쉐도잉 연습: The Greek-Turkish War 1919-1923 (Greco-Turkish War Documentary) - 영상으로 영어 말하기 배우기

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The First World War in the Middle East ended in 1918, but the end of one war was just the beginning of another.

The Allied powers have occupied parts of the Ottoman Empire, but cannot impose a peace because of Turkish resistance.

In the post-war chaos, Greece will attempt to revive past glories – but the Greco-Turkish War will instead see the rise of modern Turkey and the end of Greater Greece.

In late October, 1918, the Armistice of Mudros ended the fighting between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire – but lasting peace was still a long way off in Asia Minor.

British, French, and Italian troops occupied much of the empire, including the imperial capital of Constantinople, the seat of the now powerless Sultan Mehmet VI’s government.

As the Allied governments discussed a future peace treaty in Paris in 1919, their differences were clear for all to see.

The French wanted to secure their financial interests and their new mandates in Syria and Lebanon.

The Italians wanted to extend their influence into Asia Minor, and the British hoped to keep their First World War gains and secure the Eastern Mediterranean route to British India.

The United States had no appetite for involvement in the region other than sending humanitarian aid, despite President Wilson’s hopes.

The Greek government, led by Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, saw the defeat of the Ottomans as a historic chance to gain territory and achieve at least some version of a Greater Greece, the Megali Idea.

In May 1919, at the invitation of the Allies, Greek troops landed at the city of Smyrna and occupied a zone in western Asia Minor.

In light of the terrible violence and ethnic cleansing between Greeks and Turks during the Balkan Wars and the First World War, the move was a controversial one, including for the British General Staff: “ will create a source of continual unrest, possibly culminating in an organised attempt by the Turks to reconquer this territory.” The very first day of the Greek army landings at Smyrna, Greek troops failed to establish full control, which led to violence that saw several hundred Turks killed.

In the months that followed, atrocities committed by occupying Greek troops caused local Turks to form irregular groups attacked Greek soldiers and villagers.

This marked the beginning of the Greco-Turkish War, known as the Asia Minor Campaign in Greece and the Turkish War of Liberation in Turkey.

So the Greeks had established themselves in and around Smyrna, and local Turkish resistance groups had organized in response.

But in the Turkish Anatolian heartland, a political and military national movement was growing.

The impotence of the Ottoman government and the violence at Smyrna caused many Turks to rally around a nationalist cause that wanted to expel European and Greek troops and create a Turkish state.

One Turkish nationalist described the effect of the arrival of Greek troops: “After I learned about the details of the Smyrna occupation, I hardly opened my mouth on any subject except when it concerned the sacred struggle which was to be.” This movement coalesced around Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who had commanded Ottoman forces in the Italo-Turkish, Balkan, and First World Wars.

He and other nationalist leaders established a National Assembly eventually based at Ankara.

Kemal’s goal was simple: “ create a new Turkish state, the sovereignty and independence of which would be unreservedly recognized by the whole world.” As Kemal’s nationalists organized in the east, the Sultan’s Grand Vizier Damad Ferid Pasha also tried to preserve the country’s sovereignty in Paris, but the Allied Big Four did not react to his pleas.

In fact, the Allies were having trouble deciding what would become of Asia Minor.

Not only did they have clashing interests, they were divided about what to do with Armenian and Kurdish hopes for independence, and were worried by the reports of Greek atrocities.

An Allied Commission compared the Greek occupation around Smyrna to an annexation and recommended ending it, but Venizelos defended his position: “The Greek claims on Smyrna and the neighbouring region were not only well known, but they had been officially formulated to the conference In occupying Smyrna, Greece knew that she was not yet legally, she was at least morally, entitled to it.” The situation in Asia Minor got even more unstable in 1920.

From January, French and Armenian troops fought Turkish national forces around Marash, Urfa, and Antep with Turkish fighters murdering 10,000 Armenians at Marash and Armenian units murdering smaller numbers of Turkish civilians in response.

Ottoman elections saw Kemal’s Nationalists win representation in parliament, but the British arrested many of them and formalized the occupation of Constantinople.

In April the Allied powers finally agreed on the terms of the Treaty of Sevres to formally end the war with the Ottoman Empire.

Britain got most of what it wanted, including internationalisation of the Straits and a guarantee of Armenian and Kurdish states.

France and Italy were to gain spheres of influence in Anatolia, and more importantly, strong financial concessions.

The Greeks were to gain the region of Eastern Thrace, while Smyrna was to be administered by Greece but formally remain part of Turkey.

After five years, a referendum would decide on its final fate.

Like the other peace treaties, the Ottomans would pay reparations, and had to reduce their armed forces to 50,000 men and a handful of small boats.

No air force was allowed.

For Mustafa Kemal’s nationalist movement, the treaty would be their worst nightmare if it was implemented – but in summer 1920 it was a political gift for their cause.

More Turks rallied to Kemal, and the Allies did not have the military means or political will to impose the treaty by force – Marshal Ferdinand Foch estimated they’d need 27 divisions to enforce it, and no one in Britain, France, or the US was ready to commit them.

Athens insisted that the situation would calm down once the treaty had been signed, so the Allies gave permission to the Greeks to begin an offensive.

On June 22, Greek units crossed out of their zone of occupation and advanced towards the Sea of Marmara, central Anatolia, and in Eastern Thrace.

Kemal was still in the early stages of creating a nationalist army, so Turkish troops mostly withdrew on a fighting retreat, though both sides accused the other of committing atrocities along the way.

Greek troops captured Edirne, Iznik and Usak before the French and Italians called for a stop to the advance.

The Greeks had two options: to concentrate on Eastern Thrace, or try to crush Kemal in Anatolia.

The military favoured the Anatolian option, but Venizelos chose to wait in the hopes the British would send more troops.

But the British did not send more troops, and even though the Sultan’s government reluctantly signed the Treaty of Sevres in August, the reality on the ground looked nothing like the one envisioned on paper.

By late 1920, the Turkish National Assembly’s regular army had grown to 86,000 men, and the Greek Army of Asia Minor had grown to 100,000 and still stood deep in Anatolia without a political solution in sight.

The Turks even launched their first serious offensive along the Gediz river in October, and even though Greek forces stopped them it was a sign of growing Turkish organization and skill.

Kemal also took the offensive in the East against the Armenians and pushed them back into the territory of the former Russian empire, in fighting that saw widespread atrocities against civilians.

At the same time, Greek political life had been badly split between the Venizelos’ supporters and those of exiled King Constantine since the First World war.

By this time in the Greco-Turkish War, the tensions within Greece deepened even further.

The country had lost most of its Allied support, was in an economic crisis, and in October King Alexander was bitten by a monkey and died of the subsequent infection.

This revived the schism between Venizelists and royalist supporters of King Constantine.

Venizelos was defeated in the elections that fall, and Constantine – who was disliked by the Allies for his pro-German stance in the First World War - returned to the throne of Greece in December 1920.

Venizelos later reflected on his defeat: “My mistake was that when the death of Alexander occurred, I failed to postpone the elections in order to negotiate with Constantine and the Powers for the accession to the throne of the constitutional heir.

This was my great and, you might say, unforgivable error.

Because this solution, if it had been achieved, would have restored national unity ” So by the end of 1920 the Greek army was deep in Anatolia, and Turkish resistance was organizing around Kemal.

The leaders of an unstable Greece dependent on vanishing Allied support were getting more desperate.

The political situation continued to spiral for Greece and improve for the Turkish Nationalists in early 1921.

The Turkish Assembly passed a new constitution, condemned the Sultan’s government in Constantinople, and signed a treaty with Bolshevik Russia in March, which stabilized the eastern border and provided for more weapons shipments as well.

The London Conference was supposed to find a diplomatic solution, but failed – and the violence on the ground continued.

Greek reinforcements arrived in Anatolia, Venizelist officers were replaced with royalists, and General Anastasios Papoulas took command of the Army of Asia Minor.

Greek strength in Anatolia grew to over 100,000 men, and with the new recruits came reports of plunder and violence against the local population in the areas under Greek control.

In April 1921, the Greek Governor General of Smyrna admitted to a spike in violence against Turkish civilians, but the International Red Cross report was far more direct: “Elements of the Greek army of occupation have been employed I the extermination of the Muslim population…instead of being disarmed or broken up, the bands have been assisted in their activities and have collaborated hand-in-hand with regular troops.” At the same time Greeks were killing Turks in the west, in the Pontic region Turkish bands led by Topal Osman killed 8000 Greeks.

One Greek resident recalled the atrocities: “They stripped and threw them into wells.

Then they threw stones on top of them.

They filled the church, the schools and the barns with the old people and set fire to them.” Athens was desperate to bring the war to an end, but many felt there was no chance of victory – even Greek General Ioannis Metaxas, who was now out of the army, bluntly said the war could not be won.

Still, Prime Minister Gounares’ government decided to break the deadlock and save the Treaty of Sevres.

-The Greeks attacked at the Battle of Inönü in January, and although they executed a planned withdrawal after their advance, the Turks saw the battle as a defensive victory that boosted morale.

In March the Greeks attacked again, this time to capture important rail links near Kütahya.

More than 60,000 Greek troops made good progress in the north and the south, where they captured the town of Afyon Karahisar, but poor coordination and a Turkish counterattack pushed them back.

The Second Battle of Inonu was another Turkish defensive victory.

The next Greek attempt to break the stalemate began on July 10, 1921.

By this time the Army of Asia Minor, which had grown to 200,000 troops, 4000 machine guns, and 410 artillery pieces.

The Turks had also reorganized their 122,000 men, 700 machine guns, and 160 artillery pieces guns under Ismet Pasha.

This time the Greeks tried to encircle and destroy the Turkish army near Kütahya.

By the 20th, they had re-taken Afyon Karahisar, pushed the Turks across the river Sakarya and occupied the towns of Kütahya Eskişehir.

The Turks counterattacked, but failed to gain the lost ground.

The Greeks had won a clear victory at the Battle of Kütahya-Eskisehir, but the Army of Asia Minor had failed in its main objective of destroying the Turkish army.

The battle had cost the Greeks about 8000 men, and the Turks about 30,000 – though many of these had lost contact with their units and could fight another day.

The Greek advance caused panic in Ankara, and the Council of Ministers ordered the government to evacuate.

But Kemal and Fevzi Paşa declared the army would stay and fight, and the Assembly voted for the politicians to stay.

The Greek Army didn’t have the strength to continue the offensive, but Greek command was unwilling to admit its failure, and planned one last gamble at the Battle of Sakarya.

British observer Arnold Toynbee felt the Greeks had no chance: “It was a crazy enterprise, for every rational objective had disappeared.

The annihilation of the enemy?

Three times already that stroke had missed its aim.

The occupation of his temporary capital?

As if the loss of Anra would break a Turkish moral which had survived the loss of Constantinople, or would prevent the Great National Assembly from resuming its activities .

Everything was against the invaders.” The Greek plan was to distract Turkish forces near the river, and then surround and destroy them.

To achieve this goal, the Greeks had some 124, 000 men, 684 machine guns, 2085 light machine guns, and 296 artillery pieces.

The defending Turks had around 100, 000 soldiers, 826 machine guns and 169 artillery pieces.

The Greeks opened the battle on August 13, and at first made good progress.

Kemal was worried, and convinced the nation assembly to temporarily give him near-dictatorial powers to deal with the crisis.

Kemal later stated that at this point he issued a dramatic order: “I said there was no line of defense but an area of defense, and that this area was the whole country.

Not an inch of the country should be abandoned until it was drenched with the blood of the citizens.” He used his new powers to rush Russian weapons to the front and requisition enormous amounts of supplies from an already impoverished population.

Turkish resistance stiffened as the Greeks made it to within 50km of Ankara but also outran their supplies, and on September 3 General Papoulas ordered a retreat.

At that moment the Turkish cavalry hit the Greeks in the flank, accelerating the retreat and taking many prisoners.

Turkish nationalist Halide Edib Edivar later recounted the scene: “Through the information we obtained from the Greek prisoners we learned that they had lost one third of their forces already, and that their transport was no good in the wilderness of the and dangerous marshes.

A young prisoner told me with a grin: ‘They tell us that Angora is behind every mountain we attack: but sixteen days have passed and no Angora.

They tell us that if we fall into the hands of the Turks we’ll be killed, and they drive us on with machine-guns.’” Turkish forces harassed the Greeks as they pulled back, and the Greek army’s policy of scorched earth left a trail of destruction and burning Turkish villages in their wake.

The offensive spirit of the Greek army was broken, as historian Michael Llewelyn-Smith explained: “The Greek army had shot its bolt.

The retreat from the Sakarya marked the end of the Greek hopes of imposing a settlement on Turkey by force of arms, and the beginning of a new period in which the Government recognized that a face-saving settlement must come through the diplomacy of the Powers.” The month-long battle of Sakarya had ended in a victory for the Turkish nationalist army by attrition. 3700 Turkish troops were killed and 18,000 wounded, while the Greeks lost 4000 killed and 19,000 wounded.

In the fall of 1921, Greece suffered another diplomatic defeat, when France signed the Treaty of Ankara with the Turkish National Assembly ending what it is sometimes referred to as the Franco-Turkish War.

This helped legitimize his rival government and delegitimize the Treaty of Sevres.

100

French troops withdrew from Cilicia, leaving behind valuable weapons for the Turks and freeing up Kemal’s southern front.

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The French withdrawal also led to a mass exodus of Christians from the region, including more than 100,000 Armenian refugees who had returned under French protection after fleeing the Armenian genocide of 1915-1918.

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The Greek offensive of 1921 had failed and Allied support for Greece was evaporating, and the Turkish Nationalists and their army were growing stronger.

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Kemal was now ready to go over to the offensive once and for all.

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The winter of 1921-1922 confirmed the swing in momentum.

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the Turks grew stronger and more organized.

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They signed another treaty with Bolshevik Russia to secure the eastern frontiers and new weapons, and continued to reform the army.g Turkish commanders like Refet Pasha improved logistics, and added assault battalions of troops partially trained based on German stormtrooper tactics which Ottoman officers had learned in the First World War.

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At the same time, Turkish resources were stretched and they feared they could not sustain a lengthy war.

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Meanwhile the Greek situation continued to get worse.

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The economy was in crisis, allied support for Greece was limited to a few British cabinet ministers, and Greek leadership no longer had the political will or military means to hold the territory it had won with its hard-pressed army.

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Army logistics were catastrophic as supply lines stretched 300km from Smyrna into the interior.

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In May 1922, General Papoulas resigned and was replaced by Lt Gen Georgios Chatzanestes, who did little to change the dangerous position of Greek formations in the exposed Afyonkarahisar salient.

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Athens was so desperate to force a solution that in June it transferred Greek units from Anatolia to Eastern Thrace to march on Constantinople, a move the Allies simply blocked.

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The Turks felt they had to strike before further Greek reinforcements arrived, and launched the Great Offensive or Büyük Taarruz, on August 26.

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Their army now had 200,000 men, 2900 machine guns and 323 artillery pieces, as opposed to 218,000 Greeks with 4400 machine guns and 418 artillery.

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The major Turkish advantage was cavalry: 5300 horse to just 1300 Greek sabres.

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The Turkish plan designed by Kemal and Ismet was for 1st Army to move behind the Afyon salient from the south, while 2nd Army supported the effort from the north.

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The cavalry would surround and destroy the Greeks, just as they had tried to do to the Turks in the previous battles.

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Turkish artillery smashed the Greek lines, followed by an infantry assault hoping to imitate stormtroop tactical success – but the Greeks managed to prevent a Turkish breakthrough at first.

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The next day though, Turkish troops captured the high ground at Erikmen, which made the whole Greek defense vulnerable to encirclement.

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General Chatzanestes’ headquarters was 300km away in Smyrna, so he was not able to react to the threat in time to prevent disaster.

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Over the next several days, Greek units simply disintegrated in the confusion as the Turks tried to close the ring around them.

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On September 1, Kemal ordered a full-on pursuit of the routed Greeks: “The oppressive and arrogant army of the enemy has been defeated.

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Armies! The Mediterranean is your immediate objective.

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Forward!” As the remnants of the Army of Asia Minor fled west in disarray, Turkish units harassed and surrounded them piece by piece, taking thousands of prisoners.

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Surviving Greek units applied a scorched earth tactic, and tens of thousands of stragglers pillaged villages along the way, leaving a trail of death and destruction.

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Athens dismissed Chtatznestes but it made little difference.

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The Greek navy evacuated its remaining forces, and on September 9, 1922, Turkish nationalist troops entered Smyrna.

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Greek and Armenian civilians were terrified that the Turks might commit atrocities, but Greek authorities urged them to stay.

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Regional governor Aristidis Stergiadis told civilians to stay put while telling govt officials to leave, since he feared refugees might spark a revolution: “Better for them to stay here and be slaughtered by Kemal, than for them to go to Athens and turn everything upside down.” The Archbishop of Smyrna pleaded in vain with Venizelos to save the Christian community: “Hellenism in Asia Minor, the Greek state and the entire Greek nation are descending now to a hell from which no power will be able to raise them up and save them.

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it is a real question whether when your excellency reads this letter of mine we shall still be alive.” Fromkin 545 Turkish soldiers and civilians now took what they saw as revenge on Christians of Smyrna, despite the presence of Allied warships in the harbour.

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The day they arrived, Turkish officers under the orders of Nureddin Saklai Pasha delivered the Archbishop to a group of Turks who mutilated and killed him.

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Four days later, Smyrna’s Armenian quarter began to burn, and the flames quickly engulfed the Greek and European quarters until 50-75% of the city had been destroyed.

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Most western and Greek historians argue the fires were either deliberately started or spread by Turkish troops, which many Turkish historians debate.

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In the orgy of violence and fire, an estimated 12 to 30,000 Christians were killed.

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Some of the refugees were eventually taken onboard Allied ships, many others threw themselves into the sea to escape the flames and the Turks, and drowned.

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The Asia Minor Catastrophe, as the Greeks called it, caused political chaos in Greece.

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On September 24, Colonels Gonatas and Plastiras led a coup that deposed the government, and King Constantine abdicated.

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The Venizelists returned to power and several Royalists, including former Prime Minister Gounares and General Chatzanestes, were executed.

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On October 11, 1922 Greece and Nationalist Turkey signed an armistice, which ended the fighting in the Greco-Turkish War.

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One of the conditions was that Greek soldiers and civilians had two weeks to leave Eastern Thrace, causing a massive exodus witnessed by Toronto Daily Star reporter Ernest Hemingway: “Twenty miles of carts drawn by cows, bullocks and muddy-flanked water buffalo, with exhausted, staggering men, women, and children, blankets over their heads, walking blindingly along in the rain besides their worldly goods.

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They are the last of the glory that was Greece.” By the end of 1922, about 1.5 million Greeks had fled or been driven from Turkey.

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As Greece imploded, Turkish victory also provoked the Chanak Crisis in Britain.

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As Turkish forces advanced towards Gallipoli and Constantinople, there was a risk of war between British occupying forces and the Turkish nationalists.

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Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill wanted to fight for the Empire’s gains in the First World War, and to prevent Britain losing prestige in its Muslim colonies by losing to a Muslim power.

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But France, the United States, Italy, the British press and trade unions, and the rest of the government were not.

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As British and Turkish troops faced each other across the barbed wire in the neutral zone, Canada and Australia refused to send troops.

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The Conservative Party withdrew from the coalition government, Lloyd George resigned.

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The Conservatives then formed the 1922 Committee to make sure it never made the same mistake as Lloyd George when he became out of touch with the Parliamentary rank and file.eg Soon after the crisis the British and Turks signed an armistice, and Kemal’s new government deposed the Sultan to make way for a new Turkish Republic.

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Lasting peace was finally established with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which replaced the Treaty of Sèvres and confirmed the modern borders between Greece and Turkey.

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It also confirmed the population exchange that had largely taken place during the upheavals of the previous years: 1.2 million Thracian and Anatolian Orthodox Christians ended up in Greece, and 400,000 Balkan Muslims ended up in Turkey.

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Tens of thousands of civilians had also been killed as the cycle of revenge killings and ethnic cleansing continued from the Balkan and First World Wars.

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The Greco-Turkish War or Turkish War of Liberation was a deadly conflict on the battlefield as well.

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Turkish military losses were 13,000 killed and 35,000 wounded , while Greece suffered 23,000 dead, 50,000 wounded, 35,000 prisoners .

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It was also, perhaps, the final phase of the long and bloody series of wars that followed the First World War.

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The long, bloody, and ugly war between Greece and Turkey is just one of the conflicts that we think it’s important to cover in our documentaries.

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We also made an epic documentary about the Battle of Berlin in 1945 called 16 Days in Berlin – it's 4.5 hours long over 18 episodes, taking you through the battle day-by-day.

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It features original film footage from Soviet cameramen, never before seen photos of the battle, detailed maps and animations and expert interviews with David Willey from the Tank Museum, Ian from Forgotten Weapons and more.

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Unfortunately, we can’t upload this series to YouTube because it shows the grim reality of the 2nd World War – and that would get as demonetized or worse.

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So where can you watch 16 Days in Berlin in 4k resolution?

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On Nebula, a streaming service we built together with other creators and where we can upload and ad-free.

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We’d like to thank Konstantinos Travlos for his help with this episode.

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He is the editor of the book Salvation and Catastrophe, The Greek-Turkish War 1919-1922, and we used several articles in the book for this episode.

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If you want to order it you can check out the link below.

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This is the Great War 2022, a dctn f eal Time History and the only Youtube history channel with a clear advantage in sabres.

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이 레슨의 어휘와 말하기 포인트

이 C1 수준 말하기 레슨은 영상 “The Greek-Turkish War 1919-1923”을(를) 바탕으로 합니다. 가장 자주 반복되는 단어는 다음과 같습니다: Greek, Turkish, army, Turks, troops. 이 영상에는 섀도잉할 문장 164개와 단어 4183개가 있습니다. 말하는 구간의 길이는 27:52입니다. 화자는 분당 약 150단어로, 일상 대화에 가까운 자연스러운 속도로 말합니다. 영어에서 가장 많이 쓰이는 3,000단어에 속하는 단어가 76%뿐이라 어휘가 어려운 편입니다.

이 영상의 핵심 어휘

영상에서 가장 어려운 단어 15개를 발음, 뜻과 함께 정리했습니다.

단어	발음	뜻
nationalist 명사	/ˈnæʃ.ə.nə.lɪst/	민족주의자((民族主義者) (minjokjuuija()
artillery 명사	/ɑɹˈtɪləɹi/	포병대
atrocity 명사	/əˈtɹɑsɪti/	극악, 비도
armistice 명사	/ˈɑɹmɪstɪs/	정전
cavalry 명사	/ˈkæ.vəl.ɹi/	기병대
withdraw 동사	/wɪðˈdɹɔ/	후퇴하다, 취소하다
cleanse 동사	/klɛnz/	씻다
royalist 명사		왕정주의자
sabre 명사	/ˈseɪ.bə/	군도, 사브르
scorch 동사	/skɔɹt͡ʃ/	질주
exodus 명사	/ˈɛksədəs/	탈출, 이동
flee 동사	/ˈfliː/	달아나다, 도망치다
sovereignty 명사	/ˈsɑv(ə)ɹənti/	주권
logistics 명사	/ləˈd͡ʒɪstɪks/	물류
historian 명사	/hɪˈstɔɹi.ən/	역사학자, 력사학자

이 영상의 문법

화자가 가장 많이 쓰는 문형을 영상 속 실제 표현과 함께 정리했습니다.

문형	영상 속 표현
수동태 be + 과거분사 — 누가 하는지보다 무슨 일이 일어나는지에 초점	were divided · be administered · was allowed
현재완료 have/has + 과거분사 — 과거의 일이 지금도 관련이 있을 때	have occupied · have been employed · have passed

주의할 발음

화자는 can't, didn't, they'd 같은 축약형과 약화된 형태를 5번 사용합니다. 들리는 대로 짧게 발음하세요.

“th” 소리: withdraw /wɪðˈdɹɔ/, withdrawal /wɪðˈdɹɔ(ə)l/
“sh”와 “zh” 소리: nationalist /ˈnæʃ.ə.nə.lɪst/, negotiate /nəˈɡəʊ.ʃi.eɪt/, rational /ˈɹæʃ(ə)nəl/
긴 단어 — 강세 위치에 주의: nationalist /ˈnæʃ.ə.nə.lɪst/, artillery /ɑɹˈtɪləɹi/, atrocity /əˈtɹɑsɪti/, reinforcement /ˌɹiːɪnˈfɔːsmənt/, sovereignty /ˈsɑv(ə)ɹənti/

한국어 화자가 어려워하는 소리:

/f/ — ㅍ(/p/)으로 바꾸지 말고 윗니를 아랫입술에 대기: reinforcement /ˌɹiːɪnˈfɔːsmənt/, flee /ˈfliː/, formally /ˈfɔː.mə.li/, flame /fleɪm/, referendum /ˌɹɛfəˈɹɛndəm/
/v/ — ㅂ(/b/)과 구별하기: cavalry /ˈkæ.vəl.ɹi/, sovereignty /ˈsɑv(ə)ɹənti/
/z/ — ㅈ이 아니라 성대를 울리는 /s/: cleanse /klɛnz/, depose /diˈpoʊz/, resign /ɹɪˈzaɪn/, accuse /əˈkjuz/, exhaust /ɪɡˈzɔst/

이 영상으로 연습하는 방법

먼저 말하지 않고 영상을 끝까지 듣고 모르는 단어를 적어 둡니다.
0.75배속으로 한 문장씩 섀도잉을 시작하고, 익숙해지면 보통 속도로 돌아갑니다.
자신의 목소리를 녹음해 원본과 비교하고, nationalist, artillery, atrocity 같은 단어에 특히 주의합니다.

쉐도잉이란? 영어 실력을 빠르게 키우는 과학적 방법

쉐도잉(Shadowing)은 원래 전문 통역사 훈련을 위해 개발된 언어 학습 기법으로, 다언어 학자인 Dr. Alexander Arguelles에 의해 대중화된 방법입니다. 핵심 원리는 간단하지만 매우 강력합니다: 원어민의 영어를 들으면서 1~2초의 짧은 지연으로 즉시 소리 내어 따라 말하는 것——마치 '그림자(shadow)'처럼 화자를 따라가는 것입니다. 문법 공부나 수동적인 청취와 달리, 쉐도잉은 뇌와 입 근육이 동시에 실시간으로 영어를 처리하고 재현하도록 훈련합니다. 연구에 따르면 이 방법은 발음 정확도, 억양, 리듬, 연음, 청취력, 말하기 유창성을 크게 향상시킵니다. IELTS 스피킹 준비와 자연스러운 영어 소통을 원하는 분들에게 특히 효과적입니다.

섀도잉 방법: 단계별 전체 가이드 읽기 →

쉐도잉 연습: The Greek-Turkish War 1919-1923 (Greco-Turkish War Documentary) - 영상으로 영어 말하기 배우기

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