Pratica di Shadowing: Mes arguments philosophiques préférés - Impara a parlare inglese con i video

Bonjour à tous, j 'espère que vous allez bien.

Je vous retrouve dans cette vidéo sans grande prétention qui aura

pour objectif de vous présenter certains arguments que j 'apprécie en

philosophie parmi les arguments les plus connus et d 'essayer de les résumer succinctement dans cette vidéo, sachant que je me base principalement sur un livre qui se nomme Just the Arguments,

qui est un livre que je recommande vivement que vous connaissiez les principaux arguments de la philosophie ou non, puisqu 'il répertorie tous les arguments les plus connus de l 'histoire de la philosophie

and he has the quality of the way to summarize it

in a very clear way with always a part of a summary of two

or three pages and a small part of the argument in form of proposition

and conclusion which I find very practical because

if you want to understand the structure of the argument

and then perhaps try to critique it you will understand where

is your critique is at the level of the proposition 1 or the proposition 2 It allows you to really understand, I think, in profondeur the arguments.

And personally, now that I read sometimes to authors who are really able to clarify the arguments using the propositions, I have a bit of a problem to come back and now it becomes a reflex.

Every time I try to transform the arguments in propositions and conclusions.

So it's for that I recommend this book.

It's in English, but it's quite accessible, I think.

So I hope this video will play and it's part!

I will start by showing you a very simple question, in any case I will try to simplify in his presentation, which is the question of Tiphron, which is presented in the dialogue of Platon,

under the name of Tiphron, and if I would re -transcribe this in one question, even if it is not the way it is presented exactly in the dialogue, it would be to say,

is it something moral because God command it or is it something that

This question pousse the speaker to position the two different positions, which are both problematic.

The first is to say that something is moral because it is the will of God, but in which case, the morality seems really tributary,

dependent on a form of arbitrary which would say that whatever the nature of the thing, its function, it is necessary to say that something is moral,

and this thing becomes moral.

If we say that if God wants to kill innocent children is moral, in this case, this thing becomes moral even if at the beginning,

the action seemed cruel.

So there is a sort of circularity, of vide, because that is what God wants to do, this thing becomes moral.

And the second position would be to say that God wants something

because it is moral but in

which case it would be a sort of transmitter of the

moral it would be the person who gives us the command

of following this moral the person who allows us to know the moral

but it diminishes his action and his will because in this case the moral would be extirpure to him Well,

obviously there were responses to this problem since it was formulated a long time

so the most of the philosophers or theologians had the time to respond

and especially Thomas d 'Aquin who respond in saying

that it is not a dilemma and that we are not obligated to take the posture because as the nature of God, his essence is to be just and to be good,

and in this case, all what he commands cannot be something cruel or something bad, all what he commands is something automatically just

because it is in his essence to command something just which would allow me to solve this problem.

But I think there is a part a bit of a bit of a resolution

which is the part of the moral in the nature of God.

Is there still a norm of moral that would exist independently of God

or is this norm is totally included in the divine essence?

So even if I think there are a bit of a satisfying answers like that of Saint Thomas d 'Aquin, there is still a distinction to make,

because God and God are not synonyme, there is a distinction to make.

So how do we get this distinction?

How do we get to structure the nature of God with the nature of God?

It is still a bit funny for me.

Now I will pass to a second argument, which is a statement that was proposed by Mac Taggart on the fact that the time doesn't exist, which really marks the history of the time.

He will present two types of series, the series A and the series B.

The series A is a way to describe the time, which would mean that there is a past, a present and a future,

and that each event will be in its different states.

First, he will be the future, when he is not yet passed, after he will be the present, and then he will be the present.

So there is this series A and there is also the series B

which means to say that there are no different states in which an event can pass, but that in the other way,

the different events have a relationship between them, which are interporeless relations.

If I can allow you to say that an element is antérieur or posterior to an event.

So there are these two representations of the time.

The first, the series A, is a representation that allows us to use the notion of change.

And, just what is critical in the series B, is that the series B doesn't use the notion of change.

Or, intuitively, we have to say that the time is a change.

So it's a temporal change that will be a temporal change in the future.

Or the B's not the time in this way and the change.

So he will pench on the A and ask if the A's a good representation of the time.

Or for him there is a form of incohérence in this A.

So if we go to the series A which allows us to represent the changement, we have a same event which can have different states.

It can be future, present, past.

So for example, your anniversary was future because it was tomorrow.

Then it was present because it was today.

And then it was past because it was here.

So there is this sort of evolution where a same event will have different states except

that these states are not compatible between them.

A same event can't be at the same future, at the same present, at the same past.

So that means that this event passes from an state to another.

It was future, and then it was present, and then it was past, past.

So how to justify that this event is to change an state?

And it's there all the difficulty of the series A, and the author will tell us

that we can't justify it without making a sort of regression to infinity

because in fact if we want to justify that for example now my anniversary is passed

I will base myself on the fact

that today we are the day of the anniversary and so

that this event is now present and that it is not the anniversary

which is present because now it is the day of the day of the day

so it is to justify the fact

that the day of the day of this event is present and that it has also a past, a past which is the anniversary and that it has also a future

and therefore it is to be able to justify the state of this new event

which we serve as a point of repair

and a point of comparison with the day of the anniversary

or every time that we want to take a point of repair temporel to justify the fact

that this event is perhaps not present it is to be able to justify

that this point of repair is present and therefore justify that there are other points of repair which have been present, which have been future,

passé et donc il faut constamment arriver à remettre en perspective

ces différents points de repère en ne pouvant pas le justifier

à partir d 'autres points de repère vu qu 'il faut

arriver à rejustifier qu 'il y a eu présent passé futur

donc bref c 'est vraiment un argument qui n 'est pas

très simple à présenter j 'espère quand même que c 'est

clair et après j 'avais un peu réfléchi en me disant

mais si imaginons qu 'il y ait un point zéro de

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l 'univers peut -être que ça empêcherait la régression à infinity

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but the regression to infinity is not the fact

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that there is a regression compared to the past or future

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which is infinity it's really the fact to say that even

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if we had an universe with for example t0

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which is really the beginning of the universe there is nothing before t1

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and t2 and then in this case it would be able to justify

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that t1 is present and to justify

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that t1 is present it is to justify that for example t2 is future or that

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t0 et t0 passé et de là il faut encore arriver

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à justifier ce statut des autres temps donc c 'est de

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là d 'où vient la regression c 'est pas une régression

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temporelle vers le passé ou vers le futur c 'est vraiment

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une régression explicative que l 'on n 'arrive pas à faire

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et lui en conclut que des deux possibilités la série a

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et la série b ne sont pas satisfaisantes et donc que

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le temps n 'existe pas même si ce n 'est pas

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la conclusion de tous les philosophes mais en tout cas je trouve

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I would like to have more affinity for the time as a series B, as a relationship between events, because I represent the time as a block rather than a change,

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intuitively in any case.

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And yes, I see more the events temporal as a sort of indexico, which depend on the context of the pronunciation.

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which means that I don't think that the events are a property, the property of being present at a moment or that it is a particular state.

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It's a bit like if I said here we are at Paris, here it doesn't describe anything Paris, it's more a description of an enunciation here I am at Paris,

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so here it becomes something very contextual.

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And I feel like it's a bit the same thing for present, past, future, it's something very contextual contextuelles,

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descriptives, donc j 'aurais plus tendance à relier les événements entre eux en tant qu 'antériorité, postériorité, ce genre de choses.

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Et sinon, à part en justifiant le temps, le présent comme une sorte de fait brut qui nous apparaît subjectivement et

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qui serait une donnée dont on ne doit pas justifier l 'existence, j 'ai un peu du mal à voir comment on défend la série A, mais il faudrait que je me penche sur tous ces débats série A,

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série B que je ne connais pas assez.

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Mais en tout cas, ça m 'a donné envie de creuser la question.

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Now I'm going to pass to another argument that I've been liked, which is the question of Moore's open question, which is to say what is the good.

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If you ask this question to someone, he will have to define what is the good, and he will give a characteristic in saying,

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for example, the good is the absence of suffering, or the good is the pleasure, or the good is what God says to do.

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So he will give more explanation natural or divine explanation.

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But in all cases Moore often says that these explanations are not satisfied.

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He will take the example of a definition in other domains.

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If we take the example of a celibate

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and we define the fact of celibate by being a person in age of marriage who is not married

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or in age of marriage and who is not married.

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In this case, if we ask the question is it a célibataire is in a couple?

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This question has no sense, because there is a contradiction in the question.

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Although, he says that if we take the good, that we define the good as,

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for example, the pleasure, and then we ask the question in saying is it an absence of pleasure can still be good?

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There is a question in this style.

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The question is not absurd, the question is not contradictive.

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De même si on définit le bien comme ce que Dieu commande, si on dit est -ce que ce que Dieu commande est vraiment bien,

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la question ne semble pas non plus contradictoire.

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Et c 'est de là dont il part, c 'est vraiment cette notion de contradiction dans la présentation même de la question.

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Si véritablement le bien pouvait être défini par cette caractéristique, alors la question en elle -même nous semblerait étrange, incongrue, or ce n 'est pas le cas.

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So what I think about this argument?

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When I read it, I had well appreciated the structure of the argument, which is very simple.

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But it's true that we can quickly come back to the notion like the present of Frégue, between the distinction between sense and reference,

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the fact that two notions can have the same reference without having the same sense, which reduces the contradiction that we observe in this argument.

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For example, the very famous example in philosophy, it's Venus, this planet, which is maybe described as the morning, the morning, the evening, the evening, so two senses different, but they refer to the same planet.

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So there we could say that it's the same thing regarding the association between the good and the pleasure, for example.

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We could say that the two refer to the same notion, but that their sense is different,

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which means if we ask if something which makes the pleasure is really good, it would not be absurd, because the two are not synonyms,

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just they refer to the same thing, but maybe there are some differences between the sense.

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of the same we could also think about differences between levels

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for example it is not necessarily absurdity before a certain stage of knowledge scientific to ask

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if the water is well H2O because it is two different levels of description

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so there we could say the same thing also for the pleasure

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and the good we could say that the well and the pleasure are two different levels of description

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so we could really ask if the two agree or if the two don't agree So here are some answers, some answers that I found.

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I'm going to take another argument that I like, which is the argument of why the abortion is immoral of Don Marquis.

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It's an argument in more than an interesting because I use it often in the debates about the veganism or veganism, but which is also an argument that is also valuable in this area.

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And it has a tendency to put in the opportunity of the future being who will live in the human being.

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Because when we abort, for example, from a fetus or a baby in the heart, even if we do it without any suffering, even if the cognition of the baby is not yet very developed or whatever,

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we prive the future moments of joy, future projects, future amours, which we would have to live.

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And the argument is to say that if we kill someone, an adult, imagine, that we kill him without suffering, without he not realizing anything.

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At this moment, the argument to justify the immorality of a adult is to say that you will be deprived of his future moments, of his future events of life.

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And so the idea is to take this argument and apply it to the foetus.

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And so what's quite amusing in this argument is

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that I already used it in the debates on the vegetarian and vegan in saying that even if we eat animal, even if we take all the precautions of the world for him to suffer,

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it's depriving a future value of his future experiences and at the same time that if we kill a human, even if we do it properly,

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it will be a future experience of life.

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But I never had the same link with the case of the avortment, where in fact this argument is also valid.

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After the problem is that there is to find a limit, because at this moment, is it that when the ovule and spermatozoid are already found,

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there is already a process which is launched, which means that even if we are avorting at this moment, or even if we take the pill the end of the day, or that it means that we stop the future experience,

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that the baby could live or that the human could live.

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The problem is to find a limit from which this reasoning is worth.

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Because, like, we could say that if we don't sleep with our husband, we prive a human being of his future events.

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It's to find a limit that is quite difficult to determine.

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And then I imagine that some authors might think that even if this argument is valid or interesting, there are other arguments that could prevail,

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like for example the experience of the violinist which is quite common to say that if a person is, for example, if a violinist is on point of dying

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and you have to greffer your body

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and you are obligated to stay colled to this violinist for 9 months on a hospital

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because you can't really move like you want or do what you want, well, is that you accept this mission or is that you don't accept it?

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So there is this debate and some think it's legitimate to say

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that no we we don't have to have this charge associated and dependent on our own body.

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So there are other arguments that can be a little bit of contradiction with the argument that I presented here.

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I would also have to put the importance of the conscience in the game, to say that yes, I think this argument is worth once an individual is aware of it,

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but it's quite hard to define in a fetus or a baby at which moment the fetus becomes aware of it.

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It's complex.

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What is the argument that I like about?

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One other argument that I like is the argument of the passive and active.

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I like all the arguments in relation to some issues a bit glauque, but at least it's really concrete.

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So it's an argument that was proposed by Red Shows, which means that in our contemporary societies, we really do a distinction between the active,

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which is rarely authorized in most countries, and the passive, where we let the person die in arrêtant les soins et en l 'endormant.

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Sauf que cet auteur dit que pour lui il n 'y

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a pas de différence morale entre les deux puisqu 'il va

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proposer une expérience de pensée où dans les deux cas il

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y a une personne donc dans un cas on va appeler cette personne James et dans l 'autre cas John.

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Donc dans le premier cas James imaginons qu 'il a un

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petit cousin qui lui fait concurrence pour un énorme héritage et

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James a vraiment envie d 'obtenir cet héritage donc il va rentrer in the bathroom of his cousin.

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His cousin is in the kitchen and he will noyer his cousin in maintaining his head in the kitchen.

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Then he will allow him to obtain the heritage.

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Then there is the second person named Jones.

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Jones has exactly the same mental, exactly the same intentions, he would really have the heritage and he also wants to kill his cousin.

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He enters the bathroom and when Jones When James comes in the bathroom, his little cousin is already in the bathroom.

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So, James would be ready to let him know, but he is already in the bathroom.

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He will finally just look at his little cousin to let him know, and just wait for him to die.

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So, in the two cases, the result is the same.

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The little cousin is the same, the intentions were the same, the social context was the same

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but just in one case James has killed his cousin by

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himself in the other case Jones has assisted his death and not aid him.

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And so the author has tended to say

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that the two cases are more than moral than condemn

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because there is one case where we let him die and the other case where we kill him.

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But in the two cases the person is dead and in the second case we don't aid him.

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So he does the link with the euthanasia active and passive.

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For him, we have the same moral responsibility to make the person alive alive

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that to let the person alive in arranging the vital needs for this person.

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That's a little bit of the experience of thought and the euthanasia that I found quite interesting.

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And I will finish this video with the argument of knowledge, which is a very famous argument, but what I like about it is also the response to this argument of knowledge.

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So this argument was proposed by Jackson, and it is to say that, imagine.. that a person who is neuroscientific

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and who has a lot of knowledge on the vision and the colors is named Marie.

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So it is a great researche who knows everything about the vision and the colors.

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And on gives Marie, who is in a piece in black and white, all the information of the world on the red,

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on her longitude, on what it does in terms of neurochimia, on her impressions.

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On her describes everything that is possible to describe in transmitting this knowledge.

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So Marie will study very abondamment this subject

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and one day she will go out of this piece and see for the first time the rouge.

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And the question of Jackson is to say is -ce

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that Marie is learning something when she sees for the first time the rouge.

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And what I like about this argument of the knowledge is that it pushes us to clarify our definition of knowledge.

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Is it for us the knowledge is the appreciation of abstract concepts like for example the rouge

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or is it that we include the effect that it does

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so to say what is

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that the rouge in terms of phenomena phenomena I would rather

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have a appreciate the first option it is to say

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that I consider that she already knew the rouge in terms of concept

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but she just had a new representation of the rouge

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but everyone has not the same opinion and I think

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that depends also of our perception of cognitive science of what is a representation is that the sensorialité, la phénoménalité fait partie du concept lui -même ou est -ce

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que c 'est juste une modalité de représentation du concept donc

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c 'est assez intéressant parce que ça permet de clarifier toutes ces notions.

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Et donc voilà cette vidéo touche à sa fin, j 'espère qu 'elle vous aura plu, j 'espère que la petite liste des arguments aura été facilement

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compréhensible et que vous pourrez peut -être réfléchir ou approfondir sur ces arguments là.

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En tout cas je vous conseille vraiment le livre que that I described in the beginning of the video, Just the Arguments, because I think it's a very very good book both for the novices

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and for the people who already know better to clarify their thoughts.

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I'll see you in a future video, and see you soon!

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Cos'è la tecnica dello Shadowing?

Shadowing è una tecnica di apprendimento delle lingue supportata da studi scientifici, originariamente sviluppata per la formazione dei traduttori professionisti e resa popolare dal poliglotta Dr. Alexander Arguelles. Il metodo è semplice ma potente: ascolti un audio in inglese di madrelingua e lo ripeti immediatamente ad alta voce — come un'ombra che segue il parlante con un ritardo di solo 1–2 secondi. A differenza dell'ascolto passivo o degli esercizi di grammatica, lo shadowing costringe il tuo cervello e i muscoli della bocca a elaborare e riprodurre simultaneamente i modelli di discorso reale. La ricerca dimostra che migliora significativamente la precisione della pronuncia, l'intonazione, il ritmo, il discorso connesso, la comprensione dell'ascolto e la fluidità del parlato — rendendolo uno dei metodi più efficaci per la preparazione alla prova di speaking dell'IELTS e per la comunicazione reale in inglese.

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