ฝึกพูดภาษาอังกฤษด้วยเทคนิค Shadowing จากวิดีโอ: I watched 1170 minutes of Alonso's Chelsea. It's Time To Be Honest About His Tactics

Xabi Alonso's press is so broken that if he doesn't fix it, his job may be at risk.

That was the video I made a year ago, five matches into his Madrid reign.

Seven months later, Madrid sacked him and the defence was at least part of the reason.

Now he's at Chelsea and if you aren't watching the Blues, you're missing out.

And I hope that one day you say it was a boring game

and we win and we don't give this entertainment moment

but for sure it's kind of repeat some patterns that we are making.

Those repeated tactical patterns have left Chelsea as one of the league's best when going forward, but with a defensive setup that is determined to hold them back.

On the surface, it sounds a lot like his Madrid reign.

Lethal attack, leaky defence.

But how he's got there couldn't be more different.

And what's happening at Chelsea tells you more about Alonso as a manager than his entire Madrid stint ever could.

Because take a look at these three scenarios.

At Madrid, that direct build -up play was rare.

The focus was on playing out from the back

and one of the earliest images of his reign was Courtois pushing higher up to act as a ball -playing goalkeeper.

They kept the ball, played short and worked their way up the pitch.

At Chelsea, that approach looks like it's more or less gone.

Going into the Hull match, Chelsea were second bottom of the possession share in the league.

It's weird, Alonzo, someone profiled as a possession manager, has suddenly stopped playing possession football.

Why?

The answer starts with the shape.

In preseason he tried a back 4, as you can see on FOTMOP.

But since then he's almost committed entirely to a back 3, and this shape naturally clusters his players like this.

And to get formations like this straight to your phone, you can check out FOTMOP for free through the link below who is sponsoring this video.

Formations are great, but my favourite part of FopMob is their more advanced stats and how easy they are to find.

For example, here we can see Chelsea's attack is massively overperforming their xG, but in the physical stats we see how hard the Chelsea front three is being made to work.

Clicking here into Rodgers, we also see how he profiles vs other attacking midfielders.

And when comparing his season heat map this season vs last season, we can tell that Alonso is already using him quite differently.

You can get all of this straight to your phone for free through Fopmob in the link in the description below.

And this means they're much better suited for that longer ball.

João Pedro is decent in the air, Morgan Rodgers is a lot bigger than most wide men, so Chelsea have two legitimate targets to hit.

And they can get numbers in and around the second ball, because the tens are already close to the nine, and Neto plays high enough at times to be more like a secondary forward,

rather than a wing back.

And it's not just from the goalkeeper that they go long long.

When Chelsea do work the ball into the back three, under normal buildup, this would be the signal for slow controlled possession into the final third under any other Alonso team.

Not at Chelsea.

Here, the centre backs are also looking to go long.

Why?

Because as early as preseason, the buildup was struggling under pressure, and it's carried on into the season proper.

Going long protects them from facing any pressure at all.

But these long passes have a secondary effect.

The midfield is being completely bypassed, and that's the region we have to scrutinise.

Enzo Fernandes was sold to Manchester City for £125m.

Caicedo has been struggling with injury, and it's a huge reason that Rhys James has effectively become a full -time midfielder.

Even Malagusta has made appearances there.

To be fair, the Blues did try to address this midfield chasm.

Lamin Kamara was a big agreed for £47 million, but Monaco pulled out after the deadline had already passed, while Barco came in from Strasbourg.

But this is the end result.

Their deepest vibe in the build often looks like this.

Corwill is a decent line -breaking passer for a centre -back, James has an incredible passing range for a fall -back, but Chelsea don't have any world -class ball progressors deep,

and they don't have a tempo -setter either.

A quick glance at FopMob shows that no Chelsea centre -back is in the top 15 for line -breaking passes, and neither is any Chelsea midfielder.

Essentially, Chelsea are struggling to move the ball up the pitch in a controlled manner, which brings us onto the perception of Alonso.

We think of him as a possession manager because of his time at Madrid and Leverkusen.

But his Leverkusen spell actually needs splitting into two phases.

Relegation surviving Leverkusen and top of the table Leverkusen.

Top of the table Leverkusen in 23 -24?

Well you can see on FOTMOB there were a possession heavy side and the full expression of the of Alonso's philosophy.

Relegation battling Leverkusen?

Not even close.

They essentially only had the ball 50 % of the time.

When Alonso arrived, he focused on shoring up the defence, and critically, that side did not have a tempo setter in the midfield.

He built that initial Leverkusen side around what he had, rather than what he wished he had.

And now, he's yet to find his tempo setter at Chelsea.

And the man who eventually became his tempo setter at Leverkusen is in the Premier League right now, sitting 14th for line breaking passes, despite his side having less than 50 % of the ball.

So given the state of the build up 5, Alonso might be asking himself, why optimize for the part of the pitch where you're weakest?

His answer is bypassing it entirely, which is where those long balls come in.

But in football you can't just neglect a part of the pitch, especially not the heart of it.

Alonso has been finding ways to make it work anyway, and it's all facilitated through the right hand side.

The right centre back in the three is essentially never stationary

and for the most part that's been Achenpong

and he has two major movement The first is outside on the overlap

which knocks on to Neto his most used right wing back He may not be the biggest

but he helps Alonso's direct play in another way through constant runs in behind Usually from tucking infield

and looking to run beyond or

when Achenpong makes the run into the half space Neto stays wide and runs in behind instead.

Do these rotations sound familiar?

They should.

At Leverkusen, it was Edmund Tapsober stepping out of the right of the three, so that Frimpong could fly forward from wing back.

We're seeing Alonzo adapting to his players while keeping his Alonzo -isms.

Either way, this all trickles through to Palmer.

The Englishman's getting back to his best, and naturally the Blues look to get him on the ball as much as possible.

Those right side movements are vital to this because Palmer, nominally off the right, doesn't spend his whole time out there.

Achimpong and Neto occupy the defenders ahead of him, and Palmer uses his freedom to drop deeper into the midfield.

Which means that Chelsea suddenly do often have a midfield three, and now they have a genuinely penetrative passer in the region.

It's the reason Palmer, an attacking midfielder, is ranked so high for line breaking passes, alongside other attacking midfielders who also spend large chunks deep on the transition.

Because being so deep means he's often initiating the play.

Look at his season heat map on FOTMOB.

For a nominal right winger or a right 10, he's spending an enormous amount of time in this deeper central zone.

And here's the thing, we've sort of seen this before.

At Madrid with no crows, Alonso turned Arda Gula, a natural number 10, into this deeper playmaker because no one else was doing the job.

Now his best attacker is doing similarly at Chelsea from this deeper position on the pitch.

Palmer dropping in also gives Chelsea options.

Remember how the backline was struggling to progress in the first phase?

Well, when Palmer drops in, that's the signal for Rhys James to also drop deeper

and help with the progression as he is a better passer than anyone in the backline.

While Rodgers can then drift deeper to still give them those numbers.

But the duels of Alonso's Chelsea are the twin 10s and here's where we get to the core of what he's built.

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Rodgers is sixth in the league for chances created.

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Palmer isn't far behind.

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Two elite creators.

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But neither is high for pass completion.

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The reason is simple.

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Neither is here to retain the ball.

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They want to cause the opponent as much harm as possible, as quickly as possible.

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So that means playing forward at the first opportunity.

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High reward, but also high risk.

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Runners have been keyed throughout.

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Whether it's Neto tugging in and then running beyond, João Pedro running their channels, or Rodgers running beyond or dropping Pedro.

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Either way, the end result is the same.

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Find these runners as soon as possible.

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When it works, it releases men into space at pace.

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When it doesn't, Chelsea are giving the ball away.

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constantly, which is the single biggest reason their possession share sits where it does.

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It's not a bug of the system, it's to be expected when you're attacking that quickly.

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And there's something else worth mentioning, Chelsea have picked up a knack for scoring the opener extremely early.

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First minute at Fulham, fourth at Brighton, second at the Emirates and the seventh minute against Hull.

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Four league games where they were in front inside 10 minutes.

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That game state will make it far likelier for a team to sit off, which contributes to their possession stats as well.

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But then something interesting happened.

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Chelsea, second bottom for possession at the time, faced Hull, the only team below them.

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19th vs 20th for possession share.

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And this was the scoreline.

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The match was also fascinating because Hull lined up in a back 3 themselves.

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And Alonso responded by doing something we saw a lot of at Madrid, chopping formation early in a project as he's learning his players best roles.

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Hull was the first time in the league that Chelsea deviated from their own back 3, and they lined up in a 4 instead.

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But listen to what Alonso said afterwards.

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Howell handed Chelsea the ball, but all it did was give them more time to express the exact same principles, just in a different formation.

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Hato and Gusto both pushed high and settled into familiar patterns.

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Gusto pushed into the same regions that Neto usually does, while James dropped between the centre backs so much that he became the third man, and Palmer still dropped deeper to help the progression.

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That right side combination with runners in behind still proved to be the main point of danger.

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A different formation on paper, but the same principles driving the Alonso engine.

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And Chelsea still looked most dangerous when hitting on the transition.

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A quarter of their shots still came on the counter, even with almost 70 % possession.

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But Hall was the exception.

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For the most part, Chelsea have been playing without the ball.

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So what's their defensive setup?

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This is the area that Alonso has spent the most time tweaking.

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And so far, he's tried three different approaches.

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And none have solved the issue.

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Approach 1 is hyper aggressive, with João Pedro leading the charge, while the 10s stay deeper on the opposition's midfielders to prevent the central outlet and instead force them wide.

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The problem is that ideally, Pedro would be a one -man pressing unit, but in reality, one of the 10s usually gets drawn into it, meaning either a pivot is freed for the easier outlet,

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or a wingback has to push higher to cover, leaving space in behind.

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And this is where the centre -backs become critical successful back threes in the Premier League have one thing in common.

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Aggressive centre -backs who are extremely mobile and happy to follow dropping men between the lines.

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Antonio Rudiger was the prototype in a back three.

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And even in back fours when teams are defending more man to man, the likes of Saliba and Gabriel have shown how this should be done.

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At times Chelsea's centre -backs have been more hesitant, which means the opposition finds space in dangerous areas between the lines, the moment that the press is broken.

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The second approach has been Alonso looking to drop Pedro deeper at times, committing to pressing the centre backs through his 10s instead.

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The shape can work but the space is wide and the wing backs now have to commit to the press.

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And if the pass down the line is made, there are massive overload risks in the wide areas.

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The third approach is the most different, the mid block.

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And here the pressing stops completely.

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And this calls back to Alonso's initial Leverkusen side, the one that was battling relegation.

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They had the third highest passes for defensive action in the Bundesliga and the fewest final third possession regains.

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This was a side content to give up the ball and sit back and hit on the break.

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And we're seeing shades of it.

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The priority is almost entirely on protecting the center.

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The tens tuck in and stay narrow and only Pedro pushes up occasionally.

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This sort of mid block helps open play solidity, but doesn't help Chelsea win the ball back, meaning that they don't see as much of the ball as you would expect.

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And teams have opted to build wide against this and they've had success.

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The reason is simple, Alonzo is asking Rodgers and Palmer to protect the centre and then cover the distance onto the flanks, which is a tall task.

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And what you end up having is a 10 jogging back and the wing back being isolated, which leads to a lot of crossing opportunities in the wider regions.

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And even when the 10s do track back, the defensive instinct to follow the runners just isn't there, so the opposition still find their way into dangerous areas.

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Alternatively, one of the pivots is dragged wider to cover behind the 10, leaving a ton of central space to be exploited.

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But there's a benefit to this built -in defensive weakness.

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Having Palmer and Rodgers relatively high up means they are uniquely positioned for the counter -attack.

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When Chelsea win the ball, they can find either of the 10s and now their direct passing pays off properly.

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As soon as they receive, they don't waste any time.

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They hit the runners immediately and Alonso is happy to commit men in these phases.

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In fact, Chelsea have the most shots per game from counter -attacking situations in the league.

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The system prioritizes transitions because that's when Chelsea have been most dangerous.

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Hull showed it.

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Even with 70 % of the ball, they were most threatening on the break.

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But still, the defence can't be sacrificed for the sake of the counter attack.

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And Alonso has already been tweaking that defensive shape a little for better cover, with Rodgers now often deeper as part of a 5 -3 -2.

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He starts deeper, so now there's better lateral coverage of the pitch, and they still have two forwards to press the centre backs, but Rodgers is now a little further from the transition.

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Most teams in a back 3 would push the wing back higher and shift to a temporary 4, but Alonso has resisted this for the most part,

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which tells you something about his commitment to specific defensive principles.

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All of this means one thing about Alonso's Chelsea, they will be a fascinating watch, especially as a neutral, and with the firepower up top,

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they might do interesting things near the top of the table.

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But to do anything when it comes to a title charge, the defence will need to be tightened up massively.

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But I want to know what you make of Alonzo's Chelsea down below.

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And don't forget to download FopMob to get access to stats like the ones in this video. And actually,

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one of the most interesting things that has become apparent is the commitment to the back three in his early Chelsea stage.

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But not all back threes function the same.

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To examine how one back three led to one of the most successful stints in the league

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while another led to a manager becoming a laughing stock, check out this video on screen now.

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ฝึกพูดภาษาอังกฤษด้วยเทคนิค Shadowing จากวิดีโอ: I watched 1170 minutes of Alonso's Chelsea. It's Time To Be Honest About His Tactics

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