シャドーイング練習: Tiger! | Scorched Earth | Full Documentary - 動画で英語スピーキングを学ぶ
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The armored might of Hitler's Wehrmacht will be forever associated with its most famous tank,
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the Panzerkampfwagen VI, better known to a fearful world as the Tiger.
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More than half a century later, the still hulks of these metal masters silently mark time in the Tank Museum at Bovington in Dorset, England.
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The Tiger
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But it is not too difficult to roll back the years
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and conjure up the image of this terrible instrument of destruction in its prime.
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Like its namesake, the tiger was a rare beast, and in its field it was every bit as deadly, a hunter and killer of unmatched ferocity.
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I'm sorry.
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The End In the wake of Germany's bitter defeat in the Great War of 1914 to 1918,
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The victorious Allies imposed a series of draconian restrictions on the vanquished foe, designed to prevent Germany from developing armed forces worthy of the name.
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One of the chief restrictions was to prevent Germany from developing or acquiring any form of battle tank.
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Initially, the treaty worked.
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In 1935, only four years before the outbreak of World War II, Germany still didn't possess a tank force.
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In the space of ten short years, German tank technology would progress from the lightweight and inefficient Panzer I to the Panzer VI,
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and onto the development of the Maus, the prototype Panzer VII, which would have been the largest and heaviest armored tank in the history of warfare.
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The evil sorcerer who conjured up this energy for the mercurial transformation of the German tank arm, from a weak force of lightly armed two-man machines,
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to the menacing panzer divisions equipped with the King Tiger was
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the same man who also was to plunge the world into total war.
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He was Adolf Hitler.
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It was Hitler who provided the impetus to develop the tanks of Germany's Wehrmacht.
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To huge popular acclaim in Germany, in 1935 he cast aside the terms of Versailles and began to re-equip the country.
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In defiance of the Allies, Hitler began the development of both a tank force, and also a viable air force.
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His stance was totally uncompromising and overtly expansionist.
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In doing so, he took an enormous risk.
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In order to enforce the Versailles Treaty, Britain and France would have been well within in their rights to take military action against Hitler.
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In 1935, Germany would have been in no state to resist.
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But Hitler was a gambler, and he gambled upon bluffing his enemies into believing his forces were far stronger than they actually were.
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By doing so, he bought time while his generals desperately built up the real strength of his armies, ready for the day when war would come again.
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To continue the deception, a number of tricks were perfected.
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To impress foreign dignitaries, the tanks leading the parade would be driven round by a secret route to join the end of the colony
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and come round again, thus doubling the numbers.
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Hitler was successful in bluffing his enemies, but he also bluffed his friends.
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He had promised the generals that a major war in Europe would not come until 1942 at the earliest.
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In fact, Hitler actually precipitated the Second World War with his invasion of Poland in 1939,
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three years before the complete armament of the forces destined for the fight were due to be available.
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The German generals were able to provide a quick
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and complete victory for Hitler with the successful invasion of Poland in September 1939.
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In addition to Hitler's armies, the Poles were simultaneously attacked by Stalin's Red Army, so the contest was short and conclusive, but it was still a victory.
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The next campaign would be much more of a gamble.
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Hitler turned his gaze to the invasion of France, and his generals grew nervous.
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They knew that this time there would surely be no repeat of the victory won in Poland.
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Hitler's combination of political brinkmanship and calculated gambles had disguised the fact
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that the German army at this time could deploy only 2,000 tanks.
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The Allies could count on 4,500.
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The popular view of the Wehrmacht of 1939 is an armored juggernaut, but in fact, most of its armies still marched on foot.
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In 1939, German cavalry regiments were still deployed, and played an active role in the field.
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The bulk of the army's transport was not even motorized.
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It was still horse-drawn.
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Not surprisingly, news crews chose to focus on the new and glamorous armored formations with their high propaganda value.
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Archive footage of horse-drawn artillery and the long lines of men slogging along on foot is much rarer.
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But these were the men who formed the bulk of the German army, and they still marched to battle as their grandfathers had done.
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If the Wehrmacht hoped to defeat the French and British, they would have to defeat 4,000 French and 500 British tanks.
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Not only were their numbers inferior, but many of the tanks deployed by the Germans were of limited fighting value.
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The main offender in this respect was the tiny Panzer I light tank.
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The Panzer I tank seen here in Bovington was small and lightly armoured.
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This particular machine is a turretless command version.
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These frontline fighting machines only carried two men, and were very lightly armed and equipped with just two machine guns.
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Even though the shortcomings of the Panzer I had been cruelly exposed in Poland, some 520 machines still had to be engaged for the coming invasion of France.
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There was no alternative.
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The other mainstay of the Panzer Force in 1940 was Panzer II, a slight improvement on the flimsy Panzer I, but not much.
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It was a three-man machine and had the added benefit of a 38-millimeter gun.
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Despite its lack of armor and seriously limited firepower, it provided some 40% of the total Wehrmacht tank strength in 1940.
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Hundreds of these machines were deployed for the assault on France.
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of far greater military value was the Panzer III then one
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of the best tanks in the world by the standards of
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the later war years it had a comparatively weak main gun
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but in 1940 it was more than adequate the main problem with the Panzer III was the fact
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that it was only a in very small numbers.
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Only 349 were available for the French campaign.
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In even shorter supply was the excellent Panzer IV.
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The The
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bulk of the remaining machines were the Czech made Panzer 38T, of which some 400 were deployed.
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The Panzer 38 was to provide a reliable and efficient tank for the early stage of the war.
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Taken together with the Mark III and IV, the breakdown of forces meant Hitler's army deployed a total of 1,500 light tanks and 900 medium and heavy,
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far too high a proportion of light tanks for the liking of the German general staff.
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The questionable force was to meet and defeat some 4,500 Allied tanks.
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Including the excellent Char B and the sturdy British Matilda, seen here at Bovington, both of these tanks were the equal of anything the Germans possessed.
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But as the history books testify, Hitler was to triumph as completely in France as he had done in Poland.
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He did so for two reasons.
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Firstly, there were the poor French and British tactics.
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The French tanks in particular were distributed in small contingents throughout the army, while the German tanks were concentrated in the new panzer divisions,
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superbly led by able commanders.
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It was these new panzer divisions which really gave the edge to the Wehrmacht.
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The Germans concentrated all of their tanks into the hard-hitting panzer divisions, which were the only divisions in the whole army to be equipped with tanks.
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The panzer divisions themselves could be grouped together to form panzer corps, Panzer Corps, which could achieve a massive local superiority at the point of decision on the battlefield.
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The local superiority allowed the attacking German armored divisions to punch through the defensive line on a very narrow frontage,
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and then stream forward to take objectives deep in the rear, leaving support infantry to mop up.
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Tanks and motorized inventory would be supported by a devastating aerial bombardment by Stuka dive bombers, the division's own mobile artillery.
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This was the essence of the new German concept of Blitzkrieg, the Lightning War.
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It was this combination of efficient battlefield tactics and inspired leadership which made the difference for Hitler.
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It also prevailed in the conquest of the Balkans and Greece in 1941.
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But from these new victories, several false conclusions were drawn.
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The chief of these was the German belief that their tanks were the best in the world.
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Consequently, there was no urgent need for the development of new, heavier types of tanks.
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This arrogant attitude was to lead to a shock from which Germany would never recover.
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That shock was to be delivered in Russia.
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When Hitler ordered the conquest of Russia in the summer of 1941, confidence among the Panzer force was at an all-time high.
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The initial assault on the Soviet Union proceeded according to plan, and the mighty German army swept all before.
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As always, the panzer divisions were well to the fore.
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Despite the understandable cockiness of the German high command, some of the lessons from earlier campaigns had been absorbed, and the makeup of the tank force
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which shook Stalin to the core had a much higher proportion of Mark III and Mark IV and Panzer 38T tanks.
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This trend illustrated the steadily increasing reliance on heavier armor, which was to continue throughout the war.
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Despite being outnumbered by a factor of 4 to 1, the German tanks at first swept all before them.
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Initially the tanks met only older and obsolete Russian armor, which the Panzer 3's and Panzer 4's had little trouble dealing with.
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It was just as well, because the Wehrmacht was about to meet with a very nasty surprise.
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After a few weeks of the campaign, the German forces suddenly encountered two of the new Russian tanks, which were to change the course of the war.
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The first was the T-34.
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Far better armed and equipped than the German Mark IV, and also better equipped to deal with the extreme Russian weather conditions.
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Its wide tracks made it equally at home in the dry, mud and snow.
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In addition, the sloping armour presented an angled front to German fire, designed to cause shells to glance off the armour.
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The T-34 was to become the real nemesis of the German army.
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It was built for mass assembly, and the crude welding lines can be clearly seen.
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It was no beauty, but it was tough.
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Ultimately some 90,000 would be built.
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The T-34s
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Although the Germans would devise better tanks, they could never hope to compete in terms of the sheer numbers of T-34s which were produced.
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It was by no means the best tank to emerge from World War II, but it was more than adequate for the task,
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and the huge numbers manufactured would ultimately tip the balance of the whole war.
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The other new Russian tank which the Germans now encountered was the heavy KV-1,
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a 46-ton with superior heavy armour and a vicious 76mm gun, capable of destroying any German tank from most ranges on the battlefield.
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The German High Command of guns.
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A new heavy tank was needed urgently,
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but it wouldn't be available for at least a year. To compound matters,
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mistaken assessments based on experience in France had led to even
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the heaviest German tank being equipped with the short-barrelled 75mm gun seen here at Bovington.
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These short-barrelled weapons made the tanks easy to manoeuvre, but deprived the gun of the missile velocity and penetrating power which a larger barrel produced.
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While Germany scrambled to produce the new heavy tanks, the Mark IVs were urgently re-equipped with long-barrelled 75mm guns,
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and given extra welded skirts as protection against the new Russian weapons.
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Measures like these helped to keep up the momentum of the German advance in 1942,
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but the panzer divisions were increasingly hard pressed by the increasing numbers of T-34s and KV-1s.
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Only the deadly 88mm anti-tank gun was really equal to the task of destroying the hordes of T-34s.
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What the Germans needed was a tank big enough to have such a gun.
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The experience of tank ace Hermann Bix was typical of the desperate straits German tank commanders found themselves in from 1942.
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Bix saw a dozen of his shells bounce off this KV-1, even at the closest ranges.
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Eventually, he managed to silence the steel monster as it swung its turret to take aim against him
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by the expedient of a well-aimed shot deliberately fired through the barrel of his opponent's gun.
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Men like Vicks were part of a new breed of German
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tank commanders who achieved incredible victories against superior forces now armed with better equipment.
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Rudolf von Ribbentrop, son of Germany's foreign minister, was another celebrated tank commander during this difficult time.
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Due to the efforts of Bix, von Ribbentrop and others, the German momentum continued.
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It took them to the gates of Leningrad in the north, into the Caucasus in the south, and to the very gates of the infamous city of Stalingrad.
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But by October 1942, they could advance no further.
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The Lines of supply were desperately overextended, and the tanks were worn out by the thousands of miles they had traveled,
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and the climatic conditions which turned from dust to mud to snow, taking their toll on the engines.
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They were never given adequate time for repair and maintenance.
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Despite their robust appearance, tanks are quite delicate machines, which are not designed to travel long distances on their tracks.
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They need very frequent repairs and constant attention.
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By 1942, crucial shortages of spare parts had developed.
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For example, the lack of air filters to extract the summer dust from the air sucked into engines
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led to worn out pistons and massive extra oil consumption, which in turn placed a strain on fuel supplies.
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German lines of supply stretched 2,000 miles all the way back to Berlin, and every single item of spares had to be carried to the front,
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across Russia's limited rail network, exposed to the privations of partisans.
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All the time, the Red Army's armada of T-34s was growing ominously.
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New Russian tank armies were coming into being, and in November 1942, the storm broke.
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The new Russian offensive swept behind the German lines in the south, and surrounded and destroyed the 6th Army at Stalingrad.
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The sheer number of Russian tanks staggered the Germans, who desperately needed an answer.
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In the winter of 1942, the answer to their prayers was finally ready for delivery.
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The first time I was in the war was to be a war for delivering.
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The Panzerkampfwagen VI, or the Tiger, had been developed in 1940 and 1941,
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too late to benefit from all of the lessons of the Russian war.
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So it had the uncompromisingly flat armor at the front, which didn't deflect shots away from the vehicle.
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But it was so very heavily armored that it wasn't a major problem.
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In fact, the Tiger was almost impervious to most Russian guns at all but the closest ranges, and it carried the deadly 88mm gun,
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then the best weapon on the battlefield.
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The gunner of the Tiger lined his target up on the middle triangle of his gunsight, as the motorized turret effortlessly swung the gun into position.
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The maker's manual proclaimed that the 88mm gun was 100% accurate at ranges of up to 1,000 meters.
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On the battlefield, the Tiger soon proved its deadly efficiency.
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But there were never enough machines to equip all of the panzer divisions, so the Tigers were organized into special heavy tank battalions,
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called Schwer Abdullans, which could be rushed from place to place on the hard-pressed front, wherever they were most desperately needed.
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Each battalion of heavy tanks consisted of 17 machines organized into a command troop of three tanks, a company troop of two tanks,
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and three Zug, or sections, of four tanks each.
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The highly efficient Nazi propaganda trumpeted the arrival of the Tiger, and for once, the results justified it.
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The training manual
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which dealt with the Tiger was very specific on the subject of how they were to be employed in battle.
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The terrific firepower, strong armor,
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high cross-country ability and high overrunning power are the characteristics of the heavy Panzerkampfwagen in the Tiger Company.
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They enable the company to attack in the first wave against strong defenses, to destroy heavy enemy tanks and other armored targets already at long ranges,
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ranges, to decisively defeat the enemy defenses, to break through positions reinforced by defensive works.
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As a rule, the Tigers were to be employed in separate heavy panzer battalions,
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in order to quickly break enemy resistance and penetrate defenses by means of their concentrated fire superiority and strong armor protection.
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There were two main offensive formations.
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The Kyle Formation for attacking on a narrow front, and the Bright Kyle for attacking on a broad front.
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The main targets for the Tiger were listed in order of priority.
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Firstly, armored targets and bunker embrasures, were to be attacked using armor-piercing shells.
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And secondly, prepared defenses, anti-tank guns, artillery positions, and massed inventory targets,
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which were to be attacked with high explosive shells.
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The manual pointed out that the unmistakable noise of the Tiger's engine traveled long distances, especially at night.
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Care needed to be taken therefore with the wind direction and the location of assembly areas, which, in order to preserve the element of surprise,
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were to be as far distant from the front as possible.
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All German teachings stressed that the most important task of the Tiger companies was the engagement of enemy tanks,
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as the excellent combination of the 88mm gun and strong armour, matched by reasonably high manoeuvrability,
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made the Tiger the strongest combat weapon available to the Wehrmacht.
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The Tiger was therefore a powerful and decisive point weapon.
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Its strength was best utilized in concentrated and ruthlessly conducted attacks.
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Spreading the tanks too thinly reduced the striking power of the group.
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On the rare occasions when the Tiger was to be used in defensive operation, positions were always prepared to maximize its effectiveness.
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In combat, the Tigers were to be sent into action at the crisis points of the battle, where their presence would be decisive.
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All other weapons were merely there to support the heavy tanks and the tasks allocated to them.
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From experience of combat, the tactics which proved most successful were to engage the enemy with fire from lighter tanks,
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while the Tigers launched a flank or surprise attack, using their superiority and firepower against the enemy tank's weakest points.
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During battles in built-up areas, it was stressed that the Tiger was not to be sent into house-to-house fighting
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because of its vulnerability to infantry at close quarters.
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There was also the protruding gun, which could cause the tank to get stuck in narrow streets.
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The tactics worked.
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Although only 80 Tigers had been delivered by the end of January 1943, already they were credited with over 400 kills.
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The Allies grew nervous, but so far no Tiger had been captured.
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That situation was to change early in 1943, when British forces fighting in Tunisia knocked out and captured this machine,
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which is now housed in the Tank Museum at Rovington.
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The Every
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inch of the Tiger was studied, and a very concerned study team presented these extracts.
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The tank provides a very stable gun platform for either head-on or broadside stationary firing.
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During the firing trials, a target was engaged at 1100 yards.
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Correction was given to the gunner for the first round, after which he fired a further five rounds, and secured five consecutive hits.
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The gun appeared to be remarkably consistent.
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The highest timed rate of fire during these limited trials was four rounds in just 39 seconds.
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This tank has a higher rate of fire than our own heavy gun tanks.
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Five rounds were also fired at a target moving at 15 miles an hour range 1500 yards.
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Three hits were scored.
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A target at one mile distance was engaged, and a hit was obtained with the fourth round.
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The study revealed that the design had been well thought out, and embodied a number of distinctly original features, especially the heavy armament and armor, turret and hull construction.
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It was noted that the Panzerkampfwagen VI, with its heavy armor, dual-purpose armament and fighting ability, was basically an excellent tank,
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and constituted a considerable advance on any Allied tank.
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The study revealed its only real weakness was the limits imposed on mobility due to its weight, width, and limited range of action,
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and concluded that the Tiger all round presented a very formidable fighting machine, which could not be underrated.
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There was more bad news for the Allies.
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In tandem with the Tiger, the German armaments industry had also been developing a new medium tank to match the T-34.
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Although they would not admit it, many of the features of the new Panzer Kampfwagen 5, or Panther, were copied directly from the T-34.
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The Panther had the same sloping armour, wide tracks and even a similar 75mm gun.
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Once the Panther had overcome its initial teething problems, it would prove itself the best medium tank of the war.
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It was a far better vehicle than the T-34, but again the problem of short supply remained.
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It was never to be available in the quantities which the war in the east demanded.
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Although 6,000 would be built, that was never enough, as the numbers destroyed always kept pace with supply.
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It has been estimated that from May 1944 until the end of the war,
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on any given day an average of only 400 tanks were available for action in the entire German army.
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With this tremendous disparity in numbers, it has been estimated
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that the German tank divisions would have had to destroy ten Russian tanks for every one of their own which was lost.
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In fact, by the end of the war, it is estimated that four Russian tanks were destroyed for every German tank,
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and indeed, the figure was more like ten in the case of the Tiger.
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Even on the Western Front, where the Allied tanks enjoyed a similar advantage to the Russians, Three Allied tanks were being destroyed for every German machine lost.
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It is interesting to note that only a small proportion of Tiger tanks were actually destroyed by Allied tanks.
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The vast majority either fell victim to Allied fighter bombers, or had to be abandoned and destroyed by their crews when they experienced mechanical difficulties,
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or more frequently, ran out of fuel.
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From 1944, the Allied bomber campaigns were really beginning to bite, and the shortage of fuel was killing the panzer formations as effectively as the Allied armies.
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Before they were swept away, Small groups of Tigers performed heroically.
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One man will always be associated with the Tiger.
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He was Michael Wittmann of the 1st SS Panzer Division.
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Wittmann was responsible for a huge number of Allied tank kills.
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By June 1944, Wittmann and his Tiger had been responsible for more than 130 Russian tanks
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when they were transferred to the Western Front.
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It was there that one of the most famous tank actions of the war took place.
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On June 13th, 1944, Michael Wittmann encountered the leading elements of the British 7th Armoured Division.
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With the practical eye of an experienced veteran, Wittmann noted that the column was locked into a single road.
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He therefore destroyed the last vehicle in the column, just as quickly the first, effectively trapping the entire column.
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Slamming his vehicle into action, Wittmann methodically moved down the line, destroying 17 tanks and 8 other vehicles.
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All of this destruction was achieved by one Tiger, handled with deadly efficiency.
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Despite actions like these, the Tigers were still being destroyed as fast as they were delivered
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and Wittmann himself fell in action in August 1944, his machine totally destroyed.
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Such losses were simply unsustainable.
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By 1944, despite the pressures of the Allied bombing raids, some 20,000 German armoured fighting vehicles were manufactured.
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But battlefield losses were running at some 23,000 machines.
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So the number of tanks available at the front line actually
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fell during 1944 to a point where the bulk of Germany's
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armoured force had been severely ground down by the early months of 1945.
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During 1944 on average there were never more than 70 Tigers
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available for action at any given time on the whole of the Russian front.
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The remaining machines were either under short or long term repair.
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It was this tiny force which forged a legend.
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On the Western Front, a similar situation prevailed.
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Average battle readiness was only 65 machines on any given day.
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The The
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bulk of the German armor was trapped and surrounded by superior forces in these streets.
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The Allies by now enjoyed total air supremacy, and the Allied Air Force had a field day destroying the retreating German columns.
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The second panzer division was destroyed by the second panzer division.
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A daring thrust by the second panzer division broke the encirclement and relieved the pressure.
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But the bridges were down and the retreating panzers could not withdraw over the Seine.
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Most had to be abandoned or blown up.
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By August 1944, not one single Tiger was left operational in France.
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The high rate of attrition on their armoured force caused the Germans to cast around desperately for a solution.
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One successful expedient was to dispose with the turret of the tanks, to produce turretless vehicles with less flexibility, but with the same firepower.
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They were also easier and quicker to manufacture.
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Three could be made for every two tanks.
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These tank killers were known by the German name, Yadpanther.
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By this stage of the war, German armour was fighting almost exclusively defensive battles, for which the Yadpanzers were perfectly suited.
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They could lie in wait, firing from fixed positions.
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The Yad Panther shown here is from the Imperial War Museum.
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It has had the side removed, to permit the public to view the inside, but the sense of military efficiency still remains.
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The on
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the battlefield.
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But only 470 of these machines were ever manufactured, never enough to seriously affect the tidal wave of armor now encroaching Germany on every side.
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But the Tiger and Tiger B still made a large impact in the closing months of the war.
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So much so that General Eisenhower requested a special study of the Tiger in action.
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Drawn exclusively from eyewitnesses, it made for depressing reading for the Allies, as this selection of quotes confirms.
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It is my opinion that the Tiger enemy tank is far superior in maneuverability to our own Sherman tanks.
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The higher muzzle velocity of the German tanks enables them to far outrange our Shermans.
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I have seen them knock our tanks out at ranges up to 1,000 yards, and know of no incident where a Sherman tank has knocked out a Panther
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or a Tiger tank at more than 300 yards range.
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It is my opinion that the vast majority of Panther and Tiger tanks knocked out have been destroyed by air support, abandoned, or as a direct result of air attack.
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On the other hand, 85% of the tanks we have lost have been due to enemy tanks and anti-tank guns.
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Seldom have I seen a shot ricochet from a Sherman tank.
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However, often our armor-piercing shells have glanced harmlessly off the Tiger's front slope and turrets.
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The heavy armor plate of the Panther and the Tiger enables them to turn our shot.
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but our armor is easily pierced by their more powerful guns.
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Our tank guns, both 75mm and 76mm, haven't the penetrating power that the German tanks have.
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At El Boeuf, during August 1944, our armor-piercing shells bounced off a Tiger at point-blank range while we were on a roadblock.
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One day a Tiger Royal tank got within 150 yards of my tank and knocked me out.
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Five of our tanks opened up on him from ranges of 200 to 600 yards
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and got five or six hits on the front of the Tiger.
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They all just glanced off and the Tiger backed off and got away.
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I saw four Tigers 1,800 yards away and fired upon them.
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I hit them in their right side about 15 times with armor-piercing ammunition, but saw all of them hit and bounce off.
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We were ordered to engage a column of six Tigers.
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Each time one of the armor-piercing shells hit the tanks, you could see them ricocheting two and three hundred feet into the air.
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The Russians were less gloomy.
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They seemed to have had better success, even against the Tiger II, as this report declares.
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The Germans have built up great hopes by the production of their new heavy Tiger B Panzer, which they believe to be invulnerable.
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When our anti-tank units open fire, the King Tigers deploy, turn their front to face the enemy, and open fire to the short forts.
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But the Tiger B has many vulnerable points, and many negative characteristics that increase its vulnerability.
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as we have seen from combat experience it has been destroyed by the T-34.
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The Tiger B was the largest practical tank to see action in the Panzer Division.
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Already its huge size was giving enormous difficulty in negotiating narrow roads and moving across bridges, few of which could carry its huge weight.
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It also needed huge stocks of the vital fuel supplies which Germany could no longer provide.
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In 1945 when the war ended, Germany was developing the super heavy Panzer 7,
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a huge metal monster, massively armoured and sporting a huge main gun.
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It was never to see action, and only four prototypes were built.
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But it seemed
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that the crazed minds of the Third Reich would never give up the quest to be the best and the biggest, whatever the cost.
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But as the humble T-34 had proved, it's not just size that matters.
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Thank you.
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毎日15〜30分の練習で、IELTSスピーキングへの自信と実践的な英会話力が身につきます。
シャドーイングとは？英語上達に効果的な理由
シャドーイング（Shadowing）は、もともとプロの通訳者養成プログラムで開発された言語学習法で、多言語習得者として知られるDr. Alexander Arguelles によって広く普及されました。方法はシンプルですが非常に効果的：ネイティブスピーカーの英語を聞きながら、1〜2秒の遅延で声に出してすぐに繰り返す——まるで「影（shadow）」のように話者を追いかけます。文法ドリルや受動的なリスニングと異なり、シャドーイングは脳と口の筋肉が同時にリアルタイムで英語を処理・再現することを強制します。研究により、発音精度、抑揚、リズム、連音、リスニング力、そして会話の流暢さが大幅に向上することが確認されています。IELTSスピーキング対策や自然な英語コミュニケーションを目指す方に特におすすめです。