Shadowing Practice: This game theory problem will change the way you see the world - Learn English Speaking with Video
Elige un modo de práctica
Cada modo abre una sala de práctica a pantalla completa.
311 oraciones
Si las oraciones son demasiado cortas o largas, haz clic en Editar para ajustarlas.
1
This is a video about the most famous problem in game theory.
2
Problems of this sort pop up everywhere, from nations locked in conflict to roommates doing the dishes.
3
Even game shows have been based around this concept.
4
Figuring out the best strategy can mean the difference between life and death, war and peace, flourishing and the destruction of the planet.
5
And in the mechanics of this game, we may find the very source of one of the most first, unexpected phenomena in nature, cooperation.
6
On the 3rd of September 1949, an American weather monitoring plane collected air samples over Japan.
7
In those samples, they found traces of radioactive material.
8
The Navy quickly collected and tested rainwater samples from their ships and bases all over the world.
9
They also detected small amounts of cerium -141 and yttrium -91.
10
But these isotopes have half -lives of one or two months, so they must have been produced recently.
11
And the only place they could have come from was a nuclear explosion.
12
But the U .S hadn't performed any tests that year,
13
so the only possible conclusion was that the Soviet Union had figured out how to make a nuclear bomb.
14
This was the news the Americans had been dreading.
15
Their military supremacy, achieved through the Manhattan Project, was quickly fading.
16
This makes the problem of Western Europe and the United States far more serious than it was before, and perhaps makes the imminence of war greater.
17
Some thought their best course of action was to launch an unprovoked nuclear strike against the Soviets while they were still ahead.
18
In the words of Navy Secretary Matthews, to become aggressors for peace.
19
John von Neumann, the founder of Game Theory, said, If you say, why not bomb them tomorrow, I say, why not bomb them today?
20
If you say today at five o 'clock, I say, why not at one o 'clock?
21
Something needed to be done about nuclear weapons and fast. But what?
22
In 1950, the Rand Corporation, a US -based think tank, was studying this question, and as part of this research, they turned to game theory.
23
That same year, two mathematicians at RAND had invented a new game, one which, unbeknownst to them at the time, closely resembled the U .S.-Soviet conflict.
24
This game is now known as the Prisoner's Dilemma, so let's play a game.
25
A banker with a chest full of gold coins invites you
26
and another player to play against each other you each get two choices.
27
You can cooperate, or you can defect.
28
If you both cooperate, you each get three coins.
29
If one of you cooperates, but the other defects, then the one who defected gets five coins, and the other gets nothing.
30
And if you both defect, then you each get a coin.
31
The goal of the game is simple, to get as many coins as you can.
32
So, what would you do?
33
Suppose your opponent cooperates, then you could also cooperate and get 3 coins.
34
Or you could defect and get 5 coins instead, so you are better off defecting.
35
But what if your opponent defects instead?
36
Well, you could cooperate and get no coins, or you could defect and at least get 1 coin.
37
So no matter what your opponent does, your best option is always to defect.
38
Now if your opponent is also rational, they will reach the same conclusion and therefore also defect.
39
As a result, when you both act rationally, you both end up in the suboptimal situation getting one coin each, when you could have gotten three instead.
40
In the case of the US and Soviet Union, this led both countries to develop huge nuclear arsenals of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons each,
41
more than enough to destroy each other many times over.
42
But since both countries had nukes, neither could use them.
43
And both countries spent around 10 trillion dollars developing these weapons.
44
Both would have been better off if they had cooperated and agreed not to develop this technology further.
45
But since they both acted in their own best interest, they ended up in a situation where everyone was worse off.
46
The Prisoner's Dilemma is one of the most famous games in game theory.
47
Thousands and thousands of papers have been published on versions of this game.
48
In part, that's because it pops up everywhere.
49
Impalas living in between African woodlands and savannas are prone to catching ticks, which can lead to infectious diseases, paralysis, even death.
50
So it's important for impalas to remove ticks, and they do this by grooming.
51
But they can't reach all the spots on their bodies, and therefore they need another impala to groom them.
52
Now, grooming someone else comes at a cost.
53
It costs saliva, electrolytes, time and attention, all vital resources under the hot African sun, where a predator could strike at any moment.
54
So for the other impala, it would be best not to pay this cost.
55
But then again, it too will need help grooming.
56
So all Impalas face a choice.
57
Should they groom each other or not?
58
In other words, should they cooperate or defect?
59
Well, if they only interact once, then the rational solution is always to defect.
60
That other Impala is never going to help you, so why bother?
61
But the thing about a lot of problems is that they're not a single prisoner's dilemma.
62
Impalas see each other day after day, and the same situation keeps happening over and over again.
63
So that changes the problem.
64
Because instead of playing the Prisoner's Dilemma just once, you're now playing it many, many times.
65
And if I defect now, then my opponent will know that I defected, and they can use that against me in the future.
66
So, what is the best strategy in this repeated game?
67
That is what Robert Axelrod, a political scientist, wanted to find out.
68
So in 1980, he decided to hold a computer tournament.
69
He invited some of the world's leading game theorists from many different subjects to submit computer programs that would play each other.
70
Axelrod called these programs strategies strategies.
71
Each strategy would face off against every other strategy and against a copy of itself.
72
And each matchup would go for 200 rounds.
73
That's important, and we'll come back to it.
74
Now Axelrod used points instead of coins, but the payoffs were the same.
75
The goal of the tournament was to win as many points as possible.
76
And in the end, the whole tournament was repeated five times over to ensure the success was robust
77
and not just a fluke.
78
Axelrod gave an example of a simple strategy.
79
It would start each game by cooperating, and only defect after its opponent had defected twice in a row.
80
In total, Axelrod received 14 strategies, and he added a 15th called Random, which just randomly cooperates or defects 50 % of the time.
81
All strategies were loaded onto a single computer, where they faced off against each other.
82
One of the strategies was called Freedmen.
83
It starts off by cooperating, but if its opponent defects just once, it will keep defecting for the remainder of the game.
84
Another strategy was called Joss.
85
It also starts by cooperating, but then it just copies what the other player did on the last move.
86
Then around 10 % of the time, Joss gets sneaky and defects.
87
There was also a rather elaborate strategy called Grass Camp.
88
This strategy works the same as Joss, but instead of defecting probabilistically, grass -camped effects in the 50th round to try
89
and probe the strategy of its opponent and see if it can take advantage of any weaknesses.
90
The most elaborate strategy was name withheld with 77 lines of code.
91
After all the games were played, the results were tallied up and the leaderboard established.
92
The crazy thing was that the simplest program ended up winning, a program that came to be called tit -for -tat.
93
Tit -for -tat starts by cooperating, and then it copies exactly what its opponent did in the last move.
94
So it would follow cooperation with cooperation, and defection with defection.
95
But only once, if its opponent goes back to cooperating, so does tit -for -tat.
96
When tit -for -tat played against Friedman, both started by cooperating, and they kept cooperating, both ending up with perfect scores for complete cooperation.
97
When tit -for -tat played against Joss, they too started by cooperating, but then on the sixth move, Joss defected.
98
This sparked a series of back and forth defections, a sort of echo effect.
99
Okay, so now you've got this alternating thing, which will remind you of some of the politics of the world today, where we have to do something to you because of what you did to us.
100
And then when this weird program throws in a second unprovoked defection,
101
now it's really bad because now both programs are going to defect on each other for the rest of the game.
102
And that's also like some of the things that we're seeing in politics today and in international relations.
103
As a result of these mutual retaliations, both Tit for Tat and Joss did poorly.
104
But because Tit for Tat managed to cooperate with enough other strategies, it still won the tournament.
105
Hey my god, there's Professor Axelrod!
106
Hey!
107
There's Stephen Stewart!
108
What a treat this is.
109
And I imagined initially it'd be sort of like computer chess
110
where you'd need a pretty complicated program to play a sophisticated game, but in fact it was not like that at all.
111
It was the simplest strategy that did the best.
112
So I analyzed how that happened.
113
Axelrod found that all the best performing strategies, including tit -for -tat, shared four qualities.
114
First, they were all nice, which just means they are not the first to defect.
115
So tit -for -tat is a nice strategy.
116
It can defect, but only in retaliation.
117
The opposite of nice is nasty.
118
That's a strategy that defects first.
119
So Joss is nasty.
120
Out of the 15 strategies in the tournament, 8 were nice and 7 nasty.
121
The top 8 strategies were all nice.
122
And even the worst -performing nice strategy still far outscored the best -performing nasty one.
123
The second important quality was being forgiving.
124
A forgiving strategy is one that can retaliate, but it doesn't hold a grudge.
125
So tit -for -tat is a forgiving strategy.
126
It retaliates when its opponent defects, but it doesn't let defections from before the last round influence its current decisions.
127
Friedman, on the other hand, is maximally unforgiving.
128
After the first defection, just from the opponent would defect for the rest of the game.
129
Okay, that's it.
130
No mercy.
131
And that might feel good to do, but it doesn't end up working out well in the long run.
132
This conclusion, that it pays to be nice and forgiving, came as a shock to the experts.
133
Many had tried to be tricky and create subtle, nasty strategies to beat their opponent and eke out an advantage.
134
But they all failed.
135
Instead, in this tournament, nice guys finished first.
136
Now, tit for tat is quite forgiving, but it's possible to be even more forgiving.
137
Axelrod's sample strategy only defects after its opponent defected twice in a row.
138
It was tit for two tats.
139
Now, that might sound overly generous, but when Axelrod ran the numbers, he found that if anyone had submitted the sample strategy, they would have won the tournament.
140
I mean, it's so clever.
141
There's so many layers to this story.
142
After Axelrod published his analysis of what happened, or circulated it among these game theorists,
143
he said, now that we all know what worked well, let's try again.
144
So he announced a second tournament where everything would be the same except for one change, the number of rounds per game.
145
See, in the first tournament, each game lasted precisely 200 rounds and that is important because
146
if you know when the last round is then there's no reason to cooperate in
147
that round so you're better off defecting of course your opponent should reason the same
148
and so they should also defect in the last round but
149
if you both anticipate defection in the last round then there's
150
no reason for you to cooperate in the second to last round
151
or the round before that or before that and
152
so on all the way to the very first round and so in In Axelrod's tournament, it was a very important thing that the players didn't know exactly how long they were going to be playing.
153
They knew on average it would be 200 rounds, but there was a random number generator that prevented them from knowing with certainty.
154
Yeah, if you're not sure when it ends, then you have to kind of keep cooperating because it might keep going and you might need them on your side.
155
For this second tournament, Axelrod received 62 entries and again added random.
156
The contestants had gotten the results and analysis from the first tournament and could use this information to their advantage.
157
This created two camps.
158
Some thought that clearly being nice and forgiving were winning qualities, so they submitted nice and forgiving strategies.
159
One even submitted tit for two tats.
160
The second camp anticipated that others would be nice and extra forgiving.
161
Therefore, they submitted nasty strategies to try to take advantage of those that were extra forgiving.
162
One such strategy was called Tester.
163
It would defect on the first move to see how its opponent reacted.
164
If it retaliated, Tester would apologize and play tit for tat for the remainder of the game.
165
If it didn't retaliate, Tester would defect every other move after that.
166
But again, being nasty didn't pay.
167
And once again, tit for tat was the most effective.
168
Nice strategies again did much better.
169
In the top 15, only one was not nice.
170
Similarly, in the bottom 15, only one was not nasty.
171
After the second tournament, Axelrod identified the other qualities that distinguished the better performing strategies.
172
The third is being retaliatory, which means if your opponent defects, strike back immediately.
173
Don't be a pushover.
174
Always cooperate is a total pushover, and so it's very easy to take advantage of.
175
Tit for tat, on the other hand, is very hard to take advantage of.
176
The last quality that Axelrod identified is being clear.
177
Programs that were too opaque, that were too similar to a random program, you couldn't figure them out because they were so complicated.
178
It was very hard to establish any pattern of trust with a program like
179
that because you couldn't figure out what it was doing.
180
I mean, the other programs it was playing couldn't figure them out.
181
And so they would end up more or less defaulting to thinking, saying, every turn is like the last time I'm going to see you, so I might as well defect.
182
What to me is mind -blowing about this is that these four principles,
183
being nice, forgiving, provocable, and clear,
184
is a lot like the morality that has evolved around the world that is often summarized as an eye for an eye.
185
It's not Christianity, by the way.
186
It's not turn the other cheek philosophy.
187
It's some older philosophy.
188
What's interesting is that while tit for two tats would have won the first tournament, it only came 24th in the second tournament.
189
This highlights an important fact.
190
In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, there is no single best strategy.
191
The strategy that performs best always depends on the other strategies it's interacting with.
192
For example, if you put tit for tat in an environment with only the ultimate bullies of always defect, then tit -for -tat comes in last.
193
I wanted to see whether, for example, the tit -for -tat did well
194
because it did well with really stupid rules that didn't do well at all themselves, that basically it took advantage of people.
195
So he ran a simulation where successful strategies in one generation would see their numbers grow
196
and unsuccessful ones would see their numbers drop.
197
In this simulation, the worst performing strategies quickly shrink and go extinct, while the top -performing strategies become more common.
198
Harrington, the only nasty strategy in the top 15, first grew quickly.
199
But then as the strategies it was preying on went extinct, Harrington's numbers also quickly dropped.
200
This shows a main benefit of this simulation because it tests how well a strategy does with other successful strategies.
201
After a thousand generations, the proportions are mostly stable and only nice strategies survive.
202
Again, tit for tat comes out on top, representing 14 .5 % of the total population.
203
Now, this process may sound similar to evolution, but there is a subtle difference, which is that in this case, there are no mutations.
204
So it's actually an ecological simulation.
205
But what if the world you started in was different?
206
Imagine a world that is a really nasty place to live, more or less populated with players
207
that always defect except there's a little cluster of tit -for -tat players
208
that live in some kind of nucleus
209
and they get to play with each other a lot
210
because they're geographically sequestered they will start building up a lot of points
211
and also because that translates into offspring they'll start to take over the population
212
so in fact Axelrod showed that a little island of cooperation can emerge
213
and spread and eventually will take over the world which is fantastic
214
How can cooperation emerge in a population of players who are self -interested,
215
who are not trying to be good because they're good -hearted?
216
You don't have to be altruistic.
217
You could be looking out for number one for yourself and your own interests, and yet cooperation can still emerge.
218
Some argue that this could explain how we went from a world full of completely selfish organisms, where every organism only cared about themselves,
219
to one where cooperation emerged and flourished, from impalas grooming each other to fish cleaning sharks.
220
Many lifeforms experience conflicts similar to the prisoner's dilemma, but because they don't interact just once,
221
both can be better off by cooperating.
222
And this doesn't require trust or conscious thought either, because the strategy could be encoded in DNA.
223
As long as it performs better than the other strategies, it can take over a population.
224
Axelrod's insights were applied to areas like evolutionary biology and international But there was one aspect that his original tournaments didn't cover.
225
What happens if there is a little bit of random error in the game?
226
Some noise in the system?
227
For example, one player tries to cooperate, but it comes across as a defection.
228
Little errors like this happen in the real world all the time.
229
Like in 1983, the Soviet satellite -based early warning system detected the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile from the U .S.
230
But the U .S hadn't launched anything.
231
The Soviet system had confused sunlight reflecting off high -altitude clouds with a ballistic missile.
232
Thankfully, Stanislav Petrov, the Soviet officer on duty, dismissed the alarm.
233
But this example shows the potential costs of a signal error
234
and the importance of studying the effects of noise on those strategies.
235
The word game sounds like it's a children's game or, you know, there's something, a misnomer maybe in calling it game theory,
236
because these are life and death matters, obviously.
237
And as you mentioned that this came up in the Cold War, I mean, it could actually be life and death of the whole planet.
238
We could annihilate human civilization.
239
So these are not games in any kind of trivial sense.
240
It's just the term that is used by mathematicians and theorists.
241
When tit -for -tat plays against itself in a noisy environment, both start off by cooperating.
242
But if a single cooperation is perceived as a defection, then the other tit -for -tat retaliates, and it sets off a chain of alternating retaliations.
243
And if another cooperation is perceived as a defection, then the rest of the game is constant mutual defection.
244
Therefore, in the long run, both would only get a third of the points they would get in a perfect environment.
245
Tit for tat goes from performing very well to performing poorly.
246
So how do you solve this?
247
Well, you need a reliable way to break out of these echo effects.
248
And one way to do this is by playing tit for tat, but with around 10 % more forgiveness.
249
So instead of retaliating after every defection, you only retaliate around 9 out of every 10 times.
250
This helps you break out of those echoes while still being retaliatory enough to not be taken advantage of.
251
And so we also ran the tournament with noise and generosity.
252
And that did quite well.
253
My favorite example is Tit for Tat does really well, but it could never do better than the player it's playing with.
254
I mean, think about it.
255
By design, all they can do is lose or draw.
256
And yet, when the results of all interactions are tallied up, they come out ahead of all other strategies.
257
Similarly, always defect can never lose a game.
258
It can only draw or win.
259
But overall, it performs extremely poorly.
260
This highlights a common misconception.
261
Because for many people, when they think about winning, they think they need to beat the other person.
262
In games like chess or poker, this is true, since one person's gain is necessarily another person's loss, so these games are zero -sum.
263
But most of life is not zero -sum.
264
To win you don't need to get your reward from the other player, instead you can get it from the banker.
265
Only in real life the banker is the world, it is literally everything around you.
266
It is just up to us to find those win -win situations and then work together to unlock those rewards.
267
Cooperation pays, even among rivals.
268
From 1950 to 1986, the US and Soviet Union had trouble cooperating, and both kept developing nukes.
269
But then, from the late 80s onwards, they started reducing their nuclear stockpiles.
270
They too had learned how to resolve conflict.
271
Rather than making an agreement to abolish all nuclear arms at once and essentially turning it into a single prisoner's dilemma,
272
they would disarm slowly a small number of nukes each year, and then they'd check each other to see that they had both cooperated, and then repeat the year after,
273
and the year after that, all along checking to ensure mutual cooperation.
274
In the more than 40 years since Axelrod's tournaments, researchers have continued to study which strategies perform best in a variety of environments.
275
In doing so, they varied everything from payoff structures to strategies to errors and more.
276
Some even allowed the strategies to mutate.
277
While tit for tat or generous tit for tat doesn't always come out on top, Axelrod's main takeaways still hold.
278
Be nice, forgiving, but don't be a pushover.
279
Can I ask you, why did Anatole Rappaport submit tit for tat?
280
well the reason was because I asked him to
281
and he he wrote saying yeah I'm going to do that
282
but I just want to be clear that I'm not sure
283
that this is really such a good idea I don't he was a peace researcher
284
and I think his own inclinations were to be much more forgiving and maybe and not be so provokable.
285
What I find fascinating is that one of the main things
286
that sets life apart from non -living things is that life gets to make decisions.
287
We get to make choices, choices that don't only change our future, but also the future of those we interact with.
288
See, in the short term, it is often the environment that shapes the player, that determines who does well.
289
But in the long run, it is the players that shape the environment
290
so let's play a game the game of life
291
and make your choices wisely
292
because their impact may reach further than you think using the right strategy matters
293
but figuring out the best strategy isn't easy it requires critical thinking and innovative solutions like Axelrod's tournaments.
294
If you're looking for an easy way to build your problem solving skills then check out this video's sponsor Brilliant.
295
Brilliant will help make you a better thinker in everything from math and data science to programming, technology, you name it.
296
You can start right now for free straight from your device, the device you're watching this on.
297
All you need to do is set your learning goal and Brilliant will design the perfect path for you, equipping you with all the tools you need to reach it.
298
Did you like today's insights from game theory?
299
Then Brilliant's brand new course, Intro to Probability, is the perfect next step.
300
Introduction to probability is your gateway to mastering the tools of chance, risk, and prediction.
301
You will learn how to construct and analyze models of real -world situations, from electrons and business decisions all the way to the 2023 Women's World Cup.
302
Whether you're a budding statistician or you just want to learn about randomness and chance.
303
This course will equip you with the skills you need to make decisions in uncertain situations.
304
You'll even take a page out of Axelrod's playbook
305
and learn how to build computer simulations to put your strategies to the test.
306
Beyond probability, Brilliant has a massive library of content covering everything from math to data science and programming to technology.
307
What I love about Brilliant is that each lesson is hands -on so so you'll build real intuition.
308
And the best part is that you can learn with Brilliant on the go.
309
To try everything Brilliant has to offer for free for a full 30 days, visit brilliant .org slash Veritasium.
310
And the first 200 of you to sign up will get 20 % off Brilliant's annual premium subscription.
311
So I wanna thank Brilliant for sponsoring this video, and I wanna thank you for watching.
Descargar app
Todo lo que necesitas para hablar con fluidez
Pronunciación con IAEvalúa cada oración
Práctica de IPADomina cada sonido
VocabularioConstruye tu banco de palabras
Juego de vocabularioAprende mientras juegas
📺 Mismo canal
C11
Something is jamming GPS over Europe. Here's what we found
Daily ConversationUniversity StudentsWorking Adults
C11
The Absurd Engineering Behind the Internet
Daily ConversationUniversity StudentsWorking Adults
C11
Why It Was Almost Impossible to Make the Blue LED
Daily ConversationUniversity StudentsWorking Adults
C12
You've (Likely) Been Playing The Game Of Life Wrong
Daily ConversationUniversity StudentsWorking Adults
B22
We're trying something new...
Daily ConversationWorking Adults
C120
How does light 'know' the shortest path?
IELTS PrepTOEFL PrepUniversity Students
C12
The CIA's new tech doesn't make sense
IELTS PrepTOEFL PrepUniversity Students
C11
Why does every mammal get 1 billion heartbeats in their life?
IELTS PrepTOEFL PrepUniversity Students
C13
Why Cold Drinks Were Deadly Before 1914
Business EnglishUniversity StudentsWorking Adults
C14
Exposing The Flaw In Our Phone System
Business EnglishUniversity StudentsWorking Adults
C12
Our Greatest Delusion
IELTS PrepTOEFL PrepUniversity Students
C13
The Most Controversial Problem in Philosophy
IELTS PrepTOEFL PrepUniversity Students
B25
Why Boredom is Good For You
Daily ConversationUniversity StudentsWorking Adults
B24
Why Are 96,000,000 Black Balls on This Reservoir?
IELTS PrepTOEFL PrepUniversity Students
C13
We've Been Using The Wrong Science In Court For 50 years
IELTS PrepTOEFL PrepUniversity Students
B24
Explaining Pi With Pizza
University Students
B214
5 Fun Physics Phenomena
Daily ConversationUniversity Students
C11
The Most Misunderstood Concept in Physics
IELTS PrepTOEFL PrepUniversity Students
B11
Falling ladders - why does this happen?
IELTS PrepTOEFL PrepHigh School Students
C110
How a slinky falls in slow motion #shorts
University StudentsWorking Adults
✨ Recomendar Video
B27
37 oraciones
3 Reasons Why Nuclear Energy Is Terrible! 2/3
Daily ConversationUniversity StudentsWorking Adults
C12
182 oraciones
We Let $200 GPT-Pro Think for 7 Days on Unsolved Math
Daily ConversationUniversity StudentsWorking Adults
C1291 oraciones
Why did white men conquer the world?
Daily ConversationUniversity StudentsWorking Adults
C1182 oraciones
The Uncertainty Principle: What Does It Mean, How Does It Work?
Daily ConversationUniversity StudentsWorking Adults
C13
150 oraciones
The only good nuclear accident
Daily ConversationUniversity StudentsWorking Adults
C14
514 oraciones
Why Ukraine Is Doomed | Episode 6
Daily ConversationUniversity StudentsWorking Adults
C13
79 oraciones
3 game theory tactics, explained
Business EnglishUniversity StudentsWorking Adults
C11
238 oraciones
Cosmic Insignificance Theory: A Simple Idea That Will Change Your Life Forever
Daily ConversationUniversity StudentsWorking Adults
C1552 oraciones
The Professor Who Taught People How To Think (1962)
Daily ConversationUniversity StudentsWorking Adults
C12
162 oraciones
Crypto Agility Explained: Protect Data from Quantum Computing Threats
Daily ConversationUniversity StudentsWorking Adults
Vocabulario y notas de pronunciación para esta lección
Este vídeo tiene 311 frases y 4323 palabras para practicar shadowing. La parte hablada dura 27:16. El hablante habla a un ritmo natural de unas 159 palabras por minuto, cercano a una conversación cotidiana. Solo el 81 % de las palabras está entre las 3.000 más comunes del inglés, por lo que el vocabulario es exigente.
Vocabulario clave de este vídeo
15 palabras del vídeo que vale la pena aprender, con su pronunciación y significado:
| Palabra | Pronunciación | Significado |
|---|---|---|
| defect sustantivo | /ˈdiːfɛkt/ | falla, tacha |
| opponent sustantivo | /əˈpəʊ.nənt/ | oponente, antagonista |
| cooperation sustantivo | /koʊˌɑ.pəˈɹeɪ.ʃən/ | cooperación |
| coin sustantivo | /ˈkoɪ̯n/ | moneda, numerario |
| nasty adjetivo | /ˈnæs.ti/ | sucio |
| cooperate verbo | /kəʊˈɒp.ə.ɹeɪt/ | cooperar |
| dilemma sustantivo | /daɪˈlɛmə/ | dilema, disyuntiva |
| submit verbo | /səbˈmɪt/ | someterse [a]] |
| interact verbo | /ɪn.təˈɹækt/ | interactuar |
| simulation sustantivo | /ˌsɪm.jəˈleɪ.ʃn̩/ | simulación |
| emerge verbo | /ɪˈmɝd͡ʒ/ | emerger, aparecer |
| conclusion sustantivo | /kənˈkluːʒən/ | conclusión, neta |
| mutual adjetivo | /ˈmjuːt͡ʃuəl/ | mutuo, mutual |
| probability sustantivo | /ˌpɹɑ.bəˈbɪl.ə.ti/ | probabilidad |
| banker sustantivo | /ˈbæŋkəː/ | banquero, banquera |
Phrasal verbs que vas a escuchar
| Palabra | Pronunciación | Significado |
|---|---|---|
| figure out verbo | averiguar, captar | |
| end up verbo | terminar, ir a parar | |
| take over verbo | apoderarse, enseñorearse | |
| pop up verbo | aparecerse | |
| check out verbo | investigar, chequear | |
| come across verbo | pasarse a | |
| come out verbo | /ˌkʌm ˈaʊt/ | revelarse, salir a la luz |
| find out verbo | averiguar, anoticiarse |
Gramática en este vídeo
Las estructuras que más usa el hablante, con las palabras exactas del vídeo:
| Estructura | En el vídeo |
|---|---|
| Oraciones condicionales if + oración, will/would + verbo — una condición y su resultado | If it retaliated, Tester would apologize · If it didn't retaliate, Tester would defect |
| Voz pasiva be + participio pasado — importa lo que ocurre, no quién lo hace | have been based · have been produced · be done |
| Oraciones de relativo who / which + oración — información extra sobre una persona o cosa | one who defected · ticks, which can · thing, which will |
| Present perfect have/has + participio pasado — una acción pasada que sigue importando ahora | have been based · have been published · has evolved |
Pronunciación a tener en cuenta
El hablante usa 47 contracciones y formas reducidas, como don't, you're, didn't. Dilas en su forma corta, tal como las oyes.
- Los sonidos de “th”: mathematics /mæθ(.ə)ˈmæt.ɪks/, bother /ˈbɑðɚ/, sixth /sɪksθ/
- Los sonidos de “sh” y “zh”: cooperation /koʊˌɑ.pəˈɹeɪ.ʃən/, simulation /ˌsɪm.jəˈleɪ.ʃn̩/, conclusion /kənˈkluːʒən/, rational /ˈɹæʃ(ə)nəl/, establish /ɪˈstæb.lɪʃ/
- Palabras largas — cuida el acento: cooperation /koʊˌɑ.pəˈɹeɪ.ʃən/, cooperate /kəʊˈɒp.ə.ɹeɪt/, probability /ˌpɹɑ.bəˈbɪl.ə.ti/, complicated /ˈkɑm.plɪˌkeɪ.tɪd/, similarly /ˈsɪm.ə.lə.li/
Cómo practicar con este vídeo
- Escucha el vídeo entero una vez sin hablar y anota las palabras que no conoces.
- Empieza a velocidad 0,75×, haz shadowing frase por frase y vuelve a la velocidad normal cuando te resulte fácil.
- Grábate y compara con el original, prestando atención a palabras como defect, opponent, cooperation.
¿Qué es la Técnica de Shadowing?
Shadowing es una técnica de aprendizaje de idiomas respaldada por la ciencia, desarrollada originalmente para la formación de intérpretes profesionales y popularizada por el políglota Dr. Alexander Arguelles. El método es simple pero poderoso: escuchas audio en inglés nativo y lo repites en voz alta de inmediato, como una sombra que sigue al hablante con solo 1-2 segundos de retraso. A diferencia de la escucha pasiva o los ejercicios de gramática, el shadowing obliga a tu cerebro y músculos de la boca a procesar y reproducir simultáneamente patrones de habla reales. Las investigaciones muestran que mejora significativamente la precisión de la pronunciación, la entonación, el ritmo, el habla conectada, la comprensión auditiva y la fluidez al hablar, convirtiéndola en una de las metodologías más efectivas para la preparación del IELTS Speaking y la comunicación en inglés en el mundo real.