Shadowing Practice: Days of Revolt - ISIS, The New Israel - Learn English Speaking with Video

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Now you talk about terror I've been terrorized all my days
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How many?
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All my days
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Hi, I'm Chris Edges.
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Welcome to Days of Revolt.
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We're filming this segment in Toronto with Professor Saba El Nasri, who edited Arab Revolutions and Beyond.
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He's a professor at York University teaching
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Middle East politics, and is a native of Basra, Iraq.
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We're going to do this in two segments.
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The first one will be focused on the rise of the Islamic state known as ISIS,
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and the second will be on the Arab Spring and Arab revolutions,
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is putting them in a historical context and trying to grasp what's going to be, or what's going to come next within the Middle East.
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Thank you, Professor al -Nasri.
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Thanks, Chris, for having me.
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So let's begin with ISIS,
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which is historically an extremely important movement within the Middle East,
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the 1916 Sykes -Picot Agreement,
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which is named for the French and British diplomats that carved up the Middle East among the colonial,
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you know, among the empire, essentially turning countries in the Middle East into protectorates,
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has only been changed twice.
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For the first time was the Israeli independence movement, which rose up in Palestine,
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and now with ISIS, which controls an area roughly the size of Texas.
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The mechanisms that were used to redraw the map in the Middle East are the same terrorism,
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the use of foreign money, the use of foreign fighters,
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the tactics of ethnic cleansing and terrorism, and this mythical vision.
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In the case of Israel, the recreation of Judea and Samaria from the Bible, the land of Israel, Israel, and in the case of ISIS,
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the recreation of the 7th century caliphate.
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And these tactics have proved quite effective.
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In both cases, in the case of Israel and in the case of ISIS, you could argue, especially with ISIS has roughly 20 ,000 foreign fighters,
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that these are forces that are as dependent on the areas outside the Middle East as within the Middle East.
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And I wondered if you could kind of address that phenomena, this phenomena that we're watching.
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Right, right.
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I mean, you are right, because ISIS has a kind of settler colonialist form, the way they occupy space,
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cleans this space, plunder the resources.
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Which is what Israel does.
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Exactly, and curve our territory for itself.
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But to understand the phenomena of ISIS,
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we need to contextualize it within the setbacks and counter -revolution against the Arab revolutions.
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The amount of violence, of intervention in Libya, for instance, the war in Libya, the civil war in Syria,
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now the war also in Yemen.
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And we can't forget Egypt.
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Exactly.
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We don't forget Egypt.
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And the failure of these peaceful, nonviolent revolutions, this amount of violence,
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of contra -revolutional violence created this Frankenstein, this phenomenon.
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So you can say ISIS is a Hegelian -fishing synthesis of two forms of violence.
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Now, what is so interesting about ISIS and why it is so attractive for many young,
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unemployed, mostly Arab fighters, most of the fighters, by the way, they come from Libya or Tunisia and so on, less from Europe, et cetera,
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it's mostly from the Middle East.
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What attracted them to ISIS is that when this peaceful revolution failed, revolutions turned into kind of jihadism,
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that ISIS is much more effective and its leadership, organization, logistical structure, and its ideologies than all the other peaceful,
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nonviolent movements, mass movements.
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And we have to go back to Egypt, because with the rise of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, there was this debate between the Brotherhood,
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which said, no, we can take power through elections, through nonviolent means, and the so -called Salafis in Egypt,
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who actually were were convinced by the Brotherhood.
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I think there were roughly 60 Salafis, I can't remember the exact number, within the parliament.
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And then with the overthrow of Morsi.
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And the thing about Morsi, with all of the mistakes that Morsi made in terms of turning on the secular opposition,
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is that he worked overtime to try and placate the military.
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And in countries like Iraq or Egypt, the military is not just a military force but an economic force.
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They to control whole segments of the economy, including military industries.
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And it failed.
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The military, certainly with the support of probably Washington and Israel, certainly with the support of Israel,
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and that sent a message not only to the Salafis or the jihadists in Egypt, but throughout the Middle East.
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Right.
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But it's interesting to see that this message can take two different forms.
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The first one, you can see a positive form.
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If you look at al -Nahda in Tunisia, who actually won the election and the presidency and so on, until recently, until last year.
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But what happens in Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood, al -Nahda took different directions.
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They basically rolled back and opened up much more space to the Nida Tunis, which is much more left liberal platform,
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who won the election and the presidency because they realize if they pursue such a confrontational cause, they might be, you know, oppressed and inhalated.
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So it took a positive form.
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Whereas in Iraq and Syria, due to the context, a different context, we have ISIS.
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So what I was saying is the first type of violence was the physical military intervention of violence.
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The second one is the systemic corruption,
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the expropriation and disposition of the majority of the people of their resources, public resources.
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And this is very clear in Iraq.
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The way the United States institutionalized the political system and all this formula of muhassassah, you know, power -sharing formula,
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it actually debriefed all the Iraqi people from the access to the public resources they used to have.
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And I think we should just interject here by saying that before the war, Iraq had a very vibrant middle class.
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I remember visiting
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Iraqi hospitals, which I think were built by the Swedes.
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I mean, they were modern hospitals.
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Yes, Saddam Hussein ran an extremely repressive and horrific regime.
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But economically, Iraq shared in the oil wealth of the country, the average Iraqi.
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Part of the legitimacy of the Ba 'ath Party, it was not only based on violence.
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The Ba 'ath Party was the ruling party, we should say.
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It's not only intelligence and violence.
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That's true, too, but I think the biggest chunk of the legitimacy of the
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Ba 'ath Party was based on the redistribution of the oil income in forms of free public health care,
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education, and so on.
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So even the majority of the Shiites and the Kurds, who hated Saddam as a Ba 'athist,
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benefited from this redistribution of the income now with the privatization of Bremer which who
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Iraqi people called the Khalifa Baghdad in 2000 Bremer was the American exactly in May 2003 the privatization
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and the institutionalization of of the US strategy of shock
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and all which is state sponsor terror on the one hand
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and cash corruption using money to buy the uncoops some forces in Iraq.
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It was institutionalized.
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So the outcome of this, you have one of the most corrupt states on the face of this earth.
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So the majority of the people in the Middle East, the absolute majority, up to 65 % are under 24.
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In Iraq, 45 % of the young people are under 14.
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So it's the youngest population probably on a worldwide scale.
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Now what do they see?
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They see at the top of the state a systemic corruption you know the systematic plundering
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and of the resources of the country
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and they transfer all these resources outside the country
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there's no health care no education no jobs no pension no nothing on the other hand they see
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Isis okay they pay you $500 a month
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and they share with you any resources they plunder be it oil or gas or taxes they dispute this among their followers.
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Now, if you are young, Iraqi.
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Syrian, Libyan, et cetera.
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You see peaceful revolution failed because there was an immense, you know, external intervention in a violent way.
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The state is corrupt.
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But then there's much effective organization.
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Right.
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It's not only corrupt, but it's also sectarian in the sense
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that it feeds a Shiite elite at the expense of the Sunni majority.
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Exactly.
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And sectarian in the sense, not in a religious sense, but in a class sense.
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So you have the majority of the people, the young people in Iraq, have no jobs, no education, no health care, no perspective whatsoever.
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They are arrested, incarcerated for no reasons.
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There were so many protests the last few years for basic services, for electricity, water.
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And we should say non -violent mass protests.
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Non -violent.
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And they were faced by these militias of different parties in power.
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And a lot of people were massacred in Basra and Baghdad, et cetera.
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So then on the other hand, they see an effective form of organization like ISIS.
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They can earn money, they can share their resources, and they can push back against this class -based sectarian politics within the country.
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So you have these young people looking at ISIS.
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They earn $500 a month.
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These are the fighters.
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The fighters.
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And if they occupy a territory, if there's oil, gas, whatever resources they take, they're redistribute the resources among their followers, and they collect taxes.
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And they're very good against corruption.
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And they're good against corruption, and they bring services, basic service, to the people.
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In Mosul now, you have electricity, but not Baghdad and Basra.
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Right.
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Why is this the case?
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Because most of the, at least the leadership of ISIS, most of them used to be Iraqi bureaucrats and officers and generals.
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People have enormous institutional experience.
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They know how to run things, compared to the current corrupt political class in Iraq.
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So they know how to deal with this everyday life.
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They know how to bring services to the people.
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So these are the options the young people have.
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One, a corrupt political system.
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On the other hand, an effective, violent, but much more socially and ideologically appealing organization than the current political system.
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And there's two important points about ISIS.
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ISIS.
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The first is that much of the territory that ISIS controlled was in chaos.
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And people forget that there were, you know, competing warlords and, you know, people were being kidnapped for money.
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And so civil society completely broken down, courtesy of the American occupation.
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And for whatever terror ISIS carries out, and it certainly does carry out horrific terror, terror, it has brought, as you point out,
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a semblance of if not normalcy, at least order.
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That's the first attraction.
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The second is that, as you have also pointed out, the deep disappointment, especially among the young,
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in the failure of the Arab Spring, the failure of these nonviolent movements, has made them ask the question,
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which is a question that people in the Middle East have have been asking since the end of World War I,
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how are we going to build an authentic liberation movement?
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This is what was the impetus of Nasser in Egypt, and of course the Baathists,
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who are really just a mirror in essence of the Nasserites.
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And these secular regimes soon became corrupted, and not only became corrupted,
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but eventually became tools examples of imperial power once again.
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You know, Hosni Mubarak being a kind of classic example of that.
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And so the ability of ISIS to bring order and to actually function as a liberation movement,
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you see that when they are tear down the border post between Syria and Iraq, they will write, this is the end of Sykes -Picot,
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the 1916 agreement that that the imperial powers used to redraw the map of the Middle East, and that is true.
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Correct.
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And two things.
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The first one is, I don't think it's, I think it's very simplistic to demonize one force and forget about the others.
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So ISIS, yes, is a terrorist organization, but so too the Iraqi state with its militia, so too the U .S.
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And let's not leave out, you know, let me, that's a very important point, because remember when they captured the Jordanian pilot,
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and they burned the Jordanian pilot in a cage, which was barbaric and horrible, but why?
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Because American planes were incinerating whole families inside their houses.
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And so what they did was accrued her.
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version.
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But morally, it was the same.
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And that's what we on the outside don't see.
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Right.
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Like, think about Yemen since years.
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They're using drones, you know, massacring families and so on.
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So we don't see the state or state sponsor terror.
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We see only the so -called private or civil terror.
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And I want to avoid this simplistic worldview.
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And that's why I was arguing years ago in understanding Iraq
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that terror is a form of governance ever since the U .S occupied iraq
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so isis represent
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and embodied this form of governance the second point i think
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this is very important what enabled isis to become as such as islamic califat is the peaceful protest in ramadi
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and fallujah in the western provinces of iraq in 2013 against against corruption against you know, exclusion.
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Right.
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You know, Chris, as you know, social exclusion is not only violent, it produces more violence.
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So people protested almost for one year peacefully.
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They were camping, occupying the space just like occupied.
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So what the minister -president at that time, al -Malik, did, he used for the first time probably in the history of Iraq,
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used the army against the civilian and massacred many of them in Ramadi, in Fallujah, and in Mosul.
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There were also other peaceful protests at this stage in December 2013,
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where you have fighters of Islamic State entering the western provinces of Iraq, and then within a few months they occupied Mosul after that.
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So it's very important to remember the western and northwestern provinces of Iraq,
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which I don't call the Sinni provinces, a nomadic formation.
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I come from a nomadic family.
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My father was a nomad.
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So historically they are the one who actually secure the border of Iraq, any government.
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Was it the Munaki or the Republican under Qasim or the Ba 'athists?
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They rely on the nomads to control the western, northwestern territories and borders of Iraq.
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Control in Egypt, by the way.
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They know the territory perfectly.
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But when Al -Maliki attacked these peaceful protesters, all the tribes there, they did not resist the Islamic State fighter.
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They just let them in.
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Not that they support them, but they enable them by not resisting them.
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Because Iraq, as you know, historically speaking, doesn't have this form of extremism, especially in Islamic sense.
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It's mostly liberal understanding of Islam.
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So what enabled ISIS to become as such today was the failure of the Iraqi government and of the U .S.
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government by betting on al -Maliki all the time until we have this disaster.
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And I think this is very important to understand.
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This just didn't fall like manna from heaven.
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It has a real material context.
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And we should also be clear that the U .S came in, they brought in Colonel James Steele,
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who was running the mill group in El Salvador when I was covering the war, to arm, train, and empower Shiite death squads.
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Absolutely.
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Militias and so on.
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Death squads.
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Yes yes out of the ministry yes absolutely by the way uh...
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shukran the shot of the gala on a mabashro
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let's talk about the occupation i mean i would argue that
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from the point of american history it is probably the most disastrous strategic decision correct america's ever made correct
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and uh.. it is of course destroyed iraq as a unified country
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which i don't think it's going to come back as a unified country yeah
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it has upset the balance of power between iran and iraq yes
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and it has spawned extremist jihadism
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which as you correctly point out is a reflection of the state terrorism
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and violence one million iraqis were responsible for the death of
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one million iraqis three to four million refugees correct the physical
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destruction of iraq as we as we spoke about before
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it had an advanced infrastructure a thriving middle class a well -educated population all of
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that we wiped out correct um what are what are the consequences now uh within iraq
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and the middle east of what we as americans have done
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i think an important issue here is the civil war in Syria and the militarization of the revolution in Syria.
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It started, as you know, peacefully.
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But then you have the regional power, the international power, supporting different factions in Syria against the Assad.
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And the weird thing about it is sometimes I argued once on the real news that when war, the war of terror, become endemic,
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justifications are contingent so you have the same regional international power supporting one force in syria
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and fighting it in iraq and vice versa and that's what complicated things
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so i think if the conflict in Syria is not resolved peacefully. and politically.
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And if the constellation of forces in Iraq are not shifted in a radical sense
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that the majority of the people feel included politically,
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economically, territorially, there is no way you can deal with the Islamic State or other jihadist group for that matter.
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The good news is I was following the latest wave of protests in Iraq and Lebanon, Beirut.
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Mostly young people, they don't belong to any parties.
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Grassroot organizations start protesting since weeks against lack of services, electricity and water and clean water, et cetera.
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But now they realize once you start protesting against these basic services and you are confronted with the state power,
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things are transformed.
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Now people are asking for a regime change because they realize basic services
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organically linked to the constellation of forces that control the state apparatus and institutions.
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So there's no way you can get electricity where you have 50 degrees centigrade if you have corrupt political system.
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So all of a sudden you have all these young people across the country.
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And the good news is, especially in the so -called Shiite provinces of Iraq, the majority of the young Shiite populations, they are joining other Iraqis,
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be them Sunni or Kurds or Muslims, regardless, Because they realize all of them, regardless of their religion, ethnicity, are faced with the same problems.
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And I think that's a good news.
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There's one difference between the Israeli state and the Islamic state.
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And that is that the Israeli state was able to survive because of primarily American but outside military and financial support.
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The Islamic state does not have that.
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That and the other thing, the context.
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Israel was created in a bipolar world order.
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Right.
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And for both, at that time, for the U .S and for Stalin, they thought, Stalin thought, you know, it's a social state against all these,
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you know, primitive
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Arabs, etc. And the U .S of course supported Israel against the influence of the Soviet Union,
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etc. So the world historical context of Israel is not there.
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We are in the midst of a world disorder, or what I have termed a war order war became endemic
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and I think that's the only way for the ruling classes in Europe the United States
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and in the regionally to to process the cross I would just close by saying
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which most people don't know yeah is
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that the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 justified the militarists throughout the Arab world correct
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so that in countries like Syria for instance or Lebanon we
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We had strong democratic movements, but with the rise of Israel as an adjutant within the Middle East,
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it transformed the Middle East into this antagonistic war of parties.
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And that is what destroyed democracy and the nascent, and in some cases strong, in the case of Lebanon,
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democratic forces that, you know,
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were the most hopeful signs within the Middle East.
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Yes.
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And as I said, I mean, I'm pretty happy about what I've observed the last few weeks, what's going on again in the Middle East.
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Peaceful, nonviolent protests, grassroots protest beyond the sectarian,
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religious, whatever, artificial construction of the body politics.
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And that's something which gives me a lot of hopes.
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Thank you very much.
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Thanks, Chris, for having me.
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And thank you for watching
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Days of Revolve.
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patch.
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And you know they put me in a shack.
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Stole my name.
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Loved me in chains.

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Vocabulary and speaking notes for this lesson

This speaking lesson is built on the video “Days of Revolt - ISIS, The New Israel”. The speaker keeps coming back to these words: iraq, isis, middle, east. This video has 292 sentences and 3442 words to shadow. The speech runs for 24:18. The speaker talks at a steady 142 words per minute, a comfortable pace for shadowing. Only 79% of the words are among the 3,000 most common in English, so the vocabulary is demanding.

Key vocabulary in this video

15 words from the video worth learning, with pronunciation and meaning:

WordPronunciationMeaning
isis nounAny coral of the genus Isis, or family Isididae, composed of joints of white, stony coral, alternating with flexible, horny joints.
protest noun/ˈpɹoʊ.tɛst/A formal objection, especially one by a group.
terror noun/ˈtɛɹɚ/Intense dread, fright, or fear.
fighter noun/ˈfaɪtɚ/A person who fights; a combatant.
corrupt adjective/kəˈɹʌpt/Willing to act dishonestly for personal gain; accepting bribes.
corruption noun/kəˈɹʌpʃən/The act of corrupting or of impairing integrity, virtue, or moral principle; the state of being corrupted or debased; loss of purity or integrity.
occupy verb/ˈɑkjəpaɪ/To fill.
violent adjective/ˈvaɪ.ə.lənt/Involving extreme force or motion.
provinces noun/ˈpɹɔv.ɪns.ɪz/The part of a country outside of the capital, major cities, etc., and regarded as being rustic or parochial; a hinterland. See provincial.
argue verb/ˈɑɹ.ɡju/To show grounds for concluding (that); to indicate, imply.
electricity noun/ɪˌlɛkˈtɹɪsɪti/Originally, a property of amber and certain other nonconducting substances to attract lightweight material when rubbed, or the cause of this property; now…
phenomenon noun/fəˈnɒm.ɪ.nən/A thing or being, event or process, perceptible through senses; or a fact or occurrence thereof.
roughly adverb/ˈɹʌf.li/In a rough manner; without kindness, softness, or gentleness.
enable verb/ɪˈneɪ.bəl/To make somebody able (to do, or to be, something); to give sufficient ability or power to do or to be; to give strength or ability to.
intervention noun/ɪntɚˈvɛnʃən/The action of intervening; interfering in some course of events.

Phrasal verbs you will hear

WordPronunciationMeaning
point out verbTo identify among a group of similar subjects, or in a scene where the subject might not be readily seen or noticed, with a gesture of the body.
carry out verb/ˈkæ.ɹi aʊt/To hold while moving it out.
break down verbTo stop functioning.
come back verbTo return to a place.
go back to verbTo stem from; to originate in.
leave out verbTo omit, to not include, to neglect to mention.
open up verbTo open.
roll back verbTo return to a prior state.

Grammar in this video

The structures the speaker uses most, with the exact words from the video:

StructureIn the video
“Used to” used to + verb — a past habit or state that is no longer trueused to have · used to be
Present perfect have/has + past participle — a past action that still matters nowI've been terrorized · has only been changed · have proved
Passive voice be + past participle — the focus is on what happens, not who does itI've been terrorized · is named · been changed
Relative clauses who / which + clause — extra information about a person or thingTunis, which is · all which is · cage, which was

Pronunciation to watch

The speaker uses 23 contractions and reduced forms, such as don't, they're, we're. Say them the short way, as you hear them.

  • The “th” sounds: northwestern /nɔːθˈwɛstn̩/, ethnic /ˈɛθ.nɪk/, authentic /ɔˈθɛn.tɪk/, synthesis /ˈsɪnθəsɪs/, ethnicity /ɛθˈnɪsɪti/
  • The “sh” and “zh” sounds: corruption /kəˈɹʌpʃən/, intervention /ɪntɚˈvɛnʃən/, militia /məˈlɪʃə/, regime /ɹəˈʒiːm/, occupation /ˌɑkjʊˈpeɪʃən/
  • Long words — get the stress right: electricity /ɪˌlɛkˈtɹɪsɪti/, phenomenon /fəˈnɒm.ɪ.nən/, intervention /ɪntɚˈvɛnʃən/, terrorism /ˈtɛɹəɹɪzəm/, historically /hɪˈstɔɹɪkli/

How to practise with this video

  1. Listen to the whole video once without speaking and note the words you do not know.
  2. Shadow it sentence by sentence at normal speed, repeating each one until your rhythm matches the speaker.
  3. Record yourself and compare with the original, paying attention to words like isis, protest, terror.

What is the Shadowing Technique?

Shadowing is a science-backed language learning technique originally developed for professional interpreter training and popularized by polyglot Dr. Alexander Arguelles. The method is simple but powerful: you listen to native English audio and immediately repeat it out loud — like a shadow following the speaker with just a 1–2 second delay. Unlike passive listening or grammar drills, shadowing forces your brain and mouth muscles to simultaneously process and reproduce real speech patterns. Research shows it significantly improves pronunciation accuracy, intonation, rhythm, connected speech, listening comprehension, and speaking fluency — making it one of the most effective methods for IELTS Speaking preparation and real-world English communication.

Shadowing technique: read the full step-by-step guide →