Shadowing-Übung: Husserl: Phenomenology and the Life World - Englisch Sprechen Lernen mit Video
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Edmund Husserl is one of the most important and influential figures in 20th century philosophy.
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And this is despite the fact, or perhaps because of the fact, that he's a particularly difficult philosopher to interpret.
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His style is extremely recondite.
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His writings are voluminous, almost to the point of compulsiveness.
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And he has a tendency to construct neologisms,
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to correspond to the new paths that he's breaking into the realm of the psyche, or the realm of the mind.
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Husserl, his early background was in mathematics, which is very important.
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Husserl is, perhaps like all mathematicians, is a sort of closet Platonist.
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I think that mathematicians on the whole tend to look for something universal and abstract in all the thinking that they do.
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And Husserl, who got his PhD under Weierstrass in Germany in the 1880s, has a definite set of Platonic tendencies and commitments.
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So when you read his philosophy, when you think about Husserl's work, if you were to connect it and think of it in terms of Plato and the Cartesian tradition,
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the tradition of Western rationalism and idealism, you will be on the right track at the very least.
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Now like Descartes, what Husserl wished to do was to construct a new foundation for knowledge.
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It's a radical epistemological move which attempts to create certainty in the face of contingency
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and the uncertainty that is generated by the other realms of knowledge.
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So in some respects, perhaps like Kant, what Husserl's project involves is finding a presuppositionless foundation to human knowledge.
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And what this would be is a sort of science of sciences
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that would inform and direct and correct all the other activities of the human mind, including natural science.
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So what Husserl is trying to do is get down to the Urstuf, the bedrock of the human psyche,
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and from there to generate all the other realms of knowledge which correspond to it.
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In some respects, this is like the Cartesian project of looking into oneself,
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and after finding an indubitable foundation for that and for the contents of your mind, to move from there to generating the external world.
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So, like Descartes, Husserl is working on the assumption that, first of all, the self is self -evident.
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In other words, it's not controversial that we are selves and that we have selves and that we are conscious.
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He takes that to be simply a given, and that that is indubitable.
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And not only is that indubitable, the interesting thing about it is that the knowing self,
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the cogito, is in Husserl's view both temporally and logically prior to the world that's known by the cogito.
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In other words, the knower comes before the known.
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That has to come first.
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And if you think about the idealist tradition, all these guys believe that.
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Think about Descartes.
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Think about Spinoza.
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Think about Kant.
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The whole idealist or rationalist tradition tends to emphasize inwardness, internality.
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And perhaps that's not only an important characteristic of Husserl, but I would be inclined to say that that's one of the most characteristic moves,
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the characteristic intellectual deployments of continental philosophy.
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In other words, unlike the Anglo -American tradition, which looks outward, like Hume, and develops a theory of the external world,
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and then afterwards, as a sort of postscript to that activity, develops a theory of the psyche, of the mind, of what's internal to a human being, well, the continental tradition does the opposite.
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They start out with a theory of what's inside, and then from there they try and work outwards.
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And both the Anglo -American tradition and the continental tradition suffer from a sort of common problem.
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When they try and make the jump from one realm, what we might call the exocosm, to the internal realm, the psyche, the soul, or the mind,
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or what I call the introcosm, there's always a problem in leaping that hurdle.
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And it doesn't really matter which side you start on.
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The problem is always going to be the same.
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How do we move from one part of the hurdle to the other?
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How do we move from the beginning to the end?
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So when you look at Husserl, when you look at this Cartesian continental tradition, keep that in mind.
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They're starting out with the internal facts of human consciousness and generating the world from that.
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So it's a different problematic, a different starting point, and that's what you keep in mind when you look at Husserl.
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Now, corresponding to this way of developing a philosophy is the hope of getting certain knowledge, like Descartes.
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Descartes' whole project of radical skepticism was to develop a knowledge that was foundational and completely certain.
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Husserl is trying to do the same thing, he's a sort of neo -Cartesian.
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And much of his work, when you actually start to read the stuff that he's published, because although he produced a tremendous amount of writing, Most of what he produced was not published in his lifetime,
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and he was in a voluminous writing.
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He produced almost 45 ,000 pages of work, and it tends to be very repetitive.
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It is methodological for the most part, and particularly programmatic.
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In other words, what his writings are about is how we engage in a method,
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which he calls phenomenology, which will allow us to discern these eternal essences that exist within the human psyche.
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And once we identify these essences, then we will know ourselves.
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And once we know ourselves clearly and in a way that can't be doubted, that can't be called into question, then and only then can we construct all the other elements of knowledge.
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So what he wants is what he described as philosophy as a rigorous science, which is a very radical sort of an idea.
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I mean, by the 20th century, I think very few thinkers are willing to say that philosophy is not only a rigorous science, but it's the foundation, the ur -knowledge of all other possible cognition.
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So this is a long...it's a play that tries to go for all the marbles.
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He's trying to win the big philosophical game.
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And if he fails to do that, and I think that he does, I mean, I think that his project is a failure, I think that we have to admire the sort of nobility which tries to take on a huge intellectual project like that.
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In many respects, because Husserl himself, as a man rather than as a philosopher, was a kind of a saintly individual.
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He was conspicuous for his dedication and his devotion and his moral seriousness to philosophy.
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I would almost be tempted to compare him to sort of a Don Quixote of philosophy.
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We all laugh at the results of Don Quixote's misadventures because, well, they're silly, and he misunderstands the way the world works.
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But on the other hand, no one laughs at Don Quixote's intentions.
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They are intrinsically noble, and we have no choice but to admire that.
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I kind of feel that way about Husserl.
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I think that the project, well, not only does it not complete itself, it never completely gets started, and it's probably impossible to do,
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but I sort of admire the idea of unifying all of knowledge.
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It is a sort of quest for the Holy Grail, and even if we never find it, there is something excellent about the quest.
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And I say this initially in my treatment of Husserl
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because I'm going to be kind of hard on him a little later on.
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So without being too hard, I think that we should give him a little bit of slack because he's trying to do something that, if it is not impossible, is certainly exceedingly difficult.
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Much more ambitious than the local, small, individual projects characteristic of the Anglo -American tradition.
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Now, first off, he starts out with the idea of certainty and intuition.
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In other words, if we're going to examine ourselves in a phenomenological way, if we're going to pursue this method of phenomenology,
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we're going to have to find out what the procedure for knowing things is, I mean, what phenomenology involves as a method,
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what it investigates, and how it investigates it.
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Those are always all going to be informed.
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And since this is a methodological project, It makes sense to talk about how we do this as opposed to what we do.
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And one of the big issues here is the question of intuition.
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Now, I guess perhaps when you hear me use a word like intuition, particularly because we live in contemporary America, we are in the thrall of the Anglo -American tradition,
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you perhaps think that I should put that in italics.
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Because intuition is a kind of fishy, kind of mushy, kind of messy sort of a category.
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And I want to start out suggesting that that's not the case.
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and that in fact it might be true some of the time
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but I can imagine intuitions and I'm going to help you imagine some intuitions
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which are not only not controversial but they're not mushy and they're really not doubtable.
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Here's some ideas.
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Let me ask you some questions.
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I have a studio audience here which is live and it kind of helps me out.
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I'd like your information or your answers to these questions.
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First of all, do I have a headache?
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You don't know.
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You don't know.
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And how about, do I hope someday to be elected president?
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You don't know.
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Do I like spinach?
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You don't know.
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My point is that I can answer these questions even though you can't.
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I know if I have a headache or not.
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And what would somebody else, external to me, presume to tell me?
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No, I don't have a headache?
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Are you going to correct me on that matter?
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No, of course not.
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It's silly.
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Well, may I suggest that my knowledge of my headache is a direct intuition of my experience, my psychic state.
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And I don't need anybody else to help me out here.
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And if you doubt that, you say, no, Mike, you don't have a headache.
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What am I supposed to do?
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Do some math and show you that I did it?
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Or should we go to the lab and will I do some experiments and show you that I have a headache?
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Can you see why that project is silly
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and we wouldn't gesture at something external to my experience of the world in order to validate the proposition
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that I have a headache?
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Intuition, then, perhaps is not so gooey as we might imagine.
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There are certain things which we validate just by gesturing at our experience of them.
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In that respect, oddly enough, phenomenology, Husserl's method, and empiricism, the method of somebody like David Hume, even though they are so different in many respects,
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share a common property is that they're all ultimately based on our experience.
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Hume's phenomenalism, his empiricism, is based on our experience of the external world, observing it.
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Husserl's phenomenology.. alternatively, is based on our experience of the internal world, and it reduces only to that and there's nothing further that we can gesture at.
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So on the one hand, I would recommend that you look at this with a certain degree of skepticism.
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In other words, intuition can be a very fishy category, it can be nebulous, and it can be a simple refusal to give reasons for what you believe.
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And usually the refusal to give a reason philosophically for what you believe is a way of saying
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that you don't have a reason for what you believe.
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But my point is that that's That's not always the case.
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If you think about the idea of intuition in terms of questions like, do I have a headache, I believe you will realize that I'm the only one who knows that, and that it's not absurd or meaningless for me to say that I have a headache.
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So I'm just trying to establish the idea of intuition as not being intrinsically preposterous.
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Now Husserl was a student of Brentano, which is an interesting fact because Freud was also one of Brentano's students, and from Brentano, apparently a very influential teacher,
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he He borrowed, as Freud did, the idea of intentionality.
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And it revolves around the proposition that the facts of mental life, of our psychic life, are irreducible.
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In other words, we can't talk about love and hate and hope and guilt and lust in terms of chemicals.
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Freud liked the idea that ultimately we could reduce one to the other, but in practice he treated it as a sort of autonomous inquiry into the mind.
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Well something analogous is happening when we look at Husserl.
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He believes that the facts of mental life are irreducible, and they're real.
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And not only are they irreducible and real, but they come first.
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In other words, what Husserl wants to do is like the project of Descartes.
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He wants to construct the self first, and out of that build nature, rather than, say, the empiricist project of constructing nature first, and then, later on, constructing the self.
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So the self comes first, and how do you find out about yourself?
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Intuition.
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And the reason why it's important for me to establish intuition is
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because elsewise this seems like a tremendously nebulous and sort of baggy activity, but in fact it potentially could be more precise than one might immediately imagine.
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Now what's the problem Husserl wants to solve?
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Well, in one of his most accessible books, and if you intend to read Husserl, which can be quite trying, I would recommend you try Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man.
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It's one of his last works.
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It's published in 36, It's written in the 30s, and he dies in 38, and the reason why that's a good introduction to Husserl is
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because it's easier to figure out what Husserl is against than it is to figure out what Husserl is for.
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And what he's against are things like historicism,
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relativism, psychologism, scientism, and what he's gesturing at here is the whole tendency of thought since the Enlightenment,
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which tends to move away from theological or more precisely metaphysical structures towards an emphasis on the empirical external world.
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Perhaps this is a homage to the rise of modern natural science, but Husserl says that the rise of modern natural science has misled us, has caused us to misunderstand the world around us,
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and has put philosophy on the wrong footing.
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The result of this has been an impoverishment of our culture.
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In some ways, I would say that Husserl's concerns are fundamentally cultural.
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He's putting together this epistemological project in order to rescue us from the degeneration into a sort of pure materialism.
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What Husserl thinks, at least Husserl's self -conception, is that what he's doing is renewing and reviving the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition of Greek rationalism,
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where our logos, our rationality, applies to the whole domain of human experience.
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Let us juxtapose that to the tradition of scientism that we see in Mach and Avanarius and all those positivistic Germans.
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There, he calls that the tradition of Democritus.
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Those of you who know the Greek philosopher Democritus will know that he reduced the world to atoms in the void.
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Well, in some ways, that's what modern scientific project has done.
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And Husserl says that is a wrong turn.
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We have moved down an intellectual cul -de -sac there.
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So what he's trying to say is that we must go back to ourselves.
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It's very interesting to know about the things in the world external to us, but the real important thing is for us to know ourselves.
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And once we know ourselves, then we will be able to construct our knowledge of the external world on an indubitable foundation.
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But if we start with the external world and its contingency and its messiness and its lack of certainty, all our other intellectual activities, including our knowledge of our self,
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is going to reflect that same contingency and uncertainty.
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So while the project may not be entirely successful, the problem that he's formulating is in fact reasonable and serious and ought to be taken with great care.
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So we're going to move against the general tendency of Western culture since the breakup of the Middle Ages.
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There is a decidedly scholastic element to Husserl's work as well,
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an infinite working out of carefully constructed logical oppositions in a sort of tautological way.
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The construction of elaborate tautologies is perhaps one of the characteristic philosophical problems of mathematicians who eventually become philosophers?
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What were they doing in their training?
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Constructing tautologies and working out the implications of definitions.
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Well, that's what Husserl's whole project is, because he moves from the domain of space or quantity to the whole domain of human experience.
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So a noble and exciting project, let's dive into it and see if we can make some sort of sense out of it.
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Husserl is worried, right?
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When he's writing philosophy and the crisis of European man, Let's think about his context.
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He was a professor at the University of Freiburg until 1933, when he was dismissed from his post because he was a Jew.
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Right?
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National Socialism comes in, and he gets replaced by one of his students, Martin Heidegger.
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And at that time, it seems clear enough to Husserl that Western culture is collapsing.
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One of the results of this Democritean tradition, as opposed to the revived Platonic Aristotelian tradition, is that the fact -value distinction emerges.
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We get various kinds of relativisms.
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We get various kinds of will -to -power, voluntaristic philosophies.
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All of these, according to Husserl, are a sign of cultural degeneration.
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And the source of this cultural degeneration is our lack of knowledge of ourselves and the world around us.
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So what he's trying to do is sort of like Ajax.
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I don't know if you know the Iliad, but Ajax preventing the Trojans from burning the Greek ships.
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He stands there and will not move.
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And there is something tremendously heroic about it, even though he may be fighting phantom battles, all right?
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He thinks, at least, that what he's doing is absolutely essential to the project of our culture.
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And the problem that we're going to find, or one of the problems we're going to find in this procedure of looking into ourselves is
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that it could easily become frivolous or arbitrary.
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In other words, once I look into myself, I suppose I could tell you the immediate contents of my experience, but the problem is that that would be arbitrary and completely subjective.
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That's not going to give us an ultimate foundation.
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So we We have to do something with our looking into ourselves, with our turning inward.
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And what Husserl wants to do is use a method for examining the contents of our psyche, and that method will be called phenomenology.
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What he will do is something called the epoche, which is a translation of the idea of suspension.
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Like Descartes, when he says, I'm going to doubt the whole external world, what Husserl wants to do is, first of all, suspend the whole external world.
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Now, it's not that he disbelieves in it.
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In other words, he's not being skeptical of the existence of tables
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and chairs the way Descartes did in the discourse on method.
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He's not denying their existence.
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He's just saying that the whole external world is irrelevant, bracketed, right?
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In the strict mathematical sense of bracketing a problem, because remember, he had his training as a mathematician.
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So we're going to bracket the problem of the external world and leave out all that stuff.
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And bracketing the external world means that we're going to leave out a great deal of human experience.
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For example, this will leave out things like cause and effect relationships.
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Why?
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Because as Hume points out, we don't see cause and effect in the world.
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We just see one thing happening after another.
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All scientific theorems will be left out.
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Mathematical deductions will be left out.
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We're going to be left with the pure, raw data of being a human being.
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And what Husserl thinks is that there's something common to all of us that we're going to discern there.
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You might think of it as something like this.
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You know what it is to sift out sand, to look for something hidden in sand?
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What he's trying to do is sift out the contents of human experience
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and find out the stuff that doesn't pass through the mesh of phenomenology.
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What we hold on to there will be what Husserl calls an essence, some invariable necessary quality to human experience.
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And when we collect these essences together and reduce them still further, I think what we will get is some common urshtuff of the human psyche.
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Also think of the idea of reduction.
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Reduction is a funny word.
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From Latin, it means to lead back.
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We're going to be led back to our original kind of primal consciousness.
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Another way of thinking of reduction would be the idea of boiling down.
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Imagine the consciousness is a big whale
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and you've got to put it in a pot
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and boil away all the stuff that's irrelevant so that you can get to something that's essential and structural and permanent there.
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And this longing for something essential and structural and permanent, can't you hear the ghost of Plato here?
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Right?
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And it's a typical intellectual move of somebody that's been trained in mathematics.
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and this has had a tremendous influence on the subsequent development of continental philosophy, particularly people like Heidegger.
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Now, in the process of developing this presuppositionless philosophy,
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what we're going to find out is something like the shape of the ego's transparent cage.
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Like Kant, he's going to tell us what the necessary limitations of our experience are, and once he's done that,
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he will think that he has done it permanently for all of time in the way that any mathematician would.
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Now, the problem is to find some certain knowledge with which to combat historicism, that we get in Diltai, or scientism, that we get the positivists,
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or various kinds of relativism, and the way we're going to do that.. is by boiling down with this epoche,
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and in the first case what we'll do is we will have a sort of purified subjectivity.
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We will boil it down until we get to the essential constructs from which human minds are made, and the result will be that authentic reality will be disclosed.
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We're going to suspend our belief in the external world and just examine what's left over.
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And what's left over after we perform this kind of an activity of reduction will be these these essences
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that are permanent and eternal.
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And he will know then the structure of the human mind.
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And these will always be, they will always have a certain similar set of characteristics.
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And phenomenological statements will result from this phenomenological examination of the internal contents of our psyche.
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And the key thing here is that it's not empirical in the sense
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that I can observe that and have it be an empirical activity.
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It will be descriptive, but it won't describe anything out there it's going to describe exclusively the stuff that's in here, all right?
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So it's going to be a descriptive theory of the introcosm, all right?
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And what he's looking for is absolute certainty without presuppositions, and it will always be about internal, intentional actions.
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What he's trying to do here is derive a priori statements.
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And if you remember Kant, what an a priori statement is, is it has at least two qualities.
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One, it's non -empirical, and two, it's necessarily true.
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So what he wants to find is to generate, after looking into his own psyche in this phenomenological way, sifting out the contingent and the arbitrary and the irrelevant,
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is a priori certain truths about what it means to be a human being, contuberalis once again.
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Now the problem, you might want to say
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that after this reduction what we're getting is something like immediate direct apprehension of what the scholastics call universals, right?
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We're looking directly into the self, and since the self constructs and projects the world, what we're going to do is cogitate ourselves and bootstrap ourselves into some permanent reality.
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Now there are many difficulties with this.
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Some of them we should look at directly.
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First of all, there are very few examples in Husserl's work of actually doing this.
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One of the problems with phenomenology, the nebulous, baggy quality about it, is that he says that the first thing we have to do is figure out what the phenomenological method method is,
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and the way we develop the phenomenological method is to use phenomenology on itself, to inspect yourself.
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So there's something kind of fishy going on here.
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In order to find out what a phenomenon is, remember in Greek, phenomenon is that which is disclosed, that which is apparent and directly known.
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Well, in order to find out what a phenomenon is, one of the things we're going to do is reduce the idea of the phenomenon to find out what that essentially is, and from there we'll be able to move directly on.
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So it's a method that hopes to pull itself up by its bootstraps, and I have some problems logically with this activity.
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Let me give you some examples to kind of flesh this out, make this a little bit easier to concretely think about.
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And Husserl himself was generating things like investigations of phenomenon, but also ideas like number,
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meaning, truth, pure abstractions that he believes are common to all cognitive beings.
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And in every case, we end up with some sort of a circle, what he calls the epistemological circle, and at other times the methodological circle.
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The reasoning always ends up being circle, but of course, if you're going to restrict yourself to the domain of internality, what else could you be doing but talking about circular things in a circular way?
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Where is there to go?
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It's almost not even a circle.
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It's something like a point.
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It almost lacks that interior quality.
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And his method, or the method that he uses more often than any other, because it's very difficult to figure out exactly what this amounts to, is what he calls free imaginative variation.
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Let's see what that's like.
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That's how we search for essences.
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And what we're going to do is think of something.
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Let's take a human being as something that I'm going to do a phenomenological reduction on.
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I'm going to think about that problem now.
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Cogitating with me?
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All right.
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All right, let's give this a shot.
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What we're going to do is attribute predicates to this thing, human being, and then add and subtract them in our imagination
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and see which of these predicates we believe we can dispense with and which we believe we cannot dispense with.
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And then we'll make two categories.
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The ones we can dispense with, which are the contingent things we're trying to get rid of, that's the sand we're sifting away, and the things we can't dispense with, which are the essences, and that's what we're looking for.
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Let me give you an example.
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Is it true that we necessarily have to attach the following predicate to the human mind?
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That the human mind is good at math.
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Is that true of every human mind?
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No. I'm bad at math.
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I know for a fact that it's not true of every human mind.
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I'm no good at math.
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Let's try another one.
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The human mind forgets birthday birthdays.
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Well, that's a predicate, but some human minds remember birthdays.
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But how about this one?
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The human mind is self -conscious.
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Do you think you could dispense with that?
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No. I mean, it's built right into the idea of what we mean by being a human mind.
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All right?
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So what we're doing here is attributing a great number of predicates.
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One of the great problems here is it seems to me there are an infinite number of predicates, and we're never going to get, or we're never going to finish the first thing we try
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and reduce much less do all the other reductions that are going to be necessary to engage in this project.
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But at least this is an instantiation of what the guy is trying to do, to separate the necessary from the unnecessary, or the inessential, from the essential predicates.
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And once you have the whole list of essential predicates of a thing, now you know what it is.
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And then you get these things that are defined now as their essences, just the essential predicates, and then we start to boil that down again.
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And you keep on boiling until you get to complete disclosure of what it means to be a human being.
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I think this is a pretty fishy way of doing this.
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I think the idea of trying to find out what it's like to be a human being, inwardly, is an interesting thought.
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The difficulty is that, in practice, it's awfully hard to talk about these things.
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Now, here's the first difficulty.
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Truth conditions.
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How do we know which of these predicates are the essential ones?
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Help me out here.
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I can imagine some which it seems fairly clear.
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Triangles have to have the property of having three sides.
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I can believe that.
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I mean, that's not too controversial.
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But I can imagine cases where it wouldn't be clear, even among phenomenologists, and where there might be a lack of agreement.
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And I'm not quite sure how we go about finding that out.
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And even if I just look at it from my own perspective, in other words, leave out the social interaction between phenomenologists, I look at it in my case, and I say, all right,
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so I've decided that one of the essential predicates of human being is the fact that it is self -conscious.
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That's just fine.
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Now, suppose I'm uncertain about that.
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Well, I guess I can't be uncertain about it
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because I found out by introspection and I'm certain of all the things that I introspect.
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So I guess I can't be uncertain about that.
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But suppose I talk to one of my students and I say, kid, one of the essential properties of the human mind is that it's self -conscious.
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Suppose he says, professor, how do you know?
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And what does it do?
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Pound the table and say, look, don't ask me how I know.
345
I looked inside myself and I know.
346
That's not a very satisfactory answer and you get the sense that there's no real way to gesture at this.
347
The difficulty
348
that we're going to find is something like this i can
349
say look i'll do it right now i intuited this yesterday i looked inside myself
350
and i found out that one of the essential properties of the human being is that it should be self -conscious
351
and if you don't believe me i'm going to do it now i'm going to sit here
352
and introspect and yeah i'm definitely right i've done the phenomenological reduction i bracketed the world
353
and take my word for it this is really the case
354
now we would like this to be a universal logical procedure
355
we would like this to be univocal my sense is that in practice it is not
356
problem number one uh what it reminds one of the things
357
that sort of ruins husserl for a man is if you have been exposed to Ludwig Wittgenstein before you do Husserl,
358
because Wittgenstein's work is a wonderful way of dissolving these kind of problems.
359
In other words, Wittgenstein says he doesn't want to talk about whether this is true or false.
360
He says, look, the whole problem is misconceived, and that's the real difficulty we have here.
361
And let's think about what the criticism of this is going to be.
362
What Husserl thinks he's doing when he finds out what the essence of a human being is, he thinks he's finding out something about the universal structure of the human mind, and that all people have to think that because these words,
363
these terms like human being correspond to natural kinds in the world
364
and the natural kinds of the world correspond to natural categories in human cognition.
365
My point is, that's probably not true.
366
Wittgenstein would help us out here.
367
Wittgenstein says, I want to lead the fly out of the fly bottle.
368
Husserl is a guy walking around, or like a fly, walking around inside the fly bottle unable to get out.
369
Here's the problem.
370
Instead of essences being a quality intrinsic to the human mind, Wittgenstein will point out that essences are a quality intrinsic to a particular language.
371
So when you find out that self -consciousness is a necessary predicate for essence,
372
you're not finding out some quality about the human mind intrinsically which corresponds to essence.
373
What you're finding out is about the way we use the word essence in the English language.
374
So Wittgenstein, by dissolving this, could have saved, if they had been born a generation apart, in other words, if Wittgenstein had come a generation before, instead of Husserl coming a generation before,
375
he could have saved the guy an awful lot of handwriting.
376
Because look, the whole idea is wrong.
377
There's no such thing as an essence.
378
And what you're trying to do, what you're doing is reifying language and treating it as a model of the psyche.
379
And that's just wrong.
380
There was a wonderful, I mean, think about my hypothetical situation with my student.
381
Where I said, look, I intuited this yesterday.
382
I did the phenomenological reduction, I'm going to do it now, and believe me, this will confirm what I said yesterday, that the essence of human being is consciousness.
383
This is a lot like what Wittgenstein said when he said, look, suppose you bought a newspaper and you had some doubt as to what the story meant, or the truth of a given story on page one.
384
How would you find out if the story was true?
385
Well, there are different ways you might do that, but one way that you wouldn't do that is to go out and buy another copy of the same paper.
386
Right?
387
Now you see the point?
388
So when I said, look, I'm going to intuit this again for you, what I'm doing is I'm buying another copy of the same paper.
389
This doesn't tell us anything, and this can't tell us anything.
390
I can buy an infinite number of copies of the same paper, and it's still not going to tell us anything.
391
See the difficulty here?
392
He's trapped within the intracosm, and he can't figure out how to get out.
393
And neither can I if I follow this procedure.
394
Now can you see why this is going to be an extremely nebulous kind of philosophy, where it's going to be very hard to.. talk about how
395
we move from my internal consciousness of certain facts of the psyche to yours.
396
The difficulty here is that when we turn inward, and when we get a symbolically unmediated knowledge of anything internal to my psyche,
397
the lack of those symbols, that lack of mediation between me and these objects, means that it's real hard for me to talk about them later on.
398
And that means that it comes very close to talking to yourself.
399
And that is the opposite of what philosophy ought to be.
400
In a way, that's a betrayal of the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition.
401
The idea of logos demands that knowledge not just be rational, but that it be communicable.
402
That's one of the canons of rationality.
403
And Husserl comes up to the barriers of language, what Wittgenstein calls the limits of what can be said.
404
And he'd like to step over, but he never quite manages to do it.
405
So that's the kind of problem that comes up again and again and again.
406
Now towards the end of his life, he developed the idea of the Lebenswelt,
407
the life world, and this turn is toward the imminence of human experience and human consciousness.
408
Let me see if I can explain this idea.
409
What he wants to do is to look at the world
410
as it appears to human beings as it is given in human experience, as opposed to the impersonal,
411
abstract experience of the world that we get from our study of modern natural science.
412
In other words, science tells us, for example, that time goes on indefinitely.
413
Human beings don't experience time like that.
414
They have a very limited span in the world.
415
That's one of the big differences.
416
Concrete time is human time, my life.
417
Abstract time is just T sub one, T sub two, T sub n, goes on forever.
418
In other words, science abstracts and to that extent somewhat falsifies the reality of human experience.
419
He spends a lot of time discussing his views on time and his views on internal time consciousness.
420
That's the kind of thing that phenomenology would be suited to if we could ever get something done out of it.
421
The difficulty is this, Husserl spends a lot of his time, most of his career, not actually doing phenomenology, I mean applying this method, but rather figuring out what this method is,
422
and refining it, and trying to explain how it is we're going to do something later on, as soon as we figure out how to do it.
423
It appears from my reading of this, which has been most unsatisfactory because the philosophy itself is in many respects quite nebulous,
424
the best understanding I could come away with is this, that at some point in the indefinite future we will find out precisely what this method is.
425
And I mean precisely, mathematically Cartesian in that sense.
426
And then after we find out precisely what the method is at some point in the indefinite future, we will then actually be able to apply it to something and get some results at some indefinite point beyond that.
427
And then after that, at some indefinite point, after we've gotten all these essences and assembled them all in a lovely array, then we'll have some idea of what exactly we can do with this.
428
I mean, I'm told initially that the whole point of it is to give us an indubitable foundation to knowledge.
429
I would hope so, but it seems like we have to act on faith to a great extent
430
because it's very hard for him to communicate to us directly what it is
431
that we're supposed to do with this and how it is we're supposed to do it.
432
The best phenomenologists dispute questions like this.
433
A further problem
434
that we're going to get out of this neo -Cartesian kind of a project is the question of other minds.
435
Descartes always had a problem.
436
I mean, he didn't have any problem explaining how he knew he existed and what his existence was like.
437
But he always ran up against a sort of glass barrier
438
when he tried to explain what grounds we have for believing in the reality of other people's psyche.
439
Why is this not a kind of wilderness of objects?
440
And he thinks that there are other minds, but he can't quite explain why or how.
441
And Husserl is doing something very much like that.
442
He says, among other things, that we find out about human minds through something that is phenomenologically present to us, empathy.
443
Alas, he doesn't have a satisfactory phenomenological analysis of empathy.
444
He kind of pounds the desk and insists that, yes, there are other minds.
445
Yes, we can know them, and yes, we do so through empathy.
446
And to be honest, I think that that's kind of, in a pre -philosophic, kind of common sense way, that's true.
447
I mean, how else are you going to find that about other minds?
448
I don't know why we need a philosophy to tell us this.
449
I don't know why we need this elaborate procedure in order to be able to affirm that.
450
I don't think that he really made any progress along those lines.
451
Here's the issue.
452
Let's drop back a little bit and think about what the difficulty we have here is.
453
He wants to turn inward, and he also wants to talk.
454
And the advantage of the Anglo -American tradition is that by concentrating on external stuff on the public world, it's relatively easy to say what you're talking about,
455
to refer directly to things in the world, because they're public, they're external, they're here.
456
When I turn inward, it's very hard to make these questions public.
457
And here's the difficulty.
458
The temptation that the Anglo -American tradition has is to just abolish the internal world.
459
Remember, I mean, think of the idea that we get with Locke
460
and Hume that the psyche is a kind of an empty box, a tabula rasa, and all these impressions get sent in and then we associate them, you get that association of psychology, and that's what the mind is.
461
It's a bundle of sensations.
462
That is an impoverished view of human experience.
463
I mean, if you stop and think about it, nobody views the world and experiences the world as a bundle of sensations.
464
Here's the difficulty.
465
If we follow the Anglo -American tradition and we insist on the accuracy
466
and precision of our speech all we're able to talk about
467
is the external world their statements about what goes on inside
468
in other words the anglo -american empiricists can't make the jump from the outside in
469
and that's why the theory of the internal world is so impoverished
470
and it doesn't really persuade anybody all right it's in other
471
words the anglo -american tradition is a theory of the things
472
that are easy to talk about right the difficulty is is
473
that there are more things on heaven and earth that I dreamt of in your philosophy, I have an internal life, I experience the world that way, and although these things are difficult to talk about,
474
I feel the need to say something about them, even if it is unclear and nebulous.
475
Can you see then what the continental response to that is?
476
What they're going to do is sacrifice precision in order to enlarge the domain of discourse.
477
It is possible to truncate the domain of discourse, as the Anglo -American tradition does, and you get an increased resolution in the precision of your speech,
478
but this resolution costs a very high price.
479
You lose all of internal reality, right?
480
You lose the internal world.
481
They deny there is an internal world.
482
What that sort of procedure will lead to is something like behavioral psychology, Pavlov and Watson and Skinner, where there is no mind to talk about.
483
Now here's the difficulty.
484
If you follow that sort of a scientific Anglo -American path,
485
what you're going to get is a very elegant and precise set of verbal canons which account for the world around us,
486
but don't do a very good job of telling you about yourself.
487
And what Husserl and the Cartesians of various stripes will say is that if you don't know yourself, how are you going to know the world?
488
What the Oracle of Delphi says, know thyself.
489
It's a precondition for knowledge.
490
On the other hand, if you want to stay on the inside, the difficulty is that we are unable to get even the most basic
491
or foundational gestures at this content across to other people.
492
I know very well about my internal mental states.
493
I have a hard time getting them across to you.
494
Much of Ludwig Wittgenstein's work was an attempt to bridge this gap, but it's very, very difficult, and at least some mysterious and startling formations.
495
What Hussurel did, in kind of pounding on the desk, in a kind of Cartesian way, is to construct the idea of intersubjectivity.
496
In other words, the way in which these phenomenological psyches, these transcendental egos, communicate with each other, or the matrix in which they communicate with each other,
497
is his idea of intersubjectivity, an idea which is never completely or clearly defined, it allows us to form a sort of linguistic or verbal community with other minds,
498
and I mean, I kind of naively believe that there is such a thing, but he isn't able to give any very satisfactory account of it, and the reason why is the structure I was gesturing at just a little while ago.
499
All these continental guys, if you look at yourself, it's hard to break out of this solipsistic circle.
500
If you start on the outside, the problem is you can't get into your own mind, and you start it out as a mind, there are problems with both sides.
501
What I'm trying to do here is something like this.
502
Not to vindicate or justify Husserl, because I think that probably isn't going to work.
503
In many respects you may want to think of Husserl as being German Romanticism, Cartesianized, the lonely ego of Schiller or Goethe,
504
given a sort of mathematical Cartesian formulation.
505
And he insists in a kind of romantic way that I am a self, I know I am conscious, and I can't doubt that.
506
That's the fact of the matter.
507
I'm going to, on this rock I will build my church, right?
508
Well I can see how you might have a certain desire to do that.
509
My problem is that we're always going to end up either talking to ourselves
510
or constructing arbitrary commonsensical bridges from our philosophical solipsism into the regular world of everyday praxis, right?
511
And that's built into the idea of this project that all the continental thinkers are involved with.
512
So what I'm asking for in some respects is
513
that you cut the continental philosophers a little bit of slack
514
because of the fact that the project they have undertaken is probably impossible.
515
I mean, it may well be just impossible to talk about the internal facts of my psychic states, or it is so with a great deal of difficulty and a great deal of cloudiness.
516
It is not any particular problem with Husserl or any specific philosopher.
517
It is built into that kind of project of bridging this gap between what's inside and what's outside.
518
But here's the alternative.
519
We can go to the Anglo -American tradition.
520
I mean, Professor Staloff and I have this argument, essentially, all the time, because, I mean, neither one is completely satisfactory.
521
Well, if you start out with the external world, you're never going to get a sense of yourself.
522
You're never going to be able to talk about these internal facts, and that means that you will have to impoverish the vocabulary of our experience.
523
In other words, the problem with Hume
524
or with any of these Anglo -American empiricisms is that I just don't experience the world like that, and I think that that's a very fair objection.
525
Let me give you an example.
526
I'd have to make an analogy here, and this would perhaps make this whole difference between the Anglo -Americans and the Continentals more apparent.
527
Let's try the idea of going to a tailor and getting a suit of clothes.
528
okay it's a simple everyday thing you go to a tailor
529
and he measures you and you come back next week
530
and you've got your suit to close and you put on the jacket
531
and you find out the jacket only has one arm the tailor says well
532
if your jacket only has one arm your body is wrong
533
and the customer might well say well no no hold it let me get this straight now
534
my body is wrong
535
and your suit is right no that's not that's insane i
536
mean that's not the idea here in other words my body starts out being right i'm sure
537
that this is how i'm shaped and that if you only have one sleeve in your jacket, change the jacket.
538
The jacket is wrong, not my body.
539
And if the tailor says, no, that's absurd of you, you really have to remove that arm.
540
That's crazy, I'm not removing my arm, you're definitely putting another arm to this jacket.
541
In other words, do we change our body to suit our jacket, or do we change our jacket to suit our body?
542
Now let me suggest that our body is the set of our experiences, and that the jacket is the philosophical theory with which we account for them.
543
You really want to cut off your experience of cause and effect, of good and evil, of lust and rage and hatred and beauty because you can't talk about them precisely?
544
Or is this demand for philosophical precision taken to an unreasonable extreme?
545
In other words, when A .J.
546
Ayer, Ayer has the view that more moral theory is non -cognitive.
547
Well, I experience morals, at least sometimes, as being real and right and wrong.
548
If these Anglo -American guys, these real hard -shell empiricers, tell me that my experience is wrong, it's like the tailor telling me my body's wrong.
549
Don't tell me that I'm experiencing the world wrong.
550
No, your theory is wrong.
551
And if it doesn't correspond to my experience, then fix the theory.
552
Don't tell me to fix my experience.
553
My experience comes first.
554
Now can you see the strength of Husserl's point?
555
This is a devastating sort of an argument.
556
And in my view, it's actually true.
557
In other words, I think that Husserl's attempt to find a way out of this labyrinth just doesn't work.
558
He's spinning his wheels.
559
He's caught in a snowdrift.
560
But the idea of telling to these scientific, empirical, rational, logical guys that if your theory doesn't correspond to my experience, your theory is wrong, not my experience,
561
I think that's right on the money.
562
And I think that's the strong point of all continental philosophies.
563
They say, I'm gonna look at myself and the way I experience the world first, and if your theory corresponds to that and accounts for that, so be it.
564
If it doesn't, I am not gonna say, well look, I'll give up on beauty, I'll give up on morality, I'll give up on all my psychic states,
565
all my emotions, because after all either I talk about them clearly or I don't talk about them at all.
566
No. This demand for clarity has been taken to an unreasonable extreme.
567
It would be much better for us if we were to start with experience, or as Husserl's slogan was, to the things themselves.
568
Well, modify that a bit.
569
Let's start with experience.
570
Let's make our slogan experience first.
571
Me first.
572
And then I'll construct my world around that.
573
I'm not going to construct myself around the world.
574
That's insane.
575
It's like changing my body to suit my suit.
576
That's crazy.
577
This is the strong point of Husserl.
578
And if it doesn't ultimately offer us intuition of the essence of being
579
or whatever it is that he's trying to do here, if it doesn't offer us the ultimate structure of human cognition,
580
it does make an important point against the problem that Western philosophy has drifted into.
581
It makes the point that I come first.
582
And that's what phenomenology is.
583
In other words, if you leave out all the verbiage and the elaborate intellectual apparatus that he constructs, it all proceeds from the basic intuition that my experience is right,
584
and any theory that tells me my experience is mistaken is fundamentally, it has a cart before the horse.
585
And I think that's what holds together the whole tradition of continental philosophy in the 20th century.
586
This will be true for Husserl, but it's also going to be true for Heidegger, it's going to be true for Bergson, it's going to be true for all these guys that start out looking it themselves.
587
And if they get nebulous and fuzzy, well that's just built into the problem.
588
Another analogy that we can bring to this is that it's like singing.
589
The precision of our diction costs something.
590
The precision of our thinking and speech costs something.
591
We can loosen up the diction so it's not so precise what we're saying, but we can gain in range.
592
We can hit the high notes intellectually.
593
And I think that talking about right and wrong and talking about beauty and talking about the really important things psychically, those are the high notes of philosophie.
594
And the problem is that the empiricists can't hit those notes.
595
They have better diction than I do, but you can hit the high notes like this.
596
And this is what it's for.
597
And so for all the nebulous and dubious and perhaps even mystical qualities that we find in Husserl,
598
this is a serious and worthwhile attempt to account for what it means to be an ego in the 20th century.
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Wortschatz und Sprechhinweise zu dieser Lektion
Diese Sprechübung auf Niveau C1 basiert auf dem Video „Husserl: Phenomenology and the Life World“. Dieses Video enthält 598 Sätze und 8922 Wörter zum Nachsprechen. Der gesprochene Teil dauert 44:29. Der Sprecher spricht schnell, etwa 201 Wörter pro Minute – rechne mit verbundenen und verkürzten Lauten. 83 % der Wörter gehören zu den 3.000 häufigsten im Englischen; den Rest solltest du dir vor dem Üben ansehen.
Wichtiger Wortschatz in diesem Video
Die 15 anspruchsvollsten Wörter aus dem Video, mit Aussprache und Bedeutung:
| Wort | Aussprache | Bedeutung |
|---|---|---|
| essence Substantiv | /ˈɛsəns/ | Wesen, Essenz |
| intuition Substantiv | /ˌɪn.tjuːˈɪʃ.ən/ | Intuition, Ahnung |
| construct Verb | /ˈkɑn.stɹʌkt/ | bauen, konstruieren |
| phenomenology Substantiv | /fɪˌnɑməˈnɑləd͡ʒi/ | Phänomenologie |
| predicate Substantiv | /ˈpɹɛd.ɪ.kɪt/ | Prädikat, Satzaussage |
| phenomenological Adjektiv | phänomenologisch | |
| continental Adjektiv | /ˌkɑntɪˈnɛntl̩/ | kontinental |
| headache Substantiv | /ˈhɛdeɪk/ | Kopfschmerzen, Kopfweh |
| nebulous Adjektiv | /ˈnɛbjʊləs/ | neblig, nebelig |
| correspond Verb | /ˌkoɹəˈspɑnd/ | entsprechen, korrespondieren |
| philosopher Substantiv | /fəˈlɑsəfɚ/ | Philosoph, Philosophin |
| boil Verb | /bɔɪ(ə)l/ | sieden |
| gesture Substantiv | /ˈd͡ʒɛs.t͡ʃɚ/ | Geste, Gebärde |
| precision Substantiv | /pɹɪˈsɪʒ.ən/ | Präzision, Genauigkeit |
| dispense Verb | /dɪˈspɛns/ | ausgeben, austeilen |
Phrasal Verbs, die du hören wirst
| Wort | Aussprache | Bedeutung |
|---|---|---|
| find out Verb | herausfinden, erfahren | |
| figure out Verb | herausfinden | |
| end up Verb | sich herausstellen, am Ende irgendwo / etwas sein | |
| get out Verb | aussteigen | |
| boil down Verb | einkochen | |
| come back Verb | zurückkommen, zurückkehren | |
| come up Verb | erscheinen | |
| cut off Verb | /ˌkʌt ˈɔf/ [ˌkɐɾ ˈɔf] | abschneiden |
Sätze zum Wiederholen
Kurze, vollständige Sätze aus dem Video, die du im Alltag wiederverwenden kannst:
- First of all, do I have a headache?
- No, I don't have a headache?
- Are you going to correct me on that matter?
- What am I supposed to do?
- Do you think you could dispense with that?
Grammatik in diesem Video
Die Strukturen, die der Sprecher am häufigsten verwendet, mit den genauen Worten aus dem Video:
| Struktur | Im Video |
|---|---|
| Present Perfect have/has + Partizip Perfekt – eine vergangene Handlung, die jetzt noch wichtig ist | has misled · has put · has been |
| Passiv be + Partizip Perfekt – wichtig ist, was geschieht, nicht wer es tut | is generated · was not published · can't be doubted |
| Relativsätze who / which + Satz – eine Zusatzinformation über eine Person oder Sache | mathematics, which is · phenomenology, which will · science, which is |
Aussprache, auf die du achten solltest
Der Sprecher verwendet 159 Kurzformen und abgeschwächte Formen, zum Beispiel we're, I'm, don't. Sprich sie in der kurzen Form, so wie du sie hörst.
- Die „th“-Laute: mathematician /ˌmæθ.(ə.)məˈtɪʃ.ən/, methodological /ˌmɛθ.ə.dəˈlɑ.d͡ʒɪ.kəl/, empathy /ˈɛmpəθi/, mathematical /ˌmæθ(.ə)ˈmæt.ɪ.kəl/, thinker /ˈθɪŋ.kɚ/
- Die Laute „sh“ und „zh“: intuition /ˌɪn.tjuːˈɪʃ.ən/, precision /pɹɪˈsɪʒ.ən/, mathematician /ˌmæθ.(ə.)məˈtɪʃ.ən/, cognition /kɑɡˈnɪʃ.ən/, degeneration /dɪˌdʒɛnəˈɹeɪʃən/
- Lange Wörter – auf die Betonung achten: intuition /ˌɪn.tjuːˈɪʃ.ən/, phenomenology /fɪˌnɑməˈnɑləd͡ʒi/, philosopher /fəˈlɑsəfɚ/, indubitable /ɪnˈdubɪtəbəl/, mathematician /ˌmæθ.(ə.)məˈtɪʃ.ən/
Laute, die Deutschsprachigen schwerfallen:
- Stimmhafter Auslaut — /b/, /d/, /g/, /z/, /v/ am Wortende nicht verhärten: correspond /ˌkoɹəˈspɑnd/, inward /ˈɪnwəd/, dissolve /dɪˈzɑlv/, descriptive /dəˈskɹɪptɪv/, suspend /səsˈpɛnd/
- /æ/ — offener als „ä“: anglo /ˈæŋ.ɡləʊ̯/, mathematician /ˌmæθ.(ə.)məˈtɪʃ.ən/, characteristic /ˌkæɹ(ə)ktəˈɹɪstɪk/, satisfactory /sætɪsˈfækt(ə)ɹi/, bracket /ˈbɹækɪt/
- /dʒ/ — stimmhaft, nicht „tsch“: phenomenology /fɪˌnɑməˈnɑləd͡ʒi/, gesture /ˈd͡ʒɛs.t͡ʃɚ/, contingency /kənˈtɪnd͡ʒənsi/, degeneration /dɪˌdʒɛnəˈɹeɪʃən/, epistemological /ɪˌpɪstəməˈlɑd͡ʒəkəl/
So übst du mit diesem Video
- Höre dir das ganze Video einmal an, ohne zu sprechen, und notiere die Wörter, die du nicht kennst.
- Beginne mit 0,75-facher Geschwindigkeit, sprich Satz für Satz nach und wechsle zur normalen Geschwindigkeit, sobald es leichtfällt.
- Nimm dich auf und vergleiche mit dem Original; achte dabei auf Wörter wie essence, intuition, construct.
Was ist die Shadowing-Technik?
Shadowing ist eine wissenschaftlich fundierte Sprachlerntechnik, die ursprünglich für die professionelle Dolmetscherausbildung entwickelt und durch den Polyglotten Dr. Alexander Arguelles populär gemacht wurde. Die Methode ist einfach aber wirkungsvoll: Du hörst englisches Audio von Muttersprachlern und wiederholst es sofort laut — wie ein Schatten, der dem Sprecher mit nur 1–2 Sekunden Verzögerung folgt. Anders als passives Hören oder Grammatikübungen zwingt Shadowing dein Gehirn und deine Mundmuskulatur, gleichzeitig echte Sprachmuster zu verarbeiten und zu reproduzieren. Studien zeigen, dass es Aussprachegenauigkeit, Intonation, Rhythmus, verbundene Sprache, Hörverständnis und Sprechflüssigkeit signifikant verbessert — was es zu einer der effektivsten Methoden für die IELTS Speaking-Vorbereitung und reale englische Kommunikation macht.