Pratique du Shadowing: This 25-Year-Old Built a 2-Year Moat Nobody Can Bet Against | Corgi, Nico Laqua & Emily Yuan - Apprendre l'anglais à l'oral avec la vidéo

It's kind of hard for someone else to make like a Corgi 2 .0

because we had to spend so much time and so much money like getting the infrastructure set up.

Most companies just can't do that.

We would have been kind of, I think, a pretty boring company.

And I don't think we'd be an important company if all we did was resell someone else's product.

I don't think you can change the world if you're reselling someone else's product.

So in our case, we decided to become the infrastructure.

Nico actually lives in the office and a lot of our team members live close to the office as well.

That energy is something and that time they're able to spend on these problems is something that's really hard to compete with.

My name is Nico.

I'm the CEO of Corgi.

Corgi is an AI insurance company for a technology startup and we'll end this year at several hundred million dollars in ARR.

We're one of the fastest growing B2B companies on the planet and we're just getting started.

you I grew up in San Diego, California.

In high school, I had a couple jobs.

Anyone who works jobs while they're in high school knows that they suck.

You have like a boss that's like an idiot that's like telling you all sorts of like things

that are just like wasting your time.

I think at some point I just kind of decided

that I wanted to do something that was like big and important with my life.

And it seemed like starting a company was a really good way to make a difference.

Before COVID, I spent a lot of time kind of in the startup hacker communities and I was working

One of the apps I was working on was an app for college clubs.

It's the type of idea

that I think a 19 -year -old who knows how to program and doesn't know that much about startups typically does.

Emily, at that time, she was really interested in startups, and she was running one of Stanford's entrepreneurship clubs, and I wanted her to test out this app.

And most of the people that I knew weren't giving me that great of feedback at that time, but Emily came back with a Figma page with 100 comments about the app.

Corgi.

Nico wanted someone to help like promote his app to like everyone at Stanford.

So I agreed to help and I kind of just became more and more involved.

Eventually that became the company which was Picnic and then it became the gaming company basket.

Nico is very good at identifying good opportunities.

And I think that actually complements my skill set.

I'm very good at helping make sure that we can figure out how to like get all these different things done.

So you can throw like a very complicated thing at me

and and I'll go and figure out how to get it done.

In high school, I actually started a nonprofit with a couple of my friends called Paper Bridges.

I think it was an area where there could be a lot of work done.

I could make a lot of impact even as a student without a lot of funding, without a lot of resources.

We started off sending letters to orphans and foster kids around the world.

As we grew and scaled, we started donating medical supplies and to donate face masks to a lot of these centers in the US.

go and get people together and just go for it.

Basket, they make a lot of really great games.

I got that company to the destination that I wanted to get it to.

I spent over four years there.

But it didn't feel like a very impactful company.

It's a very different type of company than what Nico and I really wanted to spend the next 10 years building.

most like biggest, most ambitious thing possible.

- Oftentimes, the young startup founder try to make products that you yourself would use, which is normally pretty good advice.

But the problem is that problems that they try to solve are often not as big as they could be.

And I think a lot of people think that

if they take a really big idea and kind of scale it down to something very small, that that makes it more likely to succeed.

But actually, I think that people should do the opposite and think of the most ambitious version.

Because if you're doing that, then suddenly a lot of really smart people want to join you on your mission.

A lot of investors will be more likely to fund those sort of ideas.

And success actually changes the world in an interesting way.

I guess it's hard to say that something's a good idea or a bad idea, because sometimes things just work out really well.

in unexpected ways.

but Generally, I think a good idea tends to be really difficult and tends to be hard, and doing the hard things ends up working out much better.

And that makes it hard for competitors to come out and try to copy our stuff.

Being the 50th app for college students on campus,

the 500th restaurant in the financial district is not a good business because it's kind of being the same as everyone else.

I think a good business means that you're doing something unique and you are like the company in that category.

I think in order to be category defining, you can't just do something very simple and very easy and very capital light.

I think you need to do something very ambitious and difficult and hard, kind of the craziest, the highest impact, the highest leverage one of whatever their idea is.

Historically, it's been very difficult for tech startups to get insurance.

I mean, I had to get insurance for my last company and we didn't have a lot of money at that time.

And I remember the insurance policy was $60 ,000 and that's a lot of money to buy anything.

I was making less than that in my salary.

I think I was making about a thousand or two thousand dollars a month at that time.

So this was a huge expense, but my experience was terrible.

I had to call these brokers.

my emails to them for like weeks and of course they never paid out anything.

And it was just shocking like how slow the process is.

Like we were trying to give them a bunch of money to buy this product

and everyone was just taking forever to get back to us.

Like it was very confusing like what we were even buying.

We just looked at how everything was set up and we were like wow this is terrible.

Like how do you have a hundred billion dollar company that runs like this?

And I thought you know this stuff is a scam.

If you look at it as 12 % of the GDP it's about twice as big of a

I think that all of the regulation around it and the huge regulatory barrier to entry, coupled with the fact that most of these big insurance providers started 40 years ago or more,

that's led to them being very comfortable, them being very complicit, them to continually worsening their product quality.

but we're going to like plug the tech into like this existing like infrastructure.

It's actually a big advantage for us

because we can come in with a brand slate

and we can look at things and

if something doesn't make sense we can question like why is it being done this way

and is there a better way of doing it.

We don't really need to do if we're building it from like an AI and like tech native point of view.

We actually didn't think about like too many other industries when we were kind of thinking about Corgi.

It was just Insurance just seemed like perfect, like right place, right time.

And we thought that like we were able to build a team to do it you And we applied to YC, already licensed to be an insurance brokerage.

Our idea there was to embed with contract management companies.

We just wanted to be a broker and do the normal thing.

That's what we started with.

And actually, it was working pretty well.

We sold a couple like tens of thousands of dollars a premium, and our revenue growth was pretty good.

But when we first started, I don't think we understood like where the problems were in the insurance stack.

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We thought that, hey, like these insurance companies just weren't being aggressive enough.

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Like they should just market more and promote their companies more.

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But in reality, what was happening was because they had to rely on these like really old traditional insurance carriers, it made it really hard for them to have a good product.

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It was really nasty to deal with the insurance carriers, like making phone calls to them for every single policy.

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We had to get a fax machine and we were like sending faxes to them back and forth.

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And I would look up these carriers and I'd see they're like 100, 200 billion dollar companies.

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And this is the way they work with faxes, with people calling them for every single policy.

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And I thought to myself.

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There's no way that this is the way a huge part of the economy works.

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There must be a better insurance carrier out there.

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And we checked every single one out.

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There weren't any that were better.

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And through doing that, we realized that the problem wasn't the website.

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It wasn't the tech.

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The problem was the actual underlying product, which is the insurance policy.

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So we decided to shut down what we were doing, which was working pretty well.

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And at the time, that was not an obvious decision.

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That was a very controversial decision.

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I think we could have been like well regarded, maybe not the top company in our batch, but one of the top companies in our batch if we just continued to do what we were doing.

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But we shut that all down.

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We decided we're going to become the insurance carrier.

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It's our vision not to build on top of, not to modernize, not to fix what's already there.

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We're building a new type of financial institution where we actually become these highly regulated financial entities

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and rebuild them from the ground up using AI.

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You just really need to come in with new and fresh perspective.

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It's just really hard to untrain yourself from the existing paradigm of like how things are done.

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At least in our case, being new to the industry really allows us to come in with a different perspective, questioning how a lot of these like traditional industries are run,

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and just say, okay, like, we'll just go and make an AI version of that and rebuild it from ground up.

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- And the problem is you can't just like start one.

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It's something that's very difficult to do.

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So we went from a company that was, you know, doing very well in our batch, to one that was not doing well at all.

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And we didn't do demo day.

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We weren't one of the hot companies in our batch at all.

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It ended up being a very long multi -year process where Our company almost ended on many, many occasions throughout this.

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There were a lot of times where we were very default debt.

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In our case, it ended up taking us tens of millions of dollars in several years.

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We had to raise almost pre -revenue like $80 million.

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We raised all this money.

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We never made a pitch deck.

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We never went out to market or anything like that.

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We never did competitive fundraising.

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I think we just made ourselves a hard company to bet against.

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Actually, like the initial investors we had during Y Combinator that came in, they'd visit the office.

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They'd see it full, you know, every single day of the week.

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They could see and sense and talking to anyone at the company they could see that we deeply cared about the problem.

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We wanted to be winners and we wanted to win.

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And that the end kind of destination would lead to the world being a better place.

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And I think when you kind of combine all of that, it makes it a bit easier for people to bet on you instead of against you.

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If we're trying to tackle a industry as big and as complicated as insurance.

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You really do need to spend a lot of time on it.

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I live very close to the office, so I can get here quickly.

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Nico actually lives in the office and a lot of our team members just live close to the office as well.

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If we don't put like 110 % effort and a lot of time and energy into it, you just can't do it properly.

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And I think the superpower that young people have is that they have a lot of time and a lot of commitments.

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a lot of money.

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And I've been there, you know is tough, but that time and that energy is worth a lot.

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That energy is something, and that time they're able to spend on these problems is something that's really hard to compete with.

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It was a very long process and I think something

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that I've always been pretty good at is reading legal documents and kind of like really understanding what goes into them.

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And I think regulation, it's not like some mysterious thing.

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Like they tell you like you can do XYZ and you can't do XYZ.

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And you just make sure you follow the directions.

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If you can make sure that you just follow, like you stay within the guidelines of like what you're allowed to do, it's all doable.

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It wasn't for fun that we had to raise over $100 million to make it happen.

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and it wasn't for fun that it took two years.

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Overall, I think regulation is something that's pretty difficult and pretty challenging.

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But once we got our first set of licenses, our revenue started growing very quickly.

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We started looking a lot more healthier, and I think the company kind of inflected.

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after that.

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People will just go to the easiest, most convenient product available and if you're just that then people will come.

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There's not that much additional like marketing we really have to do.

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That's just fundamentally a better product than what's available.

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Unless someone else goes and makes an entire new carrier for startups like there's just aren't that many other options.

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Yeah, so I think operating in regulated industries, it's it's very difficult and is very capital intensive.

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But once you're able to to actually get the core infrastructure set up.

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There's a lot I can just build on top of it.

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I think it's a very good advantage, and it's a big moat

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that it's kind of hard for someone else to make like a Corgi 2 .0

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because we had to spend so much time and so much money like getting the infrastructure set up.

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Most companies just can't do that.

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So I think just doing the hard thing and just Getting it out of the way and getting it resolved, I think, is a really big advantage for us.

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It's hard to say that something's a good idea or a bad idea, but generally I think a good idea tends to be really difficult and tends to be hard.

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And doing the hard things ends up working out much better.

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Like for us, it's been almost two years getting regulatory licensing in order to launch our first product.

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We would have been kind of, I think, a pretty boring company, and I don't think we'd be an important company if all we did was resell someone else's product.

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product.

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So in our case we decided to become the infrastructure.

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and it took us a lot longer and a lot more money than we thought it would.

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But in the end, I think it ended up working out.

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you you Thank you you you - Hello.

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you

Qu'est-ce que la technique du Shadowing ?

Le Shadowing est une technique d'apprentissage des langues fondée sur la science, développée à l'origine pour la formation des interprètes professionnels. Le principe est simple mais puissant : vous écoutez de l'anglais natif et le répétez immédiatement à voix haute — comme une ombre suivant le locuteur avec un décalage de 1 à 2 secondes. Les recherches montrent une amélioration significative de la précision de la prononciation, de l'intonation, du rythme, des liaisons, de la compréhension orale et de la fluidité.

Pratique du Shadowing: This 25-Year-Old Built a 2-Year Moat Nobody Can Bet Against | Corgi, Nico Laqua & Emily Yuan - Apprendre l'anglais à l'oral avec la vidéo

Context & Background

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Step-by-step Shadowing Guide

Qu'est-ce que la technique du Shadowing ?