven- or eight-story homes, and we live in tents. It takes us one or two months to get something done in government offices, and the other side had good connections and is able to ruin us.

If they attack us and fight us and we go to court, the court does nothing because they are in cahoots with them.” Officials reinvest much of Iran’s oil income back into industry or the military, but little of Iran’s 1972-74 oil boom goes to the countryside.

The Shah’s reforms split Iranian society into distinct groups, and as unemployment and corruption increase following a crash in oil prices in 1975, some begin to oppose his central rule. Leftist intellectuals, opposing royal absolutism and US interference, join the National Front or Tudeh, while more radical leftists join the Marxist-Leninist Fedayeen-e Khalq or the Islamic-Marxist Mujahedeen-e Khalq. Both militant organisations conduct small-scale attacks and assassinations.

Other Iranian intellectuals remain independent of major organisations, partly to avoid SAVAK’s attention. The most influential opponents are religious clerics. Many oppose the White Revolution’s secularism as well as corruption, foreign interference, and the Shah’s central power. As religious figures, they partly escape SAVAK’s repressions and combine political messages into sermons.

The most notable anti-Shah cleric is Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Since the early 1960s he has openly opposed the Shah, who exiles the Ayatollah to Iraq. Described as a "revolutionary traditionalist”, Khomeini claims democratic republican ideals within an Islamic context. These appeal to young rural men from traditional backgrounds who now have formal education and work in cities. “Those who are out in society more and go into Shiraz are for Khomeini. But the old men who haven’t studied and don’t go into the city much aren’t. There is a difference between those whose level of thinking is lower – who are illiterate and haven’t seen much of the situation – and those whose level of thinking is higher.” Khomeini also benefits from clerics historical role as leaders of popular resistance movements.

By early 1978, economic crisis and political agitation lead to protests. When security forces react and kill protesters, the funerals draw huge crowds.

The Shah seems genuinely surprised by events, which are spontaneous and contradict his self-perception as a beloved figure. The US is also surprised. They lack information about Iran or Khomeini, and considered the Shah’s position stable.

In August, riots erupt in major cities, coupled with attacks on symbols of modernisation and foreign influence. On August 19, Islamic extremists set fire to the Cinema Rex, killing up to 470 people. But many Iranians believe the hated SAVAK is responsible. Clashes between protesters and security forces multiply, especially at mosques and colleges. Student Mohammad Amini struggles with police at a Teacher’s College: “The police took up positions and attacked us. We fought them with our rocks. A violent struggle broke out, but we weren’t an equal match for them. We were forced to retreat. When we went back into the college yard, I noticed the dean was watching from his window and laughing. At that very moment, a student threw a rock at him. The window shattered.” The Shah orders the military not to use significant force, but the response is uneven. Some ministers encourage the Shah to make reforms, including legalising political opposition and adopting the Islamic calendar. Pahlavi also appoints new Prime Minister Jafar Sharif-Emami to oversee a government of reconciliation. But the reforms satisfy few opponents, and released political prisoners join and lead opposition groups.

On September 7, the Shah orders martial law, which bans public gatherings and imposes a curfew. The next day protesters, many of whom have likely not yet heard the martial law announcement, gather in Jaleh Square – where government troops fire on them. They kill 68 and wound 205, but some opposition sources claim up to 5,000 casualties. The event, known as Black Friday, causes confusion amongst the authorities, as both ministers and local commanders hesitate to apply martial law.

There is also fraternization between protesters and troops. Most troops are conscripts from rural areas and are receptive to opposition clerics’ religious messages of solidarity or threats to excommunicate soldiers. Most of the army stays loyal, but Chief of Staff General Abbas Gharabaghi is worried and addresses the troops: “At this critical point in our history I want to urge you to maintain discipline, unity, and obedience to command.

Be aware of ill-wishers and agitators who wish to split your ranks... It is important not to yield to emotional factors and continue to support the legitimate government.” Throughout late 1978 large protests run parallel with religious marches. Although some ministers advise banning them, the Shah allows them to avoid further enraging protesters. But it doesn’t work, and the entire Iranian free media and institutions like the Central Bank now favour the opposition.

The Shah tries to position himself as leader of a revolution against corrupt officials, while simultaneously announcing a new military cabinet in early November. Henry Precht, the US State Department’s Iran Country Director, notes the inconsistency: “The Shah was following a bifurcated policy. On the one hand the regime had shot a lot of people.

On the other hand, he tried to appeal to the population by appointing a new prime minister...

It was a confusing time if you were not an Iranian. Is he soft or is he hard? In fact, he was both, groping for a solution.” The US reaction is muted. Even before the revolution, President Jimmy Carter cooled relations with Iran due to human rights issues, but Iran is still a vital Cold War ally and receives large amounts of sophisticated weapons like F-14 aircraft. Although some US officials want Carter to support the Shah, some State Department figures advise reaching out to Khomeini’s entourage, especially Dr Ebrahim Yazdi – a naturalised US citizen. The inconsistent US response leads the Shah to conclude they are working with Khomeini against him, which isn’t true.

So the Shah and his government can’t get the unrest under control in 1978 – and things soon escalate in 1979.

In January, the Shah appoints Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar to create a new civilian government. Bakhtiar belongs to the banned National Front, so the Shah hopes the new government will calm the protests. Bakhtiar orders political prisoners released, relaxes censorship and martial law, and suggests disbanding SAVAK and negotiating with Khomeini.

Khomeini refuses, and Bakhtiar concludes the Shah’s presence is blocking any deal. He encourages the Shah to leave Iran, even as the military insists the monarch’s presence is the only thing maintaining the morale of the army. On January 16, though, the Shah leaves Iran for Morocco. He says it’s for health reasons, which is partly true as he does have leukemia, though this is not public knowledge yet. Henry Precht suggests the diagnosis plays a role: “In retrospect, we know now that he knew he was a sick man and what he wanted more than anything was to pass on to his son a viable monarchy. He wanted his son to inherit the throne. He was afraid if he slaughtered people in the streets and turned over to a teenager a situation he could not handle the dynasty would be swept aside.” When the Shah leaves, protests grow and soldiers defect en masse, up to 12,000 a day. The air force, with many educated technicians, is especially rebellious. Hundreds go on hunger strikes against the closing of Tehran airport, which blocks Khomeini’s return to Iran. As protesters clash with demoralised air force troops guarding the airport, Bakhtiar reopens it. On February 1, Khomeini returns to Tehran from Paris, where he had gone after being expelled from Iraq. About a million Iranians take to the streets to welcome him.

He quickly establishes the Provisional Revolutionary Government and takes over government ministries, including foreign affairs, finance, and justice. Bakhtiar attempts to incorporate Khomeini’s shadow cabinet into his own, but Khomeini doesn’t cooperate.

On February 11, loyal Imperial Guard troops clash with rebellious air force cadets at Doshan Tappeh airbase. Armed civilians join the cadets, and capture a machine gun factory. The air force refuses to bomb the facility, forcing a crisis of allegiance for commanders. Many now favour Khomeini and on February 11, the army declares neutrality. This seals the fate of the Shah’s government, as even loyal forces defect: “Once we were named the Imperial Guard; today we accept whatever name people will give us. We have ordered the surrender of all units under our command.” Bakhtiar resigns and flees, while Khomeini takes control and dismantles martial law. He is now the defacto leader of Iran.

So the Shah and his government have fallen, but Iran experiences revolutionary chaos in the following weeks – made worse by the 300,000 weapons in circulation after the collapse of the army.

Many groups of young men self-appoint Revolutionary Committees. Some take up police duties, including arresting supposed counter-revolutionaries. One armed group, the Party of God – or Hezbollahis – pledge themselves to Khomeini, but he exercises only limited control. His Provisional Government cannot prevent Revolutionary Courts summarily trying and executing 68 people, including military leaders. Tension also develops with the US. In February, protesters storm the US embassy resulting in a brief hostage crisis. Both sides quickly deescalate, but the development concerns the US, who initially hoped to normalise relations with the new regime. Many in the US are stunned at the Shah’s rapid collapse: “How could Iran, with its oil and strategic situation between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf, between Europe and the Middle East, fall under the sway of a holy man out of the mists of the thirteenth century? How could the shah, a monarch who commanded more tanks than the British Army, more helicopters than the United States First Cavalry in Vietnam, be pressured so neatly out of power?” The answer is partly the wide, inter-opposition support for Khomeini. To maintain this, he appoints moderate nationalist Mehdi Bazargan as Prime Minister of a new republic. In March, Khomeini orders a referendum on the question: “Should Iran be an Islamic Republic?” 98.2% answer ‘yes’.

Observers note issues with voting, including colour-coded ballots revealing voters’ choices, but the results are largely legitimate. Even many moderates favour an Islamic Republic and recognise the clerics’ role in organising revolution. However, Iranians disagree on how an Islamic Republic should function. Moderates worry about revolutionary committees imposing strict religious morality and deteriorating international relations. Iranian-American scholar Saïd Amir Arjomand concludes: “The coalition between the Shi’ite clerics and the Westernized bourgeoisie was unstable. It rested on fraudulent silence on the part of the former, and on wishful self-delusion on the part of the latter. It did not last long.” Khomeini uses the divisions and the threat posed by armed leftist groups to centralise authority.

Although his regime faces some opposition, including assassinations by guerilla groups, he maintains a stable traditionalist foundation, creates new parties and sides with radical elements to further marginalise moderates . He also sidelines Bazargan, who wants to improve relations with the US. Events escalate again in November 1979 when the self-exiled Shah requests medical treatment in the US. Carter is reluctant but faces pressure from Shah supporters like Henry Kissinger and David Rockefeller. When Carter finally allows the Shah temporary shelter, angry protesters again storm the US embassy and take 52 hostages.

Both sides expect a repeat of the rapidly resolved February crisis, but Khomeini hamstrings negotiations. Bazargan resigns in frustration and Carter faces pressure to bring the hostages home by other means. In April 1980, he orders Operation Eagle Claw, a special forces rescue raid. But three of the eight US helicopters assigned to the mission suffer technical problems, while another crashes into a fuel tanker while refueling in the desert, causing an explosion that kills eight American servicemen. The raid is a failure.

"It was my responsibility as President to launch this mission. It was my responsibility to terminate the mission when it ended.

This was a decision that was shared completely by the field commander in charge of the rescue team and by the officer in charge of the overall force that was involved in the rescue effort. There is a deeper failure than that of incomplete success, and that is the failure to attempt a worthy effort, a failure to try." Eagle Claw hardens Khomeini’s resolve to keep the hostages and is a political disaster for Carter. His approval rating is already low, and in November 1980 he loses the election to republican Ronald Reagan. Carter’s team eventually agree a deal with Khomeini before Reagan’s inauguration. Khomeini will release the hostages in exchange for the US pledging not to interfere in Iran and unfreezing Iranian assets worth $25 billion in today's value. Iran appears to make no concessions, although some claim Khomeini secretly agrees to Israel selling arms to regional rival Iraq.

The deal comes into effect 20 minutes after Reagan’s inauguration, freeing the hostages after 444 days. The timing has led to allegations from Iranian and US officials that Reagan covertly encouraged Khomeini to delay releasing the hostages until his presidency began.

The Iranian Revolution dramatically shifts regional and global relations. Iran extends its influence across the Middle East, including by exporting Hezbollah as a militant group supporting Shia Muslim minorities in Arab states like Lebanon.

The US loses a major ally in the region, and looks for new allies opposed to Iranian hegemony, like Saudi Arabia and Israel. Meanwhile, anti-American rhetoric becomes a cornerstone of Khomeini’s position as Supreme Ruler and propaganda against Iranian moderates. It’s a policy that continues until today, although political analyst Suzanne Maloney notes a certain irony: “...By grounding its identity and legitimacy in anti-Americanism, Tehran remains just as firmly contingent upon the United States as the shah ever was.” Iran’s revolution has the largest impact on its neighbours. Although Iraq’s Saddam Hussein hosted Khomeini for years, this relationship of convenience and relations soured when Iraq deported Khomeini shortly before his return to Iran. The revolution also undermines previous Iran-Iraq agreements which resolved border disputes and barred Iran from supporting separatist Iraqi Kurds and anti-Saddam Shia movements. As Khomeini continues to suppress internal opponents throughout 1980, revolution gives way to what some call the 20th century’s last total war.

The Iran-Iraq War was supposed to be an easy victory cementing Saddam Hussein’s legacy as defender of the Arab world. Domestically, his Baath regime ruled with an iron fist and Saddam was preparing his son Uday to one day take over. If you want to learn more about Uday Hussein, the “Mad Prince of Iraq”, you should check out Real Life Lore’s new series “Mad Kings” on Nebula. In the first episode you’ll learn more about Saddam’s rule and Uday’s upbringing – and his decent into madness. “Mad Kings” is one of many exclusive documentary series on Nebula, a streaming service we’re building together with other creators. If you go to nebula.tv/realtimehistory you can sign up for just $36 for an entire year. On Nebula you can watch Mad Kings, exclusive documentaries from us at Real Time History like Red Atoms, the story of Chernobyl and the Soviet Nuclear program and all our regular videos ad-free.

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To learn more about the immediate aftermath of the Iranian Revolution in the region, check out our videos about the Iran-Iraq War and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. As usual you can find all the sources for this video in the video description below. If you are watching this video on Patreon or Nebula, thank you so much for the support, we couldn’t do it without you. I am Jesse Alexander and this is a production of Real Time History, the only history channel whose level of thinking is higher.

Was ist die Shadowing-Technik?

Shadowing ist eine wissenschaftlich fundierte Sprachlerntechnik, die ursprünglich für die professionelle Dolmetscherausbildung entwickelt und durch den Polyglotten Dr. Alexander Arguelles populär gemacht wurde. Die Methode ist einfach aber wirkungsvoll: Du hörst englisches Audio von Muttersprachlern und wiederholst es sofort laut — wie ein Schatten, der dem Sprecher mit nur 1–2 Sekunden Verzögerung folgt. Anders als passives Hören oder Grammatikübungen zwingt Shadowing dein Gehirn und deine Mundmuskulatur, gleichzeitig echte Sprachmuster zu verarbeiten und zu reproduzieren. Studien zeigen, dass es Aussprachegenauigkeit, Intonation, Rhythmus, verbundene Sprache, Hörverständnis und Sprechflüssigkeit signifikant verbessert — was es zu einer der effektivsten Methoden für die IELTS Speaking-Vorbereitung und reale englische Kommunikation macht.

ShadowingEnglish.com – Englisch-Shadowing-Übung

Sprich fließend Englisch mit der Shadowing-Technik. Höre nativen YouTube-Videos zu, wiederhole Satz für Satz und baue echte Aussprache und Sprachflüssigkeit auf — weltweit von IELTS-Lernenden genutzt.

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