शैडोइंग अभ्यास: World's Deadliest Computer Virus: WannaCry - वीडियो के साथ अंग्रेजी बोलना सीखें

Midnight, China.

Hotel in the east of Dalian.

A computer glows on a bedside table in a dim hotel room.

Its user sits in a deep trance.

For five days now, he's been trying to solve a problem.

Literally days.

He hasn't had much sleep or any real break besides short trips to the hotel's restaurant to grab some food.

He's been working on a simple project.

How to create a monster.

But so far, he hasn't had much luck, and neither have the other peers assigned for the mission.

This is not good.

Failure means there will be consequences.

The user's name is Park, and he's a programmer.

Unlike his Hollywood peers, he doesn't spend days tapping away at the keyboard.

Instead, he spends most of his time scouring the internet for clues.

What can be the thing that makes the monster work?

Surely someone out there has found the the missing piece.

Perhaps it's somewhere on hacker forums, or for sale on the dark web.

He searches again and again, but nothing.

So far, the only thing they have is a leak.

Recently, a trove of incredibly advanced cyber weapons was stolen from the NSA and dumped into the wild.

But they are useless unless you find a way to make them work with your code.

A way neither Park nor his co-workers have found.

All they need is...wait, what was that?

Eternal Eternal Blue.

Somebody reverse engineered Eternal Blue, one of the NSA's top tools.

Could this work?

He looks through the code.

This is wonderful.

Thrilled, he gets to work.

Several hours later, the monster is almost ready.

Park is exhausted, but satisfied.

With just a few tweaks, the superiors will have precisely what they requested.

Finally, he has earned his rest.

He turns off the computer and finds a small bed in the rim's corner.

The next morning, Park turns the computer back on, determined to give the monster the finishing touches.

Except, the monster has vanished.

Frantically he searches file by file.

Nothing is there.

The machine's been wiped clean.

A message comes through.

His lead, Kanban in Korean, congratulates him for the hard work.

They… they didn't wait.

An order came.

They released the monster.

Unfinished.

panic sets in, but it's too late.

The monster is already wreaking havoc, crippling computers in schools, train stations, offices, and hospitals one by one.

WannaCry, one of the deadliest malware specimens in history, was released on May 12, 2017, and rewrote cybersecurity for good.

After that, there was no rollback.

World War II split the Korean Peninsula into two parts.

Then the Korean War happened, which changed nothing except destroying millions of lives and leaving the peninsula in ruins.

It also cemented the unending rivalry between what we know today as North Korea and South Korea.

After the war, North Korea was backed up by two powerful parents, the USSR and China.

However, in the 1990s, as the USSR collapsed and China opened itself to the world, Pyongyang isolated itself.

Reaching out to the USA and its allies meant sleeping with the enemy.

So instead, it closed off.

Famine and hardships developed quickly.

So North Korea had to create its own system to survive.

A practice that continues this very day.

Crime.

It started with counterfeits, everything from Viagra to birth control, and even forged U.S currency.

But as the world became digital, Pyongyang saw the opportunity to take its criminal activities to new heights.

Their testing ground was close to home, South Korea.

Between 2009 to 2013, North Korea terrorized its neighbor with cyber attacks.

At first they were denial of service or, in simple terms, overwhelming websites with requests to shut them down.

But soon the attacks became more complex.

In March of 2013, the North Korean military unleashed a coordinated day of digital strikes against the capital of South Korea, Seoul.

It used a type of malware called dropper trojan, specifically designed to target South Korean systems.

Within hours, 32,000 machines were infected, including two major banks and three of the largest TV stations.

This was clearly not an isolated IT outage.

Offices, ATMs and TVs across Seoul went dark.

Dark Seoul.

And with it came a revelation.

North Korean hackers were no rookies.

They were becoming sophisticated, precise and deadly.

Soon the rest of the world would learn that lesson.

A year later, in 2014, Sony Pictures was preparing to release a comedy that mocked North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-un.

Pyongyang heard about this plan and did not like it. At all.

And if they could not yet launch a missile across the Pacific, at least they could strike America's propaganda machine with their growing cyber army.

Through a carefully planned spear-fishing campaign, North Korean hackers breached Sony.

They stole information about the studio staff, unreleased movies, and even private emails between celebrities.

they dumped it all into the public domain, sparking chaos.

A country with only 1,024 IP addresses and limited broadband had just hacked Hollywood.

Here we briefly pause to ask you to subscribe and like this video.

We put a lot of effort into our content and your support will help us grow.

Plus, we have other great videos about North Korea, like the Sony hack and the general history of North Korean cyber operations.

Feel free to check them out after this video for extra content.

Cybercrime had proven itself a powerful weapon for grabbing headlines and disrupting global discourse.

But could it also bring profit?

Crime had helped North Korea through famine, so perhaps cybercrime could follow its legacy.

It was time for pragmatic hacking.

By 2015, the banking sector came under attack.

Vietnam's Tian Phong Bank, several Polish banks, and various financial institutions in Mexico and Uruguay all reported North Korean intrusions.

But these incidents were just rehearsals for something bigger.

first major financially motivated cybercrime from North Korea, the Bangladesh heist.

This cyber heist shook the world for its magnitude.

After lurking inside the bank's system for nearly a year, the hackers attempted to steal $1 billion.

They sent phishing emails, compromised the bank's SWIFT mechanism, which is how financial institutions send and receive requests for money transfers,

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and authorized about three dozen requests to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

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Fortunately, the New York bank noticed the strange requests and stopped the attack.

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But the attackers still managed to steal $100 million.

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The message here was clear.

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North Korea's cyber operatives were disciplined, persistent, and dangerously effective.

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In 2016, North Korean hackers no longer surprised the world.

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People had gotten used to this country making headlines.

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By that time, tensions between North Korea and the West began boiling.

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Again.

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Kim was testing nuclear weapons.

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Again.

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Sanctions piled on.

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And even China, North Korea's longtime ally, expressed some mild criticism.

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The world was turning on North Korea, and pressure was mounting on the country.

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But this time, things were different.

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They were no longer limited to simple DDoS attacks.

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They had forged an army of elite threat actors that could hijack film studios, banks, and plunge entire country's infrastructure to darkness.

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In April 2017, Kim and his cyber army were entangled in all kinds of complicated geopolitical games.

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However, something else was beginning to stir public discourse.

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a new player had stepped onto the stage, one that would help fuel the birth of many monsters, the Shadow Brokers.

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It was a mysterious group of hackers who started posting cryptic messages on social media between late 2016 and early 2017.

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The rants were incoherent, with purposefully bad English, and filled with strange geopolitical commentary.

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They just looked like a band of sketchy script kiddies, but this was nothing but obfuscation.

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Shadow Brokers' posts had links, and those links contained entire caches of malware.

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stolen straight from the National Security Agency of the United States.

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The NSA had been quietly hoarding these for years.

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Among them was EternalBlue, a tool that exploited an obscure vulnerability and allowed the takeover of any Windows machine.

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The agency had known about that vulnerability since 2012.

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Still, instead of bringing it up with Microsoft to ensure the safety of millions of users, it had chosen to remain silent and develop a tool that took advantage of this situation.

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In 2017, right before the exploit was leaked, Microsoft finally patched the vulnerability, probably because, seeing their tools stolen, the NSA tipped the company off.

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Typically, this should have limited the damage.

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However, users rarely update their devices, some out of ignorance, others out of habit, and most out of inconvenience.

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So for most users, the patch came too late.

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By late April, the exploits were already dissected by security researchers.

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Back then, if you dipped your toe into the InfoSec community, you probably were aware of how massive this development was, not least because everybody was discussing it.

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One of the companies joining the conversation was RiskSense, a cybersecurity firm that, like everybody else, published its own take on the exploits.

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But RiskSense stands out for one thing.

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It became the unexpected catalyst in the chain of events that triggered WannaCry.

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Only three days before the attack, a senior staff member posted in RiskSense's GitHub, a developer's website.

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But this entry was not just another write-up of Eternal Blue.

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He had reverse-engineered its code.

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In a nutshell, he disassembled the complex tool to understand how the exploit worked.

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That 9th of May, or perhaps a day or two later, North Korean threat actors stumbled upon the post.

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It was exactly what they needed.

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With this knowledge, they could learn how to use Eternal Blue and combine it with another exploit, Double Pulsar, to create the ultimate cyber weapon,

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a ransomware crypto worm that would spread automatically faster than anything they had ever created.

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But was this really what North Korea was looking for?

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Let's go back to Kim and his cyber army now.

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By late 2016, Kim was growing increasingly frustrated, and by 2017, the tensions peaked.

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But North Korea wasn't seen as a powerful adversary.

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Instead, people saw it as a reckless outcast.

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Perhaps what the world needed was a show of force.

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Perhaps this was the right time to unleash their shiny weapon.

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But there was a problem.

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The monster was not ready.

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Yes, it was already capable of significant damage, but it was still flawed.

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Imperfect monsters are dangerous.

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They can slip out of control if not handled correctly.

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And maybe the tension and stress made North Korea careless.

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Or perhaps not.

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Maybe it was deliberate.

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Perhaps desperation led them to act fast while they still had a chance.

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Whatever the case, on May 12th, the malware was unleashed.

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And in less than a working day, it spread across the world, paralyzing more than three-fourths of it.

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The world was under the grip of a beast.

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At least, until around lunchtime.

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WannaCry is regarded as one of the deadliest ransomware outbreaks in cybersecurity history.

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But the irony is that the malware itself is not particularly advanced.

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Its true power came from two things, how it infected and how it spread.

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Most of these characteristics came courtesy of the United States, the staunchest enemy of North Korea.

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The deadly combination of the NSA's exploits, EternalBlue and DoublePulsar.

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EternalBlue enables remote code execution on unpatched Windows machines.

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It uses the SMB v1 protocol, a system that Windows computers use to communicate and share files.

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It is the best known of ShadowBroker's tools, and we explained it in detail in our video about Napetya, another devastating cyber attack this exploit enabled.

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Double Pulsar is slightly less known.

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In the leak, it was bundled together with Eternal Blue, and doesn't really work without a decent penetration tool like that.

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Because in essence, Double Pulsar is a backdoor, a passage that, when installed, keeps access to the target's system, like a tunnel connecting the attacker and the victim.

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It doesn't cause any damage, in fact it's designed to be so low profile that it's pretty much undetectable.

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But through this tunnel, other, nastier things can be smuggled.

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So once inside, once EternalBlue broke the victim's defenses and DoublePulsar established a tunnel through them,

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WannaCry deploys its payloads, two simple encryption algorithms that crawls through the system

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and turns everything they see into gibberish with the .wncry extension.

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Before finishing the process, the malware deletes any shadow copies in the victim's computer, making the recovery of the files incredibly difficult.

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Then the cherry on top, it executes its famous red screen.

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Oops, your files have been encrypted.

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If you want to decrypt all your files, you need to pay.

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You only have three days to submit your payment.

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If you don't pay in seven days, your files will be lost forever.

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Send $300 worth of Bitcoin to this address.

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Just imagine seeing all of this on your computer.

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Panic is inevitable.

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The first red screens appeared around 7.44 a.m in Southeast Asia.

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Within an hour, it spread to Latin America.

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and around 10 a.m.

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UTC, it was already causing mayhem in Spain, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

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Train stations, offices, schools, anywhere with computers woke up with WannaCry's mark.

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WannaCry is considered self-propagating malware.

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This is because, unlike most malware, it doesn't need phishing emails or human interaction to spread.

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Instead, it moves on its own from one infected computer to others connected to external and internal networks, all thanks to EternalBlue.

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This vulnerability allowed hackers to execute arbitrary code on a victim's computer and install the ransomware.

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From there, the infected machine would scan local networks and the internet for unpatched systems, breaking into as many as possible.

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While the malware was spreading all over Europe, it was severely affecting the UK's National Health Service.

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At first, only a couple of hospitals were hit, then dozens.

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And at some point, one-third of its infrastructure collapsed.

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One of the people witnessing this crisis as it unfolded in real time was Tony Bleepman, a doctor working as an emergency consultant in London during the attack.

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I went to work a locum shift, I was not a regular member of staff in a London hospital.

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My shift started at midday

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and I got there just before midday to the consultant's office

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where a lot of people were sitting around their computers

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and pretty much as I arrived the WannaCry virus came up on everybody's screen.

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About the same time people were getting phone calls from other people that this had happened in other parts of the NHS.

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It became clear fairly shortly that the IT had been significantly compromised.

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With hospitals nationwide struggling to operate, the medical staff had to adapt to the chaos as quickly as possible.

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It was decided that we would just do what we did before there was IT in hospitals.

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So instead of having a map on the screen of where every patient was, we took an old-fashioned

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whiteboard and marker pens and we drew a plan of the department

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and somebody was put in charge of that board to record where all the patients were and where they were moving to.

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We rapidly moved to paper registration and paper note keeping for patients.

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While the staff did everything they could to keep hospitals functioning normally, surgeries and appointments were postponed.

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Hundreds of patients were left in limbo, uncertain when or how their procedures would happen.

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But I think you need to look at the wider impact as well.

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Since about 2010 there has been a regionalisation of specialist services.

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So London, with a population of approximately 12 million, has only four major trauma hospitals and a limited number of heart attack centres.

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And they rely on networks for referrals and for receiving patients.

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And so that was problematic in

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that some patients in smaller hospitals had difficulties in getting critical patients to the tertiary centres

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because I heard this but I'm not sure if it's true

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that in at least one of the trauma centers everything apart from immediate life-saving surgery was cancelled

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because there was no access to the support systems that the surgeons required.

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I'm not sure that's verified but that's what I heard on the day

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that non-essential operating had stopped

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and I think for a short time there was a pause

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in invasive cardiac procedures as well in the regional centers the situation was scary,

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and it didn't take long for most of the country to get glued to the nearest radios, TVs, and computers.

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Among them was a UK researcher named Marcus Hutchins.

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At 2.30 p.m.

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Marcus had just finished lunch and returned home.

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He had a few days off, so he was taking it easy.

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But the moment he opened his computer, the scale of the crisis hit him, and he felt he needed to do something.

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Marcus recalls the motions of that day with Jack Recider on Darknut Diaries

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when he was brought back to his old parents' room.

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And my first instinct was this isn't phishing, this is hitting way too many organizations, way too many parts of the same organization,

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it has to be something bigger.

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So I went and asked my friend Caffeine, can I have a sample of this?

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And the second I looked at it, I was like, oh this is bad.

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As Marcus continued to investigate the malware, he quickly noticed something else unusual.

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The worm was trying to connect to a random domain before deploying its payload.

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And when I saw this unregistered domain in the WannaCry code, I was like, nice, this is probably a command and control server.

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So I registered it.

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And then I started looking, what can I do with this code?

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What can I do with the control of this domain?

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I'm thinking it's a command and control server and maybe we can exploit a vulnerability.

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But it actually turned out while we were trying to figure out what is the purpose of this domain?

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What does it actually do?

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We had already stopped WannaCry because the domain was a kill switch.

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With the domain registered, WannaCry couldn't cause any further damage.

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It didn't erase existing infections, but it did stop the malware's attack.

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By 1503, the destruction was officially over.

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Marcus had just become a hero in cybersecurity history, and computers around the world could finally breathe again.

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However, the case of WannaCry was far from being solved.

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WannaCry hijacked an estimated 200,000 computers across 150 countries, infecting almost a few every country worldwide,

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all through just two hours of being operational.

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And it could have easily caused more damage if not for the discovery of the kill switch.

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Something that makes you instantly wonder, what was the kill switch doing there?

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And more importantly, what was the real purpose of the attack?

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The UK police launched an investigation to answer some of those questions, but the mystery only deepened as new details of WannaCry emerged.

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For example, it was revealed that the scheme generated less than $200,000, a small sum for the scale of the attack.

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Not only did many victims refuse to pay, but the payment mechanism was essentially useless.

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Unlike better-designed ransomware, WannaCry had no automated system for distributing decryption keys or tracking who had paid and who hadn't.

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It was odd.

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Too odd for threat actors who are supposedly in it for the money.

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This led to a darker theory.

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Perhaps WannaCry was not about money.

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The kill switch supported this theory.

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Some researchers believed it was not meant to stop the worm but to cover the hacker's footsteps.

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The kill switch was a way for the worm to understand whether it operated in an organic environment or a sandbox.

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A sandbox is a virtual computer used to run malware for research purposes.

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So in this case, if the malware detected a connection to a certain domain, it would shut itself off, assuming it was being studied.

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However, the creators of WannaCry have been sloppy.

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The domain was not different for each infection, it was static.

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So when Marcus registered it, The worm believed the entire internet was a sandbox and shut itself off.

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If the domains had been different for every computer, the kill switch would have only worked for Marcus, and the infection would have continued spreading.

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That would be a smart way to design ransomware, the way nearly every known attack works.

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But in other aspects, WannaCry was pretty sophisticated and was definitely designed with a lot of care and a lot of resources.

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So the most logical explanation was that the malware was simply unfinished.

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Somebody released a testing version instead of the final one.

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The set of circumstances that led to WannaCry was so insane

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because of course you have the Shadow Brokers leak and the Shadow Brokers isn't, they haven't attributed yet but it's widely believed to be Russian intelligence.

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So Russian intelligence hacks the NSA, steals one of their most prized vulnerabilities, leaks it onto the open internet,

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at which point North Korea pick it up and decide to make ransomware with it,

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and we're not even to this day sure whether WannaCry was supposed to be released yet.

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There are a lot of just signs in in the code

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that it might have been a work in progress that accidentally leaked a little earlier than they had intended it to.

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As the investigation progressed, the UK brought the case to America, which uncovered the nastier side of it.

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At the end of the day, the NSA's fingerprints were all over the two stolen exploits that made WannaCry work, Eternal Blue and Double Pulsar.

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WannaCry's power came straight from America's intelligence, and working together, British and American investigators discovered who was behind the worm.

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First, the FBI analyzed WannaCry's code and concluded that there were at least two other versions of the malware, dating from February and April of 2017.

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All three versions shared the same code.

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No reverse engineer was involved.

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This was the work of a single group of threat actors.

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Then came another revelation.

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WannaCry had much in common with other infamous cyber attacks.

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The malware data chart matched the one used in the Sony and Bangladesh cyber attacks.

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Also, the development environment was the same.

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Visual C++, and while this alone does not guarantee that the malware creators were the same, one discovery made the difference.

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Several IPs and email addresses were reused across WannaCry, Sony, and Bangladesh.

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It was like finding that after robbing three separate places, the burglars went to the same warehouse to store the stolen goods.

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All of these attacks had been perpetrated by the same threat actor, and all the evidence was pointing in one direction.

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Lazarus Group.

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Lazarus Group, also known as Guardians of Peace or Who Is Team, is believed to be behind most of North Korea's cyber attacks.

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Jeff White, an investigative journalist, explores this group in great detail and believes these hackers never act independently.

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They are North Korea's war machine.

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Some hackers working for North Korea are accused of attacking banks.

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Some are accused of attacking governments or media organizations.

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So there's this idea that there are different teams.

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And yes, they will be within the military because North Korea is a highly militarized society.

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From memory, I think something like 5 or 6 million of its 25 million inhabitants are in the military services.

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So yes, the hackers will be inside the military.

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They will be part of an organizational structure.

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They will have a commanding officer who is controlling what they do.

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So that's the sort of setup in terms of the hackers.

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There was one more thing all of these attacks had in common.

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Tracing them and connecting them allowed the investigators to finally connect the Lazarus Group to a real person,

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turning what used to be a shadowy organization with ties to North Korea into a group of operatives with faces and names.

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In the aftermath of the Sony hack and the Bangladesh heist, FBI agents found a shared network of emails that led them to a mysterious user, Kim Hyun-woo.

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Although this turned out to be a fabricated persona, the alias was actually helpful for the FBI.

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They connected this alias to Chosin Expo Group, a North Korean front company for state-sponsored hacking.

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Chosun Expo was initially an experimental venture between North Korea and South Korea.

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It sold everything from lottery tickets to mushrooms and even ornate bases.

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But at some point, South Korea withdrew from the venture, and North Korea maintained the business.

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On paper, the company's purpose was to supply various goods and services, including software, freelancing software development, and gambling-related products.

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But this was only on paper.

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The FBI soon uncovered that Chosen was connected to the Sony and Bangladesh incidents.

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Not only was it using an official government-run email account to target victims, but the logins of Chosen Expo's website were tied to the network of fake email accounts used in the attacks.

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The evidence was clear.

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Whoever ran the company's website also participated in the cyber attacks.

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They came across a Gmail address, a Google email address that had been used in that attack.

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So they issued a warrant to Google and said, we want the data on this account.

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And they discovered a CV

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that had been sent by one of the allegedly North Korean

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hackers to his new employer in China as he was going across the border to work for this company in China.

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And of course, it had his photo and his name and all that kind of thing.

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And they had this whole correspondence about how this North Korean was looking forward to going over to China, to set up in China and to have this new life.

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Incredible privilege, by the way, to travel abroad as a North Korean.

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His name was Park Jin-hyuk.

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Unlike other nicknames and aliases found during the investigation, he did not have a ghostly presence.

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His birthday, education, language proficiency, and skills were all in the hands of investigators.

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And this was just enough to build a case.

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North Korea's cyber army was behind the attacks.

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And Park Jin-hyuk was the executioner's hand.

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By the end of 2017, the USA publicly shared that North Korea was behind WannaCry.

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The press and the White House spoke openly, pointing to Pyongyang, claiming that the reason behind the attack was to generate chaos against the USA and allies,

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something that North Korea obviously denied.

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But there was one detail the White House conveniently did not mention.

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As discussed thoroughly during this video, WannaCry did not have a trigger or respond to one clear event.

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Instead, it combined various factors including North Korea's thirst for power, the shadow broker's leak, and indirectly, the NSA's obsession with exploits.

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Brad Smith, president of Microsoft, acknowledged this in a post after the incident.

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In it, he heavily criticized the U.S and its tendency to hoard exploits, comparing the situation to the U.S military having some of its Tomahawk missiles stolen.

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This was not taken well in Washington.

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The U.S government tried its best to deflect the questions surrounding America's indirect role in WannaCry, and when asked whether the NSA was accountable for WannaCry,

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their Your answer was...

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No, not at all.

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WannaCry resulted from a chain of events that fueled a beast, but North Korean threat actors could not have completed this beast without the Shadow Brokers leaks.

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Luckily, we have a video about this mysterious group on our channel if you want to learn more about their story, and how those leaks came to be.

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Thank you for watching, and we'll see you in the next video!

✨ अनुशंसित वीडियो

137 वाक्य

इस पाठ की शब्दावली और बोलने के सुझाव

यह B2 स्तर का स्पीकिंग पाठ वीडियो “World's Deadliest Computer Virus: WannaCry” पर आधारित है। सबसे ज़्यादा दोहराए गए शब्द ये हैं: Wannacry, Korea, attack। इस वीडियो में शैडोइंग के लिए 364 वाक्य और 4610 शब्द हैं। बोला गया हिस्सा 27:08 लंबा है। वक्ता लगभग 170 शब्द प्रति मिनट की स्वाभाविक गति से बोलता है, जो रोज़मर्रा की बातचीत के करीब है। केवल 78% शब्द अंग्रेज़ी के 3,000 सबसे आम शब्दों में से हैं, इसलिए शब्दावली कठिन है।

इस वीडियो की मुख्य शब्दावली

वीडियो के 15 सबसे कठिन शब्द, उच्चारण और अर्थ के साथ:

शब्द	उच्चारण	अर्थ
malware संज्ञा	/ˈmæl.wɛəɹ/	मैलवेयर, दुर्भावनापूर्ण सॉफ़्टवेयर
leak संज्ञा	/liːk/	रिसाव
worm संज्ञा	/wɝm/	कीड़ा, पोका
heist संज्ञा	/haɪst/	चोरी, डाका
investigator संज्ञा	/ɪnˈvɛs.tɪˌɡeɪ̯.təː/	जाँचकर्ता, अन्वेषक
mysterious विशेषण	/mɪˈstɪɹi.əs/	रहस्यपूर्ण, गूढ
famine संज्ञा	/ˈfæm.ɪn/	अकाल
accuse क्रिया	/əˈkjuz/	आरोप लगाना
forge संज्ञा	/fɔɹd͡ʒ/	भट्ठी, भट्ठा
operative विशेषण	/ˈɑpəɹətɪv/	सक्रिय
researcher संज्ञा	/ˈɹiˌsɝ.t͡ʃɚ/	शोधकर्ता, शोधक
revelation संज्ञा	/ˌɹɛv.əˈleɪ.ʃən/	प्रकटीकरण
peninsula संज्ञा	/pəˈnɪn.sə.lə/	प्रायद्वीप
headline संज्ञा	/ˈhɛd.laɪn/	शीर्षक
ally संज्ञा	/ˈæl.aɪ/	मित्र

वीडियो में आने वाली फ़्रेज़ल वर्ब

शब्द	अर्थ
turn off क्रिया	बंद करना

इस वीडियो का व्याकरण

वक्ता जिन संरचनाओं का सबसे अधिक प्रयोग करता है, वीडियो के असली शब्दों के साथ:

संरचना	वीडियो में
Present perfect continuous have/has been + -ing — पहले शुरू हुआ काम जो अब भी जारी है	he's been trying · He's been working
“used to” used to + क्रिया — बीती आदत या स्थिति जो अब नहीं है	used to run · used to be
Present perfect have/has + past participle — बीता हुआ काम जिसका असर अभी भी है	hasn't had · has found · have found
Passive voice be + past participle — ज़ोर इस पर कि क्या होता है, न कि कौन करता है	was stolen · been wiped · was released

ध्यान देने योग्य उच्चारण

वक्ता 21 बार संक्षिप्त रूपों का प्रयोग करता है, जैसे doesn't, didn't, I'm। इन्हें वैसे ही छोटा बोलें जैसा आप सुनते हैं।

“sh” और “zh” की ध्वनियाँ: phishing /ˈfɪʃɪŋ/, unleash /ʌnˈliʃ/, unfinished /ʌnˈfɪnɪʃt/, revelation /ˌɹɛv.əˈleɪ.ʃən/
लंबे शब्द — बलाघात सही रखें: vulnerability /ˌvʌln(ə)ɹəˈbɪlɪti/, cybersecurity /saɪbəsɪˈkjʊəɹɪtɪ/, investigator /ɪnˈvɛs.tɪˌɡeɪ̯.təː/, mysterious /mɪˈstɪɹi.əs/, operative /ˈɑpəɹətɪv/

इस वीडियो से अभ्यास कैसे करें

पहले बिना बोले पूरा वीडियो एक बार सुनें और जो शब्द नहीं आते उन्हें लिख लें।
0.75× गति से शुरू करें, एक-एक वाक्य की शैडोइंग करें, और सहज लगने पर सामान्य गति पर लौटें।
अपनी आवाज़ रिकॉर्ड करें और मूल से तुलना करें, ख़ासकर malware, leak, worm जैसे शब्दों पर ध्यान दें।

शैडोइंग तकनीक क्या है?

शैडोइंग (Shadowing) एक विज्ञान-समर्थित भाषा सीखने की तकनीक है जो मूल रूप से पेशेवर दुभाषिया प्रशिक्षण के लिए विकसित की गई थी। विधि सरल लेकिन शक्तिशाली है: आप मूल अंग्रेज़ी ऑडियो सुनते हैं और तुरंत इसे ज़ोर से दोहराते हैं — जैसे वक्ता की छाया 1-2 सेकंड की देरी से। शोध से पता चलता है कि यह उच्चारण सटीकता, स्वर, लय, जुड़ी हुई ध्वनियाँ, सुनने की समझ और बोलने की प्रवाहशीलता में काफ़ी सुधार करता है।

शैडोइंग तकनीक: पूरी चरण-दर-चरण गाइड पढ़ें →

शैडोइंग अभ्यास: World's Deadliest Computer Virus: WannaCry - वीडियो के साथ अंग्रेजी बोलना सीखें

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